Managing Epistemic Uncertainties in the Underlying Models of Safety Assessment for Safety-Critical Systems by Leong, Chris Wai Kiat
  
Managing Epistemic Uncertainties in the 
Underlying Models of Safety Assessment for 
Safety-Critical Systems 
 
 
Chris Wai Kiat Leong 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
University of York 
Computer Science 
 
 
 
Jun 2018
  
  
3 
Abstract 
When conducting safety assessment for safety-critical systems, epistemic uncertainty is an 
ever-present challenge when reasoning about the safety concerns and causal relationships 
related to hazards. Uncertainty around this causation thus needs to be managed well. 
Unfortunately, existing safety assessment tends to ignore unknown uncertainties, and 
stakeholders rarely track known uncertainties well through the system lifecycle.  
In this thesis, an approach is described for managing epistemic uncertainties about the system 
and safety causal models that are applied in a safety assessment. First, the principles that define 
the requirements for the approach are introduced. Next, these principles are used to construct 
three distinct steps that constitute an approach to manage such uncertainties. These three steps 
involve identifying, documenting and tracking the uncertainties throughout the system 
lifecycle so as to enable intervention to address the uncertainties.  
The approach is evaluated by integrating it with two existing safety assessment techniques, 
one using models from a system viewpoint and the other with models from a component 
viewpoint. This approach is also evaluated through peer reviews, semi-structured interviews 
with practitioners, and by review against requirements derived from the principles. Based on 
the evaluation results, it is plausible that our approach can provide a feasible and systematic 
way to manage epistemic uncertainties in safety assessment for safety-critical systems. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 The Danger of Uncertainties in Safety Assessment 
Safety assessment throughout the lifecycle for large-scale safety-critical system can be 
complicated. It involves multiple areas of expertise, resources and time to make informed 
decisions about the safety of the system not only for one safety assessment but multiple 
assessments throughout the system lifecycle. The knowledge that is needed to make a 
confident analysis depends on the quality of information available during the safety assessment 
and often depends on analyses conducted in previous safety assessments. In practice, there is 
a risk that safety analysts may make unsafe decisions when there is uncertainty about the 
information used during the safety assessment. The worst scenario could be a misplaced sense 
of confidence that the information available adequately represents the real world where the 
system is operating, which may lead to an unsafe situation during system development and 
operation. Unfortunately, such a misplaced sense of confidence has resulted in many 
catastrophic accidents and incidents as shown in the following examples. 
 CHALLENGER Space Shuttle Explosion 
On 28 January 1986, the space shuttle CHALLENGER exploded 73 seconds after launch and 
killed all seven crew members. The cause of the explosion was the technical failure of the 
primary and secondary rubber seals (known as O-rings) at the solid rocket boosters to prevent 
hot propellant gases from escaping the boosters to other parts of the shuttle, such as the external 
fuel tanks. The temperature was so cold that the O-ring was not able to perform its role of 
sealing the joints. This O-ring breakthrough caused the catastrophic explosion that lead to the 
disaster. 
In her research on the CHALLENGER space shuttle accident [1], the sociologist Diane 
Vaughan surfaces multiple problems that could be contributing to the misfit, such as the 
overconfident belief in the assumed safety of the shuttle launch through the years (she called 
this ‘normalised of deviance”), cultural and social context during the multiple meetings and 
reviews prior to the launch that discourage candid interactions, as well as the lack of complete 
information to make a safe decision to avoid the accident. In our research, we are concerned 
with the last problem - the lack of sufficient information on the performance of the O-ring that 
affect the subsequent decision made on the launch of the space shuttle.  
The hazard we are concerned with is the O-ring breakthrough and the uncertainty is with the 
analysis of the O-ring performance specifically at low temperature. In her research, Diane 
wrote that while safety analysts had plotted the performance of the O-ring at high temperature 
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based on field data of previous launchers, they did not have data for low temperature as there 
were no launching done at low temperature before. Hence, there was some data but insufficient 
to provide conclusive evaluation if the O-ring can still perform safely at low temperature. 
There was uncertainty about the safety assessment by the analysts and this affected the 
assessment on the actual day of the launch. As stated by Diane, on the day of the launch, the 
surface temperature fell to 80-degree Fahrenheit before the launch, but this was not measured 
and reported since it was not a launch criterion.  
The lack of uncertainty monitoring was also sharply pointed out by American physicist, 
Richard Feynman, who was an appointed member of the Rogers Commission to investigate 
the cause of the CHALLENGER disaster. During the commission hearing, Feynman [2] 
reported that “the fact that this danger did not lead to a catastrophe before is no guarantee 
that it will not the next time, unless it is completely understood. When playing Russian roulette 
the fact that the first shot got off safely is little comfort for the next”. He was implying that 
uncertainty about the O-ring performance in low temperature was not handled properly.  
For the CHALLENGER space shuttle accident, this uncertainty about the low temperature 
performance of the O-ring was not tracked and highlighted timely to the higher management. 
The potential danger of the O-ring not able to seal at lower temperature was not raised as a 
critical issue. Instead, it became what Diane stated as “routine, mixed and weak signal” that 
the management eventually conclude as not important enough to terminate the launch. The 
management had missed a good chance to arrest the danger of launching at low temperature 
so as to prevent the accident.  
In conclusion, we believe that while uncertainty about safety assessment may not directly 
cause an accident, proactive monitoring of such uncertainty could raise awareness to other 
issues that may prevent a hazard from becoming an accident. Our research wants to focus on 
monitoring such uncertainty systematically so as to increase the confidence in safety 
assessment. 
 PIPER ALPHA Disaster 
In the PIPER ALPHA disaster on the evening of 6 July 1988, 165 lives out of the 226 people 
were lost on board the offshore oil platform. According to the Lord Cullen’s public inquiry 
[3], several factors have been identified that could have contributed to the disaster. Some of 
the major factors include: 
• Job pressure to complete the task leading to deviation from procedure and poor shift 
handover, 
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• Lack of communication among the workers to avoid the faulty pump, 
• Poor documentation of the job completed and outstanding, 
• Legacy design on the oil platform that didn’t contain the fire after multiple explosions, 
and 
• Lack of emergency preparedness and training leading to wasted time during rescue. 
While Lord Cullen had the benefit of hindsight when he wrote the report, it was also discovered 
that many of these factors were known issues prior to the accident. For example, the legacy 
design of the oil platform was highlighted during a safety audit and it was concluded that more 
in-depth analysis needs to be conducted to assess the fire-fighting system at the production 
platforms where the fire brought out. From cost and risk perspectives, the analysis was not 
given priority based on the information available then and it was not followed up after the 
audit. Unfortunately, the analysis wasn’t conducted even until the disaster happened, and the 
failure of the fire-fighting system was one of the contributing factors for not localising and 
containing the fire within the production platforms. 
If the uncertainty associated with the safety assessment about the fire-fighting system within 
the production platform was flagged and managed with the right emphasis, it could have been 
tracked and followed up diligently through the system lifecycle. While this might not have 
guaranteed that the necessary analysis would have been conducted in time, it could at least 
have ensured that such plausible but uncertain concerns were not ignored before it was given 
a chance to be investigated. Such uncertainty might turn out to be safety-critical when more 
information is solicited after an initial safety assessment. 
 Safety Assessment in the RSAF 
In the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), we introduce new weapon systems regularly 
into our fighting forces, while continuing to maintain existing and legacy systems. Such new 
systems would go through a lifecycle similar to the MoD’s CADMID cycle [4]. Safety 
assessments have to be conducted at various milestones and the system needs to be assessed 
to be safe before the acquisition process can proceed. Uncertainty about such safety assessment 
can occur when the relevant information is either not available or insufficient.  
Scenarios where information is not available include: 
• contractor does not have equipment specification for the equipment that is to be 
provided by sub-contractors, 
• expertise not present during the safety assessment, and 
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• inability to predict the operation profiles owing to another system that is in the 
operating concept being yet to be developed. 
Scenarios where information is not sufficient include: 
• use of preliminary system design instead of the final one, 
• use of initial operating concept before the final concept is available further down the 
lifecycle, and 
• use of flight trial report that only consists of 3 flight profiles out of the desired 4, as 
the last flight profile was not conducted due to bad weather. 
While thankfully, there has been no major accident in the RSAF that is due to uncertainty from 
safety assessment, this concern continues to be one of the top watch areas as the airforce moves 
toward operating in safety critical system-of-systems environment. 
Moving forward, we will use running examples in this thesis that are based on uncertainties 
experienced while conducting safety assessments for new systems in the RSAF.  
 Implication of These Uncertainties 
All the examples above represent complicated safety-critical systems with established risk 
assessment and management programs. However, the examples show that uncertainties 
continued to exist even in safety-critical systems with established safety assessment programs. 
When not managed well, these hazards that have uncertainties can become catastrophic and 
result in the loss of lives and property. In a safety assessment, there could be uncertainties that 
would need more time to investigate. If the uncertainties are identified early, it could have 
been tracked and follow-up diligently throughout the system lifecycle. The danger is when 
uncertainty that turns out to be safety-critical (when more information is solicited) gets 
discarded before it is investigated. 
This thesis is concerned with the management of such uncertainties during safety assessment 
of complicated safety-critical systems. Since the danger of uncertainties in safety assessment 
is apparent, there is value to consider complementing existing safety assessment techniques 
with additional steps to better manage potentially safety-critical uncertainties. 
1.2 Risk, Confidence and Uncertainty in Safety Assessment 
Before discussing the management of uncertainty in safety assessment, it is important to 
differentiate the concept of risk and confidence in safety assessment. In safety assessment, risk 
and confidence can often be confused and mistaken to mean the same thing.  
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 Risk 
Traditionally, safety assessment has mostly been focused on risk, which is defined as a 
“combination of the severity of the mishap and the probability that the mishap will occur” [5]. 
It involves multiple activities such as hazard identification, risk analysis and risk management. 
Hazard identification involves discovering hazards that can potentially result in a mishap, risk 
analysis estimates the probability of occurrence and severity of a mishap and risk management 
proposes actions to reduce the risk associated with the hazards. 
Stakeholders would use the arguments and evidence from the risk analysis and risk 
management to claim that a system is reasonably safe despite the presence of potential hazards. 
A safety argument explains how the risks due to each hazard are either not safety-critical or 
that that the risk can be mitigated to an extent that the system is reasonably safe. For example, 
the proposition that the system is safe for flight because there has been a successful flight trial 
is part of a safety argument. A safety evidence provides the facts or information to support the 
truth of a claim or argument about the safety of a system. For example, the flight trial result is 
a piece of evidence to support that argument that a system is safe by doing a flight trial.  
Risk assessment is a fundamental activity in safety assessment for stakeholders to determine 
hazards and suitable measures to adequately address these hazards. There are many established 
principles and processes to conduct risk assessment in existing safety assessment techniques. 
For example, the “as low as reasonably possible” (ALARP) principle [6] is adopted in the U.K. 
to help stakeholders justify that risk has been reduced to a point whereby “the cost involved in 
reducing the risk further would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit”. There are also 
many established techniques to identify hazards such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [7]. Stakeholders can also make use of a risk 
assessment matrix to analyse the probability and severity of a mishap. There are also many 
hazard logging tools and hazard tracking systems available for stakeholders to manage the 
hazards throughout the system lifecycle.  
 Confidence 
To derive greater assurance in a safety assessment, it is important to focus on both risk and 
confidence during the analysis. This is echoed by Jelen [8], who states that there is a need to 
focus on getting sufficient confidence that one is satisfied with the safety assessment, besides 
focusing on only the assessment itself. If risk is used to quantify the extent that the system is 
safe during a safety assessment, then confidence measures the trust that one has on the safety 
assessment. For example, supporting a similar argument, the Federal Aviation Administration 
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in the U.S.A. establishes a need for its Safety Management System to “systematically provide 
confidence that organizational outputs meet or exceed safety requirements” [9].  
It is not easy to measure and analyse confidence as it is often implicit during safety assessment, 
rather than explicitly discussed and documented. Furthermore, there is often a lack of 
distinction between risk and confidence in a safety assessment. For example, a safety analyst 
may assess that a system is less risky because the safety assessment has been conducted by an 
experienced and reputable individual. However, being experienced and reputable should only 
increase the confidence in the evidence provided. It is the findings from the safety assessment 
that should determine the level of risk associated with a system.      
Such lack of distinction between risk and confidence can make it difficult to spot 
incompleteness and imperfection when justifying the level of risk and the level of confidence 
in a safety assessment. Since risk is often the key focus, there is a danger that important 
considerations that affect confidence get ignored or discarded because of large volume of risk 
arguments and evidence presence in the assessment. 
 Uncertainty 
In safety assessment, the greater the uncertainties, the less confidence we have with the results 
of the assessment. Uncertainty can broadly be classified as aleatory or epistemic [10]. Aleatory 
uncertainty is about randomness (e.g. the outcome of throwing a dice); epistemic uncertainty 
is due to a lack of knowledge (e.g. lack of details in the initial design document). In this 
research, the focus is on the management of epistemic uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty can 
be due to things we know we do not know (known uncertainties), or things we do not know 
we do not know (unknown uncertainties) [11]. In practice, safety analysts never completely 
know if they have all the information about the system and its environment when modelling 
them during safety assessment. Hence, both known and unknown epistemic uncertainties are 
unavoidable. 
“When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human 
environment in an environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant 
information or scientific uncertainty, the agency shall always make clear that such 
information is lacking or that uncertainty exists.” 
Extract from "Policy Issues Related to Worst Case Risk Analyses and the Establishment of 
Acceptable Standards of De Minimis Risk", Miller B. Spangler, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission” - 
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The above extract from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission illustrates the importance of 
acknowledging and managing uncertainty when evaluating adverse effects on the human 
environment. In a separate study on the role of interdisciplinary analysis on technical risk 
assessment, Spangler [12] similarly highlights the demand for knowledge - “It is quite obvious 
that the assessment of such a wide diversity of beneficial and adverse consequences involves 
knowledge and scientific methods from a large number of scientific disciplines” and the need 
to focus on managing uncertainty when our scientific knowledge is limited - “The greater the 
limitations of science, for whatever reasons, to provide reliable answers, the greater is the 
need for wisdom to carry the burdens of analysis and translate the resulting balance of 
knowledge, judgment, and uncertainty into a meaningful form for decision-making”.  
In safety assessment, such adverse effects are measured in terms of technical safety risk. 
Similarly, we are concerned with uncertainty associated with such technical risk assessment, 
which we name it as ra-uncertainty for short in this thesis. And the specific ra-uncertainty that 
we are focusing on is the uncertainty associated with models that are used to predict safety 
risk, which we name it as risk assessment model uncertainty, or ram-uncertainty for short. 
For this section, we address the association between such ram-uncertainty and safety risk. 
First, we explain how ram-uncertainty is considered in relation with safety risk. Next, we 
contrast our understanding of ram-uncertainty and safety risk against another researcher that 
also uses the terms uncertainty and risk.  
 
 
 
The relationships between ram-uncertainty and safety risk are summarised in Figure 1. From 
the diagram, we can make three major observations: 
• The figure shows that in safety assessment we gather together relevant models of the 
system, from which we can derive a safety causal model (e.g. a model that establishes 
the causal relationships that exist between faults, failures, hazards and accidents). This 
causal model (which we will describe in detail under section 3.3.2) provides us with 
the basic information from which we attempt to predict the safety risk associated with 
those hazards (from an understanding of the causes and consequences of the hazards).  
Figure 1. Association between ram-Uncertainty and Safety Risk  
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• Whilst this is a well-understood concept of safety assessment, in this thesis we 
explicitly recognise that it involves inherent uncertainties. Firstly, there can be 
uncertainties associated with the underlying system models (e.g. do they accurately 
and sufficiently capture all the relevant design dependencies and 
influences?).  Secondly, both the uncertainty associated with these ‘source’ models, 
and the subjectivity present in the creation of the safety causal models (e.g. the 
subjectivity of scoping assumptions used in hazard identification) inevitably leads to 
uncertainty in the safety causal models that are established. This uncertainty is the 
ram-uncertainty we defined at the start of the section.  
• As a result of such ram-uncertainty, safety analysts will be less confident of the safety 
risk that has been predicted from the safety causal model. In order words, the ram-
uncertainty reduces the assurance in this area.   
The relationships between system models and safety causal models, as well as with the ram-
uncertainty, are described in detail under section 3.3.1.  
For example, in the CHALLENGER space shuttle accident, the safety analysts needed to 
predict the safety risk of having a blow-through of the O-ring (i.e. the safety risk of causing 
damage or life lost if the blow-through happen). The associated question about the knowledge 
they have related to the blow-through (e.g. accuracy of the rocket booster model and the 
significance of temperature on the behaviour of the O-rings) would determine the ram-
uncertainty associated with the safety risk. In this accident, those making the decision were 
clearly aware of the blow-through safety risk, but due to the lack of knowledge (i.e. 
uncertainty) underestimated this safety risk.  
Of course, it is true that the safety causal models that are constructed in safety assessment 
often attempt to consider the aleatoric uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty related to quantifiable 
randomness) that is associated with real-world events through a probabilistic treatment. For 
example, models (such as from operational experience) can be used to predict failure rates 
associated with physical failure events, which in turn can lead to probabilistic estimates of 
consequential outcomes. However, this is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, we are concerned 
with the epistemic uncertainty (i.e. relating to knowledge) associated with the risk assessment 
models (ram-uncertainty) we have created, the potential impact that such ram-uncertainty may 
have on decisions based on such models, and the necessity of identifying, documenting and 
tracking this ram-uncertainty. 
For comparison, we look at how Knight [13], a researcher from the economic domain, 
associate uncertainty with risk (which we shall call economic risk). In his seminal work on 
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“Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”, Knight differentiates economic risk and uncertainty by the 
presence or absence of knowledge regarding the possible outcomes to a given situation, such 
that one can accurately measure the probability of an outcome in a quantitative manner. When 
all possible outcomes and their associated probabilities of occurrence are known, Knight 
considers it as a situation where economic risk can be assigned and the odds calculated with a 
probabilistic treatment. In safety assessment, this is akin to treating a real-world event with 
aleatory uncertainty such as calculating the probability of an outcome when rolling a dice. As 
for the term - uncertainty, Knight uses it to describe the opposite situation whereby one is 
unable to know everything needed in order to calculate the odds. Knight believes that 
economic risk cannot be assessed in such situation since it will involve subjective judgement 
rather than using probability. We summarise Knight’s and our understanding of risk and 
uncertainty in Table 1.  
Table 1. Different Perspectives Regarding Risk and Uncertainty 
 
Type of risk we are 
predicting  
How is aleatory (random) 
uncertainty being treated?  
How is epistemic (knowledge) 
uncertainty being treated?  
Our 
Perspective 
Safety Risk, such as in 
aviation domain. 
Predicting safety risk 
from a set of chosen 
models that represent 
the real world, which 
are inherently 
uncertain. 
Use quantitative 
probabilistic treatment to 
calculate safety risk from 
models with aleatory 
uncertainty.  
(Example: predicting 
failure rate from statistics 
of physical failure events) 
Either (1) not being treated or (2) use 
assumption subjectively to scope the 
situation when predicting safety risk. 
(Example: with insufficient 
knowledge about a system design, 
either (1) ignore it or (2) make 
assumption such that the missing 
knowledge is not important when 
predicting system safety risk.) 
Knight’s 
Perspective 
Economic Risk, such 
as in insurance 
domain. Predicting 
economic risk using 
models that have 
perfect knowledge of 
all possible outcomes  
Use quantitative 
probabilistic treatment to 
calculate economic risk 
from models with aleatory 
uncertainty. (Example: 
predicting major illness 
occurrence rate from 
statistics of actual illness) 
Treat as uncertainty instead of as 
economic risk. (Example: insurance 
usually does not cover extreme sports 
as there are too many unknowns 
regarding the danger of such 
activities) 
When there is epistemic uncertainty, Knight chooses not to consider it as a situation suitable 
to predict the economic risk. This is perhaps plausible in the economic domain, such as when 
an insurance agency decides on the finite situations that it wants to insure (usually those with 
perfect knowledge as much as possible). This is not the same as predicting safety risk where a 
safety analyst does not have control over the level of knowledge available during the safety 
assessment and is typically being asked to make a priori predictions about future events. 
Furthermore, the ram-uncertainty we are concerned with is not determined by the amount of 
information that is (theoretically) knowable about a situation or a system. Instead, it depends 
on the actual knowledge that safety analysts have at the point of conducting the safety 
assessment.  
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For example, in 1995, eight Chinook helicopters were ordered by the UK MoD from Boeing 
but the MoD did not contractually purchase the required software source code in order to assess 
the safety risks that were needed to validate the airworthiness of the helicopters [14]. While 
this information is theoretically knowable (i.e. it could be provided by Boeing), it was not 
actually available to the safety analysts in the UK MoD. However, the lack of software source 
code did not cause the helicopter to be more unsafe. Instead, it created more uncertainty when 
predicting the safety risk, which affect the confidence in the safety assessment.   
To conclude, safety analysts often do not have perfect knowledge of the underlying models 
(system and safety causal models) that are used to predict safety risk. Hence, there will 
inherently be epistemic uncertainty. In our research, we are pragmatically concerned with what 
the safety analysts know (and do not know) at the point of predicting the safety risk. In other 
words, the focus is on the quality of the knowledge that the safety analysts have when assessing 
the safety risk.  
In our research, we consider two possible scenarios where uncertainties can be managed 
together with risk (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Scenarios to Consider both Risk and Uncertainty in Safety Assessment 
In scenario 1, while the assessed risk is tolerable, there may not be enough confidence in the 
risk analysis due to known uncertainties associated with the safety assessment. Hence, it is 
important to solicit more information about the uncertainties so that the system risk can be 
confidently accepted. For example, there could be an acceptance test result that shows a system 
is safe. However, the equipment used for the testing may not be certified and this reduces the 
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confidence in the analysis. Efforts may be needed to verify that the result generated from the 
test equipment can indeed be trusted.  
In scenario 2, the assessed risk may not even be tolerable due to either the presence of known 
uncertainties or the concern about uncertainties that the safety analysts are not even aware of 
(i.e. unknown uncertainties). Hence, there may be a need to solicit more information to 
discover plausible uncertainties that the safety analysts may not have considered before. For 
example, a system is expected to operate with another legacy system but there is insufficient 
information about the legacy system to make a comprehensive safety assessment. There could 
be uncertainties about how both systems are going to interoperate safely and efforts would be 
needed to identify and track these uncertainties until there is sufficient information.  
Uncertainties should not be managed retrospectively after the safety assessment as it may not 
be possible or efficient to solicit comments from the various stakeholders about the 
uncertainties associated with the assessment. Furthermore, the stakeholders involved in the 
safety assessment may have already forgotten their rationales for accepting or not accepting a 
condition based on its uncertainties. This is made worse as uncertainties during safety 
assessment are often not documented and there will be few records of such considerations after 
the safety assessment for any retrospective tracing. Hence, an uncertainty should be managed 
as soon as it is being discovered during a safety assessment. While this may sound trivial, it 
underlines the importance of tracking uncertainties in parallel with risk analysis. 
1.3 Research Strategy 
According to Kothari [15], in his book on research methodology, there are two basic 
approaches to research - quantitative or qualitative. In our research, we depend largely on 
soliciting qualitative concerns from safety analysts and subject matter experts to develop a 
practical proposal to support safety assessment. As described by Kothari, qualitative research 
focuses on ‘subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours’. Our qualitative 
research can be described as having two complementary loops (divergent and convergent) 
comprising four phases: observe, assemble, construct and evaluate. Such divergent-convergent 
framework is not new and supported by researchers, such as the work by Aviña et al [16]. In 
their research on ‘Engineering a better future’, Aviña et al emphasised that ‘interactive 
divergent (idea generation) and convergent (idea test and selection) thinking are the 
fundamental processes underlying research’. The outcomes and key activities for these four 
phases are elaborated in Table 2. The common factor that binds both loops is the hypothesis, 
which in our research becomes the thesis proposition (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Complementary Divergent and Convergent Loops in Our Research 
  
Table 2. The Four Phases under the Research Methodology 
Phase Outcomes Key Activities 
Observe Observations to frame the problem 
space 
Construct initial problem definition  
Conduct preliminary literature survey  
Interview stakeholders 
Assemble Ideas to scope the hypothesis Capture ideas on the gaps in safety assessment  
Capture ideas on the gaps in managing uncertainty 
Construct  Approach to implement the proposition Develop the steps, processes and models that support 
the approach  
Evaluate Feasibility and future growth for the 
approach 
Conduct qualitative feedback 
Conduct quantitative feedback 
Divergent Loop: Observe and Assemble.  As shown in Figure 3, the first iterative loop in our 
research is to observe the problem space and assemble possible focus areas, before we 
eventually hypothesise a thesis proposition. It is divergent in nature since the aim is to cast the 
considerations as wide as possible so as to appreciate the challenges facing safety analysts 
when they conduct safety assessments.  
• Observe.  The initial problem definition referenced the 2014 technical review from 
the Republic of Singapore Air Force. The review surfaced the need to develop 
expertise in managing safety assessment for air force systems that are highly 
integrated with each other. In parallel, we conducted literature surveys related to safety 
assessment and interviewed safety analysts to solicit feedback on the challenges they 
face. For example, during the interview, an air force safety analyst raised the concern 
that safety assessment is becoming more uncertain as it is getting more and more 
challenging to understand the complicated interactions between systems.  
• Assemble.  During the interview with the safety analysts, they were asked the question 
- ‘What are the common concerns you have when conducting safety assessment?’. 
Lack of knowledge or epistemic uncertainty has repeatedly been surfaced as one of 
the key concerns, as well as the lack of systematic approach to manage unknowns in 
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a networked environment. Hence, we have chosen the management of epistemic 
uncertainty in safety assessment as our key focus in this thesis. Through the session, 
we have also further clarified that the uncertainty we are concerned with is not the 
uncertainty due to the absence of safety techniques, but rather it is about the 
uncertainty when conducting safety assessment with different safety techniques. It 
involves ram-uncertainty associated with not only the safety causal model, but also 
the system models that produces the safety causal model (as explained in section 
1.2.3).  
Convergent Loop: Construct and Evaluate.  From the thesis proposition, we went into the 
second research loop (as shown in Figure 3) to construct our proposal by converging the 
observations into something useful and practical for the safety analysts. As we narrowed down 
on the area of uncertainty, we use the Kipling method [17] that advocates asking ourselves the 
5W1H questions (i.e. what, who, where, when, why, how) in the domain of information 
gathering,  to surface important questions we want to focus on. The ‘why’ portion has been 
answered earlier through the rationalisation on the importance of uncertainty management in 
chapter 1, while the ‘who’ and ‘when’ are tactical questions downstream during 
implementation of initiatives. Hence, three important questions (what, where and how) remain 
that are related to the management of uncertainty.  The methods used to tackle each question 
is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3. Research Methods to Tackle 'What', 'Where' and 'How' 
Questions and Research 
Methods 
Considerations 
WHAT aspects of the 
epistemic uncertainties do 
we want to manage? 
Research Methods: 
Literature survey 
Observations from 
qualitative interviews 
There are many aspects of epistemic uncertainty that we can focus on as 
described in detail under the literature survey in chapter 2. For example, under 
the research by Weick [18], he suggests to focus on the three areas of 
‘sensing’, ‘seizing’ and ‘transforming’. Another relevant research by Diana 
[19] looks at the areas of ‘monitoring’, ‘understanding’, ‘deciding how to 
respond’ and ‘producing a response’. After our brainstorming session and 
interview with safety analysts, we have decided to narrow down to the major 
areas of identify, document, track and address - which mirrors closely the 
focus areas from the work of Weick and Diana. This grouping is intentional so 
as to simplify the concept to promote acceptance during implementation. The 
details will be elaborated in chapter 3.2. 
WHERE do these epistemic 
uncertainties reside in safety 
assessment model? 
Research Methods:  
Modelling according to 
fundamental relationships 
and reference standards. 
We aim to develop a common representation to consider epistemic uncertainty 
during safety assessment by defining the underlying models of safety 
assessment. The focus is on the epistemic uncertainties that can reside in both 
the system models in the system domain and the safety causal model in the 
safety domain (see Figure 4); and represent it using standard modelling 
relationships like association, inheritance and aggregation. External references 
have also been made which include the IEEE 42010 standard for architectural 
description [20], the ‘Condition’ concept developed by Wilson [21] and the 
Coleman’s boat of causal pathway representation [22]. All these references 
help us to develop a way to represent epistemic uncertainty while 
complementing the current way of conducting safety assessment. The details 
will be elaborated in chapter 3.3. 
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HOW can we better manage 
the epistemic uncertainties 
as part of the system 
lifecycle? 
 
Research Methods:  
Literature survey       
Process development     
Goal Question Matrix 
(GQM) approach 
Refinement through case-
study  
The approach to manage epistemic uncertainties will take reference from the 
principles of identify, document, track and address. Different research methods 
are adopted for different principles.  
For identification, the focus is on doing literature survey to (1) solicit factors 
where uncertainty can reside and (2) how uncertainty can be categorised. In 
terms of documentation, track and address; there are two central research 
methods: process development and GQM approach.  
For documentation, the aim is to develop complementary processes to augment 
existing means of documentation during safety assessment (such as assumption 
documentation). During brainstorming, a concern was raised over the fear that 
the list of uncertainties being identified could be long. Hence, we need a 
systematic way of prioritising the list of identified uncertainties during 
documentation. As a result, the GQM approach [23] is adopted because it 
provides a structured way to develop factors to help in prioritisation.  
For track and address, similarly, we use both process refinement to 
complement existing processes of tracking safety related issues and the GQM 
approach to formulate questions for safety analysts to develop an action plan to 
conduct track and address of epistemic uncertainties. The details of how we 
propose to manage epistemic uncertainty will be elaborated in chapter 4. 
Further refinement to the approach is also carried out through case studies. 
These case studies are elaborated under chapter 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 4. Underlying Models of Safety Assessment* 
* The CMSS concerns the system domain, while the CRMSA is specifically focusing on the safety domain. We 
will use these two models to recognise critical relationships in safety assessment where epistemic uncertainties may 
reside. The details of both models are captured in chapter 3.3.  
Finally, we evaluate our proposal based on the thesis proposition to validate its feasibility to 
support safety assessment. The evaluation is based on two core activities of verification and 
validation. These two areas are proposed by the ISO 9001:2015 standard that is used to guide 
the evaluation if a product or service has met specify requirements. During the assessment, a 
semi-structured interview is chosen as the interview is very specific to a small pool of safety 
analysts. Hence, a set of open-ended questions, with a one-to-one interview, provides the 
flexibility to solicit qualitative feedback on the thesis proposal. Compared to a fixed set of 
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questions, valuable feedback can be missing without a more in-depth discussion while 
conducting the questionnaire.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: First, in the next section, we will state the 
hypothesis that is translated into the thesis proposition and explain the key terms in the 
proposition. In the following chapters of this thesis, we will describe the literature survey 
(chapter 2), theory (chapter 3), approach (chapter 4) and application (chapter 5 and 6) that are 
integral in constructing the eventual proposal. The final evaluation based on the thesis 
proposition is presented in chapter 7. 
1.4 Thesis Proposition 
Having considered the danger of uncertainties in section 1.1 and the relationships between risk 
and uncertainty in section 1.2, the thesis proposition is defined as follows: 
Epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessments for safety-
critical systems can be feasibly and systematically identified, documented and 
tracked through-life in order to enable intervention to address potential risk. 
The following terms from the above proposition are worthy of explanation: 
• Epistemic uncertainties – Uncertainties that are due to a lack of knowledge 
• Underlying models – Representations of the real world for the purpose of analysis   
• Feasibly – Able to apply the results within the context of existing industrial practice 
• Systematically – Methodically, according to principles and concepts 
• Identify – Establish or indicate what something is  
• Document – Provide information or evidence that can be recorded for traceability 
• Track – Follow the movement or development of something 
• Through-life – From conceptual design to operation, to the end of life 
• Address – Begin to deal with an issue 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 surveys the literature that are relevant to this research, especially two important 
concepts that serve as important background knowledge: uncertainty and safety. Whilst there 
is various literature in each of these separate domains, the aim is also to find out the extent that 
uncertainty is being surfaced and managed in safety assessment (i.e. dealing concurrently with 
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both domains of uncertainty and safety). The survey also focuses on the modelling of safety-
critical system, which is the type of system that this research will be concerned with. 
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical foundation to manage epistemic uncertainties in safety 
assessment after soliciting the knowledge and observations from the literature survey. It 
answers two questions: 1) “WHAT aspects of the epistemic uncertainties do we want to 
manage?” and 2) “WHERE do these epistemic uncertainties reside in safety assessment 
models?”. To answer the first question – “WHAT”, this chapter defines the aspects that are 
important to focus on in managing epistemic uncertainties by stating three principles that guide 
the development of the eventual approach: identify, document, track and address. The reasons 
that these principles are important are also presented. To answer the second question – 
“WHERE”, two underlying models are constructed to describe the locations where epistemic 
uncertainties can reside in system and safety causal models. We use the uncertainties 
experienced while conducting safety assessments for new systems in the RSAF as a running 
example in this chapter, as well as subsequent ones.   
Chapter 4 provides an approach to manage epistemic uncertainties in safety assessment based 
on three desired considerations: comprehensive, effective and feasible. The approach 
comprises three steps that are guided by the three principles mentioned earlier in chapter 3. In 
the first step, to help identify uncertainty, a taxonomy of causal mechanisms is consolidated 
to recognise known and unknown uncertainties not covered in the original safety assessment. 
In the second step, to help document uncertainty, process and factors to prioritise epistemic 
uncertainties analyses are developed to document such uncertainties in existing safety 
assessment techniques. In the final step, to help track and address uncertainty, a method to 
develop actionable goals is introduced to manage epistemic uncertainties that can be tracked 
through-life and addressed when some thresholds are met. 
Chapter 5 describes the application of the approach from chapter 4 on existing safety 
assessment techniques. To cover a broad range of safety assessment techniques, the evaluation 
will focus on safety assessments conducted from both system and component viewpoints. In 
this chapter, the focus is on safety assessments from system viewpoint. The approach to 
manage epistemic uncertainties is integrated with the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) hazard analysis technique. This is based on the STPA analysis on the Yongwen 
railway system by Song et al [24].  
Chapter 6 describes the application of the approach from chapter 4 on existing safety 
assessment techniques conducted from a component viewpoint. The approach to manage 
epistemic uncertainties is integrated with the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes 
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and Effects Analysis (FMEA) techniques. This is based on the aircraft design example in ARP 
4761 [7]. Unlike the system viewpoint that consider broader system issues such as technology 
and processes, component viewpoints can often create models that are more targeted such as 
an electrical circuit diagram or physical design specifications. The challenge is to be aware of 
the scope and limitations of each model, as well as appreciate the relationships between models 
that potentially can affect each other and become safety critical.  
Chapter 7 evaluates the approach proposed in the thesis against the requirements given in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It then evaluates the approach against the original thesis proposition given 
in Chapter 1. To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiencies of the proposed approach, peer 
reviews during sharing at conferences and semi-structured interviews have been conducted. 
Feedback from preliminary adaptation of the approach in the industry has also been solicited.  
Chapter 8 concludes the research presented in this thesis and states the direction of possible 
future work. 
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Chapter 2 – Survey of Related Literature 
The danger of uncertainties in safety assessments has been mentioned in chapter 1 with 
examples from the RSAF, CHALLENGER and PIPER ALPHA case studies. It is thus 
important to focus on how we can better manage such uncertainties when conducting safety 
assessments on safety-critical systems. To do that, three domains are identified in this literature 
survey: uncertainty management, safety management and modelling of safety-critical systems 
(see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Three Focus Areas in Literature Survey 
Our survey has focused on the current developments and challenges related to these three 
domains. While our research focuses on uncertainty management in safety, there are useful 
literature related to our research in uncertainty management from other domains. We have 
therefore complemented our understanding by drawing upon definitions and concepts in other 
domains. In this aspect, we have widened the scope of this chapter by examining the literature 
on how other domains (e.g. economic, sociology) manage uncertainties. To begin with, we 
research into how uncertainty is being classified and managed currently (see section 2.1) and 
then we narrow our reviews on concepts related to safety management (see section 2.2). 
Finally, we survey the ways that safety-critical systems are currently being modelled (see 
section 2.3), keeping in mind the observations from the research on uncertainty and safety 
management. 
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 Concepts in Uncertainty Management 
The study of uncertainty is common in many domains, besides just safety assessment, as it 
occurs whenever we do not know something. While we acknowledge the presence of 
uncertainty, there isn’t a common standard or approach to classify or treat uncertainty. For 
example, this is echoed by Walker [25] in his research into policymaking situation or scientific 
decision support. He states that while the existence of uncertainties is generally acknowledged, 
there is little focus on the “different dimensions of uncertainty” and “different characteristics, 
relative magnitudes, and available means of dealing with them”. This section will provide an 
overview of the current classifications and treatments of uncertainty as a background for our 
research. 
Before we embark on our research to manage the lack of knowledge, it is important to clarify 
the differences between the meaning of data, information and knowledge as used in this thesis. 
We based our definition closely to that provided by Jashapara [26] as follows (see Table 4): 
Table 4. Comparison between Data, Information and Knowledge [26] 
Type Definition  Example 
Data known facts or things used 
as a basis of inference 
(1) Physical observations from flight test 
(2) System behaviour at different temperature steps 
Information  systematically organised 
data  
(1) Flight test report that collates data from the flight test 
(2) System specification that states the temperature range for 
normal operation  
Knowledge  actionable information  (1) Flight readiness review that uses information from the flight 
test report to identify hazards  
(2) System operating manual that uses system temperature 
specification to determine the cooling requirement for different 
operating scenario  
In safety assessment, safety analysts have to make decisions both with the presence and 
absence of knowledge, which is actionable information being used in the context of the system 
being investigated. While our research focuses on the management of knowledge, it is also 
important to consider the impact when there is a lack of either data or information since both 
can affect the quality of the knowledge. Besides focusing on knowledge that we have, we also 
want to develop an approach that focuses on managing knowledge that we do not have (i.e. an 
identified epistemic uncertainty) during a safety assessment. 
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When relevant information about a system is not accessible to the safety analysts, they would 
run the danger of lacking system knowledge necessary to predict safety risk. For example, in 
his research on the NIMROD aircraft accident in September 2006 [27], Dogan highlighted 
many instances whereby there were safety documents (e.g. inspection and failure reports) 
available as information, which were not converted to practical knowledge as this information 
was either not sought out, inaccessible, or “stored in places or database which are not readily 
accessible to those on Front Line”. Unfortunately, the right information wasn’t provided to 
the right people at the right time to make the safety assessment more robust to prevent the 
accident. 
 Classifications of Uncertainty 
In this session, we will highlight two common ways that uncertainty is being classified. The 
first is about the “aleatory vs epistemic” divide, while the second focuses on the differences 
between known and unknown uncertainties.   
2.1.1.1. Aleatory versus Epistemic 
Within the context of scientific computing, Roy and Oberkampf [28] classifies uncertainty 
into either aleatory or epistemic. He clarifies that aleatory is “the inherent variation in a 
quantity that, given sufficient samples of the stochastic process, can be characterized via a 
probability density distribution”, while epistemic is the “uncertainty due to lack of knowledge 
by the modelers, analysts conducting the analysis, or experimentalists involved in validation”.  
For Roy’s research in scientific computing, he mentions many sources of uncertainty such as 
“model inputs, the form of the model, and poorly characterized numerical approximation 
errors”. Such sources of uncertainty can either be aleatory, epistemic, or a mixture of both. 
Specifically, for epistemic uncertainty, Roy adds that the lack of knowledge can occur in 
various aspects such as lack of information about the system or its environment, during 
simulations or when collecting data to verify or validate the system through experiment.  
Kiureghian [29] also classifies uncertainty as either aleatory or epistemic. He explains that the 
word aleatory is derived from the Latin word, alea, which refers to the “rolling of dice”. 
Following this argument, Kiureghian states that aleatory uncertainty refers to uncertainty that 
is due to the random nature of the subject of interest. On the other hand, the word epistemic is 
derived from the Greek word, epistēmē, which refers to “knowledge”. That’s why epistemic 
uncertainty is uncertainty that is the result of a lack of knowledge. 
Kiureghian cautions that it may not always be easy to distinguish between these two types of 
uncertainty. In his research, he mentions the challenges to distinguish between both types of 
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uncertainty by mentioning that “attempts to get a hold of the two concepts to make indisputable 
and unambiguous definitions seem to slip between the fingers”. He further explains that it can 
be difficult to distinguish both types of uncertainties when modelling a system as it depends 
on the knowledge and experience of these who built the system model.   
In summary, aleatory uncertainty refers to the inherent randomness in a system. According to 
Skinner et al [30], this form of uncertainty “cannot be reduced, although additional research 
may help to better understand the complexities of the system of interest”. Epistemic 
uncertainty refers to the imperfection of knowledge associated with a system. To Skinner et 
al, epistemic uncertainty may be “quantified, reduced, and possibly eliminated, depending on 
the specific situation”.  
Observations.  In our research, we would assume the common definitions that aleatory 
uncertainty refers to the inherent randomness in the system of interest, whereas epistemic 
uncertainty is about the lack of knowledge at the point of analysis. As mentioned in chapter 1, 
we believe that it is possible to better manage risk during safety assessment by focusing on 
and being explicit about the knowledge that is lacking, i.e. the epistemic uncertainty. Hence, 
moving forward, our literature survey pays more attention to epistemic uncertainty.  
2.1.1.2. Known versus Unknown 
There is literature that present epistemic uncertainties by what are knowns and unknowns such 
as Logan [31], Daase and Kessler [32] and Chow [33].  Former United States Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfeld made this classification of epistemic uncertainty famous during his 
news briefing in 2002. This was later captured in his memoir: Known and Unknown [34].  
 
“Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me because 
as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we 
do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we 
don't know.” 
According to Rumsfeld, known knowns are “facts, rules, laws we know with certainty”. 
Known unknowns are “gaps in our knowledge, but they are gaps that we know exist”. The 
way to manage known unknown is to be able to query the status quo by asking the “right 
question”. Unknown unknowns are “gaps in our knowledge, but they are gaps that we don’t 
know exist”. Rumsfeld quoted the 9-11 terrorist attack as an unknown unknown whereby no 
one would ever think about such a scenario before the tragedy strikes.  
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While Rumsfeld mentioned that it was impossible for anyone to expect the 9-11 terrorist 
attack, an aerial strike into a tall building could be a valid scenario being conceived by a team 
that is formed intentionally to identify possible terrorist strikes. An unknown unknown 
situation can be subjective since it depends on the amount of efforts and resources to focus on 
identifying the unknowns. Hence, we believe that by directing the attention to plausible 
unknown unknowns, we can help safety analysts to recognise unknowns that are related to the 
system under analysis so that they become known unknowns for further tracking. 
Such an approach of classifying epistemic uncertainty has since become popular in many 
domains. For example, the  German sociologists Daase and Kessler [32] agree with Rumsfeld 
by stating that the “cognitive frame for political practice” can be based on the relationship 
between “what we know, what we do not know, what we cannot know”. Besides the three 
categories, philosopher Slavoj Žižek [35] argues that there could be a fourth classification, 
unknown known, which represent knowledge that one “intentionally refuse to acknowledge 
that we know”. He believes that human beings have unknown knowns that represent “beliefs, 
suppositions and practices that we pretend not to know about, even though they form the 
background of our public values".  
One possible model where the known vs unknown classification could have been derived from 
is the Johari window [36]. The window is a 2x2 matrix with four perspectives (see Figure 6). 
It was designed to create self-awareness of the information being processed or communicated 
between multiple parties in an organisation. 
 
 
Figure 6. Johari Window 
The first two perspectives on the left (Arena and Façade) are quadrants of knowledge that are 
known to oneself. Hence, these would most likely be the known knowns that do not lead to 
epistemic uncertainty. The top right quadrant, Blind Spot, refers to knowledge that is not 
known to oneself even though it may be known by others. This is like the known unknowns 
where epistemic uncertainty resides. The last quadrant on the bottom right refers to the 
unknown unknown situations where neither oneself or others are aware of the knowledge.  
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Observations.  The Johari Window, while developed by Luft and Ingham [36] for self-help 
groups and corporate development, is a useful reference for our safety domain as it provides a 
matrix to articulate information that is known and unknown to an individual; as well as 
information that is known and unknown to others. Such a matrix is relevant for system safety 
as we depend on the information that is known to the safety analysts during the hazard 
identification to make our risk assessment. The differentiation between known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns is important in our research as it creates the awareness and need to manage 
both types of uncertainties. While known unknowns can be hazardous to a system, the 
unknown unknowns can potentially be hazardous too. Hence, it is important to engineer an 
approach to move potential hazards first from unknown unknown (i.e. totally not aware) into 
the known unknown (i.e. being aware of a situation but realise that one does not have sufficient 
knowledge about it) during safety assessment. Then, such known unknown needs to be tracked 
systematically until information is available to address the epistemic uncertainty such that the 
hazard becomes a known known in safety assessment. 
 Qualitative Modelling of Uncertainty 
We begin the survey of existing qualitative approaches of modelling uncertainties by 
considering the key characteristics of epistemic uncertainty. This would follow by a survey of 
existing ways of managing uncertainty qualitatively. As a useful reference, we end the section 
by reviewing ways that uncertainty is being modelled in requirements engineering. 
2.1.2.1. Characteristics of Uncertainty 
In order to apply the right approach to manage epistemic uncertainty, one needs to make 
informed decision about uncertainty based on its characteristics.  
In the context of industrial development, both McQuiston [37] and Johnston & Bonoma [38] 
refer to three attributes: complexity, novelty and importance to characterise uncertainty and 
determine its impact on the organisation. McQuiston refers to complexity as “how much 
information the organisation must gather to make an accurate evaluation of the system”. 
Novelty is defined by him as “the lack of experience of individuals in the organisation with 
similar situations.”, while Importance is considered as “the perceived impact on 
organisational profitability and productivity”. 
In their study of new product development for IT systems, Peng et al [39] and Novak & 
Eppinger [40] uses the Organisational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) to determine the 
characteristics of uncertainty. According to the OIPT, different tasks are expected to have 
different degree of uncertainty. It is further explained that “higher uncertainty implies higher 
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variability in and unpredictability of exact means to accomplish the task, in turn leading to 
poorer task outcomes”. In their study of inter-organisation supply chain, Bensaou and 
Venkatraman [41] explain that the OIPT implies that “an organisation must design 
appropriate structural mechanisms and adopt the right technologies and practices to provide 
the information processing capabilities that meet the organisation’s information processing 
needs”.  
For project management, both Peng and Novak conclude that information processing needs 
are affected by product size and task interdependence. Product size refers to the number of 
parts in the product design and task interdependence refers to the influence of any given task 
on other tasks. Specifically, Peng [39] also adds a third factor – project novelty which includes 
novelty of product or process, lack of information about markets and customers and the 
ambiguity of project goals. Galbraith [42] also uses the Organisation information processing 
model to emphasize that the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of information 
that must be processed to achieve a given level of performance. 
Separately, in their study of product development projects, Tatikonda and Rosenthal [43] 
consider uncertainty to vary along two dimensions: technology novelty and project 
complexity. Tatikonda refers to technology novelty as the “newness to the development 
organisation of the technologies employed in the product and process development effort”. He 
defines project complexity as “the nature, quantity and magnitude of organisational subtask 
and subtask interactions posed by the project”. He adds three attributes under project 
complexity, namely project difficulty (level of task performed), objective novelty (novelty of 
task objectives) and technology interdependence (interdependency of task units). Interestingly, 
Tatikonda classifies novelty as a component under project complexity which is different from 
the classification by McQuiston, which was explained earlier. 
Also, in the domain of project management, Shenhar and Dvir [44] introduce the “diamond 
framework” to identify and manage uncertainty by considering four project characteristics: 
“novelty, technology, complexity and pace”. They consider novelty as “how intensely new are 
crucial aspects of the project”, while complexity is about “finding out how complicated are 
the product, the process and the project involved”. They also mentioned that having an 
awareness of the characteristics is not enough if there is no time and resources to learn and 
improve. 
Other categorisations include the “learnability, multiplicity, temporality, complexity, 
uncertainty and sociability” factors introduced by Svejvig & Anderson [45] under their 
rethinking project management initiatives. Separately, Saunders et al [46] refers to 
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determinants of uncertainty based on “environmental, individual, complexity, information, 
temporal and capability”. Like Shenhar, both Svejvig and Suanders agreed that having the 
resources to learn are important besides being aware of the characteristics of uncertainty. 
Observations.  From the above survey, characteristics such as complexity and novelty are the 
common factors exacerbating uncertainty. Such characteristics would be useful subsequently 
in our research when we attempt to qualify uncertainty in safety assessment.   
2.1.2.2. Management of Uncertainty 
In this section, we look at existing approaches to manage uncertainty.  
Cynefin framework. One such approach is the Cynefin framework that was developed by 
Snowden and Biine [47]. The framework aims to help decision makers propose different 
strategies to address issues under different levels of uncertainty. The framework comprises 
five contexts to help decision makers manage uncertainty. The first four contexts are simple, 
complicated, complex, and chaotic. The fifth context, disorder, refers to the situation when it 
is not clear which of the other four contexts are the most dominant.  These five contexts are 
summarised in Table 5.  
Table 5. Decision Making in Different Context under Cynefin Framework 
Context Characteristics Example 
Simple Clear cause-and-effect relationships that are 
easily observable by everyone, e.g. known-
knowns 
Loan payment 
processing 
Complicated Clear cause-and-effect relationships but not 
everyone is aware and may have multiple “right 
answer” (i.e. multiple causes leading to same 
effect), e.g. known-unknowns 
Working of a 
Ferrari sports car 
Complex Cause-and-effect relationships may not be 
apparent to anyone, e.g. unknown-unknown 
Rainforest 
ecosystem 
Chaotic Impossible to determine cause-and-effect 
relationships as there is no manageable pattern, 
e.g. Unknowable, (based on current knowledge) 
Sept 11, 2011 attack 
on the World Trade 
Centre 
Disorder Difficult to recognise which of the other four 
contexts is predominant 
Leaders arguing 
with one another 
It is interesting to note that the September 11 incident is classified as chaotic, which is 
unknowable, by Snowden, whereas Rumsfeld considered the 9-11 terrorist attack as an 
unknown unknown in section 2.1.1.2. One reason could be that Rumsfeld may have knowledge 
that was not available to Snowden. Another reason could be that Rumsfeld did not create a 
fourth category known as “unknowable”. This again demonstrates that there are multiple ways 
of categorising different situations depending on individual’s knowledge and experience.  
In the case of safety assessment, we have assumed that most of the causal relationships related 
to safety can be derived, given the right knowledge. However, such causal relationships may 
not be known to everyone, especially during the safety analysis due to time and resource 
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constraints. Hence, we classified it under the complicated domain according to the Cynefin 
framework. However, as a system evolves, it is possible for its complexity to evolve such that 
it exhibit characteristics of different context, such as simple or complicated. 
Pacing of Experiences.  Under the Dynamic Capabilities Theory, Eisenhardt & Martin [48] 
advocate that “resources and capabilities must be constantly reallocated and reoptimized to 
adapt to changing environment”. Using a “resource-based” view of organisation, Eisenhardt 
et al say that an organisation should constantly monitor changes due to uncertainty and be 
ready to shift resources using learning mechanisms such as “practice, codification, mistakes, 
and pacing”. Specifically, the concept of pacing is worth elaborating. It refers to the pacing of 
experience so that it is conducive for learning and gaining knowledge. Argote [49] explains 
that “experience that comes too fast can overwhelm managers, leading to an inability to 
transform experience into meaningful learning”. In the context of uncertainty management, if 
we equate experience to information gain, this could serve as a cautious not to overwhelm 
managers with a long list of uncertainties to the extent that they will not be able to analyse this 
massive information. Argote further adds that “similarly, infrequent experience can lead to 
forgetting what was learned previously and so result in little knowledge accumulation as well”. 
For uncertainty management, if most uncertainties are not tracked, managers may not be 
exposed regularly to the presence of these uncertainties and could eventually forget about them 
later in the system lifecycle.   
Managing Surprises.  In a complicated system, confidence can be undermined by the element 
of surprise due to uncertainty. Aven [10] states that uncertainty leads to surprises and one of 
the ways to reduce surprises is to reduce the undesirable impact of surprises on safety.  
Traditionally, uncertainty is measured under risk assessment as part of the “likelihood” or 
probability of harm. Aven argues that this is incomplete as probability of harm is derived from 
a finite set of known past occurrences, which does not consider unknown events. He introduces 
the phrase “ignorance of unknown events” to describe a “lack of understanding of how the 
consequences of the activity are influenced by the underlying factors”. While one’s knowledge 
will neither be completely deterministic nor total ignorance [25], the lack of complete 
awareness and knowledge of a system and its environment will always limit the accuracy of 
safety assessment.  
Aven assumes that the goal of a decision maker is to reduce the undesired impact of surprises 
due uncertainty, instead of expecting to eliminate them. The challenge, he added, was on how 
to communicate uncertainty between multiple stakeholders, especially between system 
engineers and management, so as to make more people aware of safety related issues. While 
we agree with Aven’s pragmatic approach of acknowledging the presence of epistemic 
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uncertainty when making decision, it is also the ethical responsibility of safety analysts and 
system engineers to reduce the epistemic uncertainty as much as possible. We want to develop 
a proactive approach to reduce the epistemic uncertainty to as low as reasonably practical. At 
the same time, strive for a balance between being aware of the uncertainty and reducing the 
uncertainty through life.  
Sensemaking.  Another area of research relevant to manging uncertainty is the domain of 
sensemaking. As explained by Weick [18], sensemaking in an organisation refers to the efforts  
to “develop information processing mechanisms capable of detecting trends, events, 
competitors, markets, and technological developments relevant to their survival”. One of the 
frameworks to operationalise sensemaking in an organisation is introduced by Petit & Hobbs 
[50]. They build a conceptual framework to study project uncertainty by recommending three 
core activities for sensemaking. These three core activities are sensing, seizing and 
transforming. 
• “sensing” refers to the processing of information in the environment related to an 
uncertainty, 
• “seizing” refers to the efforts to identify and decide whether changes are needed with 
respect to what has been sensed earlier, and 
• “transforming” refers to the actual action to change the “routines of the enterprise”. 
Sensemaking can be used to engineer the tracking of known unknowns until information is 
available to eliminate the uncertainty to the extent that it becomes a known known suitable for 
safety assessment. The three activities of “sensing”, “seizing” and “transforming” are useful 
reference to develop the approach to manage the epistemic uncertainty through-life.   
In another study, Saunders et al [51] also attempts to define key approaches to manage 
uncertainties under project management. In their research, they recommend three key 
approaches - structural, behavioural and relational, to help managers prepare for uncertainties 
in project life and describe ways to identify, analyse and act on the uncertainties. Separately, 
Diana [19] mentions that uncertainty would be the key impetus to drive the need to do 
sensemaking in the risk and security domains. He elaborates that “risk signals that we can 
capture (sense) provide us with an opportunity to mitigate that risk (respond)”. The 
sensemaking processes proposed by Diana involve “monitoring and observing, incessant 
rehearsing, understanding and interpreting data, deciding how to respond, and producing a 
response”. While most are intuitive, “incessant rehearsing” is an activity that is worth 
explaining. It refers to the continual discovery of possible scenarios and be prepared for them 
if they ever become reality.  
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Observations. Using the taxonomy from the Cynefin framework, we consider safety-critical 
systems as complicated systems whereby there are definite cause-and-effect relationships. The 
challenge then is to identify such cause-and-effect relationships in the presence of epistemic 
uncertainties. While the literature in this section bring out the areas to focus on to manage 
uncertainty (e.g. surprises, experiences, sensemaking), none of them focus on implementing 
methods to manage uncertainty. The closest to an implementable approach is the introduction 
of the three core activities (sensing, seizing and transforming) by Petit & Hobbs [50] but even 
that has been presented as a strategic framework, instead of a tactical method. Moving forward, 
we would consider customising the research under the domain of sensemaking and build a 
practical and systematic approach to manage uncertainty in our context. We will study this in 
greater detail in chapter 3 and 4.     
2.1.2.3. Modelling of Uncertainty in Requirements Engineering 
As we focus on the underlying models of safety assessment, it is useful to review research in 
the area of uncertainty modelling. In particular, the treatment of modelling uncertainty in 
requirement engineering presents some useful contributions. In particular, the following three 
areas of research present relevant insights: partial modelling, under specification and 
subjective modelling.   
Partial Modelling.  The concept of partial modelling is introduced by Famelis and Chechik 
[52] for model-based software development that involves multiple software design options 
that have yet to be finalised. The uncertainty in this context refers to the lack of knowledge or 
confirmation on which solution will be chosen out of the multiple ways of developing the 
software. It was highlighted that traditional software developers are “comfortable with using 
models to express information about software but not good in expressing uncertainty and 
reasoning about uncertainty with such models”. In partial modelling, uncertainty is expressed 
by having multiple of such alternate partial models that represent other possible scenarios in 
view of uncertainty. For reasoning, annotations (TRUE, FALSE and MAYBE) are used to 
label the elements in the model to measure the level of uncertainty. Annotation TRUE or 
FALSE implies that the element is either chosen or not chosen based on the available 
information, while MAYBE refers to element that the developers are unsure if it will be chosen 
due to lack of knowledge. The partial model research by Famelis et al emphasises that besides 
identifying and annotating uncertainty, there must be an approach to reason about the 
uncertainty and integrate this approach into existing processes. There is similar concern in our 
research whereby we are also concerned with the way to express uncertainty in the underlying 
models for safety assessment, as well as the approach to reason about this uncertainty during 
hazard identification. The partial model uses a sequential process of “construction, 
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verification, diagnosis and refinement” to reason and manage uncertainty. Similarly, our 
research will also consider developing an appropriate process to manage uncertainty for safety 
assessment. 
Underspecification. Underspecification in requirements engineering can be observed in 
software policy and standards. This may lead to ambiguity. An example is the assessment by 
Ferrari et al [53] that there are over 18% of underspecified sentences in the Standard 
EN50128:2011 Software for railway control and protection systems. Reading across to our 
safety domain, we need to be equally mindful that safety policy and standard can also be 
ambiguous, and this can unintentionally lead to uncertainty when they are being referred to 
during safety assessment. In software engineering, another aspect of underspecification is 
when certain variables in the software model (e.g. in design choice, software configuration, 
implementation choice) are omitted either intentionally or unintentionally. Such omission 
could be due to a genuine lack of knowledge or intention to allow flexibility for subsequent 
interpretation. Papavassiliou and Mentzas [54] works on handling uncertainty due to 
underspecification in “weekly structured” software business processes. In their approach, work 
flows that may not be well articulated shall be labelled as black boxes using the common UML 
notation. When more information is available, the actual work flow will then be added to the 
model to complete the specification of the task in the model. Such method of tracking the 
uncertainty by underspecified the model and subsequently address the uncertainty by inserting 
the actual work flow are good reference for our research when we devise the approach to 
manage uncertainty throughout a system life cycle. The topic of underspecification will be 
revisited in section 3.2.2.2 of this thesis regarding the concern of documenting uncertainty. 
Subjective modelling.  A third area where uncertainty is being modelled is known as 
subjective modelling. In subjective modelling, fuzzy logic is used when there is uncertainty in 
the assessment of variables that are not definitive at time of decision making. For example, 
Wang [55] introduces subjective modelling in ship safety assessment as safety analysts often 
can only use subjective descriptors to describe the safety associated with an event. In his 
research, three parameters (failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure consequence 
probability) are assessed subjectively. Each parameter is described using “subjective 
linguistics variables” such as failure likelihood (“highly frequent”, “frequent”, “reasonably 
frequent”, “aver-age”, “reasonably low”, “low” and “very low”); consequence severity 
(“catastrophic”, “critical”, “marginal” and “negligible”); and failure consequence 
probability (“definite”, “highly likely”, “reasonably likely”, “likely”, “reasonably unlikely”, 
“unlikely” and “highly unlikely”). Each linguistic variable will be further described using a 
membership function, according to fuzzy theory. Wang states that such subjective safety 
analysis “provides marine safety analysts with flexibility in articulating judgements produced 
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by multiple safety analysts”. Another similar example is the research by Ozdamar and Alanya 
[56] on software project scheduling. Ozdamar et al explains the need to manage uncertainty 
due to a lack of precise knowledge in software development project. They chose fuzzy set 
theory as it “enables modelling the uncertainty associated with vagueness, with imprecision, 
and/or with lack of information about the system”. As seen by both examples, subjective 
modelling is useful for analysis where events, scenarios and activities are mostly known but 
there are uncertainties to either which will occur or in what severity or frequency. In other 
words, these are known uncertainties and the focus is on deriving fuzzy terms to reduce 
linguistics ambiguity. While this is important, our research is also concerned with the lack of 
knowledge to identify such events, scenarios or activities in the first place. There are unknown 
uncertainties we want to focus on in our research, beyond minimising any linguistic ambiguity. 
 Quantitative Modelling of Uncertainty 
Besides qualitative modelling of uncertainties, there are also attempts to quantify uncertainties. 
While qualitative assessment focuses on describing the characteristics of the uncertainties, 
quantitative assessment focuses on calculating the amount of uncertainties based on certain 
measurement. In this section, we have surveyed the use of mathematical formula and matrix 
to quantify uncertainties.  
Use of Mathematical Formulae. The use of statistical probability in risk assessment is one 
of the common types of mathematical formulae in the safety domain. This is also used in 
treating uncertainty quantitatively. For example, in the research by Mensing [57], he uses 
statistical approximation to model epistemic uncertainties quantitatively as part of his efforts 
to measure the risk of explosion at a military site. He derives mathematical formulae by 
representing the epistemic uncertainties of specific parameters using lognormal distributions. 
For example, he modelled the variation in the quantity of explosive, E, using a lognormal 
probability distribution: 
E = Eo* δe 
In this equation, Eo refers to the median daily number of exposures, and δe is a lognormal 
random variable. 
However, in order to do that, there is a need to have a “mathematical/probabilistic model of 
the environment and risk source of interest” or what Mensing terms as the “model of the world 
(MOW)”. The MOW involves building models to represent the real world. For example, for 
the explosion case, Mensing suggested the need to define MOW for “physical characteristics 
of the explosive site structures, temporal distributions of the quantity of explosives, number of 
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personnel at the site, occurrence and magnitude of explosive events, severity of the explosive 
effects and occurrence of fatalities at the explosive site”. 
In his concluding remarks, Mensing acknowledges that “successful application of the 
methodology relies, significantly, on development of the MOW and modelling of the epistemic 
uncertainties associated with the MOW”. He emphases that the success of estimating the risk 
relies on “how well the MOW depicts the actual physical environment being analysed”. 
Unfortunately, there were no further details on the way to “develop the MOW or model the 
epistemic uncertainties”. There were no details in the research about how such MOW can be 
constructed and be considered as sufficient to represent the real world.  
In their work on environmental and health risk assessment, Hammonds et al [58] presented 
guidelines for evaluating uncertainty using mathematical equations and computer models. 
They analyse uncertainty quantitatively to estimate the confidence that can be placed in a risk 
estimate. Their analysis focuses on two key aspects: 1) defining the parameters that form the 
uncertainty model and 2) specify the probability distribution function of these parameters. 
Hammonds et al advocate the use of numerical methods to develop the probability distribution 
for the uncertainty model. The suggested numerical techniques to estimate the uncertainty 
include “variance propagation, Monte Carlo simulation, differential uncertainty analysis, 
non-probabilistic methods such as fuzzy logic and first-order analysis employing Taylor 
expansions”.  
One of the key challenges of quantitative uncertainty analysis discussed by Hammond et al is 
the inability to define the boundary or extent of the environment that can possibly influence a 
system. For example, they mention that “if the characterization of the nature and extent of the 
amount of contamination in a given environmental media at a site is inadequate to permit even 
a bounding estimate (an upper and lower estimate of risk), a quantitative uncertainty analysis 
cannot be performed”. Another difficult task in quantitative uncertainty analysis is to support 
the “judgmental decisions that are made to obtain subjective probability distributions for the 
uncertain model parameters”. Hammonds et al suggest that soliciting the views from more 
experts would help to “defensibly estimate parameter and model uncertainty”. 
Another approach of modelling uncertainty quantitatively is to use Bayesian probability, such 
as the Bayesian Belief Network. As Goldstein [59] explains, Bayesian approach is to “quantify 
your uncertainties as probabilities, for the quantities you are interested in, and conditional 
probabilities for observations you might make given the things you are interested in. When 
data arrives, Bayes theorem tells you how to move from your prior probabilities to new 
conditional probabilities for the quantities of interest.” Such a network of Bayesian 
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probabilities can be applied in practice and is commonly known as Bayesian Belief Network. 
One of such example is the work by Kinder [60] for system of systems, which is a type of 
complicated system. Kinder uses Bayesian probability to model the system and applied the 
Monte Carlo simulation to generate the probability so as to manage the uncertainty when 
historical data is not available.  
Use of Matrix.  An example of a matrix most safety analysts are familiar with is the risk 
assessment matrix that use probability and severity to measure the risk of a hazardous situation. 
In his work on quantifying uncertainty, Aven [61] proposes a similar matrix to measure 
“uncertainty factor” based on risk and vulnerability as shown in  Table 6. If an uncertainty 
factor is considered to have significant effect on either risk or vulnerability, more efforts would 
be allocated to analyse and manage that uncertainty. Aven considers safety assessment as 
affected by two types of uncertainty: (1) uncertainty about the occurrence of events and (2) 
uncertainty about the consequences if an event occurs. 
 Table 6. Uncertainty Factor (extracted from Aven) 
e.g. Risk of ignition Effect of risk Effect on vulnerability 
Uncertainty factor Minor Moderate Significant Minor Moderate Significant 
gas concentration  x   x  
no. of persons   x    x 
Aven further explains that the assessments on the effect of risk and vulnerability are based on 
a specific “background knowledge”. The assessments themselves are not uncertain. Instead 
the uncertainty lies in the “background knowledge”, which is closely related to the 
assumptions made when quantifying the uncertainty. For example, under  Table 6, the 
probability that defines the risk of ignition is not the main concern of uncertainty. Instead, the 
uncertainties lie in the amount of information available to determine the gas concentration and 
the number of persons in the affected areas. According to Aven, “surprises relative to the 
assigned probabilities could occur if the background knowledge on which the probabilities 
are conditioned turns out to be wrong”.  
Observations.  An in-depth analysis of the mathematical methods discussed in this section is 
beyond the scope of our research on managing epistemic uncertainty. While there is a similar 
intent of managing uncertainty, quantification of uncertainty usually occurs at a more localised 
level of looking at specific parameter, instead of looking holistically at a system model. For 
example, in Aven’s case study, since gas concentration and the number of persons can be 
measured, quantifying such uncertainties would be a natural approach. However, in hazard 
identification, we may need to manage uncertainty beyond just a localised area of focus, which 
may not be possible to quantify. Furthermore, such quantitative analysis assumes hazards are 
either known knowns or known unknowns. There is no provision in the analysis to consider 
the presence of unknown unknowns that may invalidate the assessment. 
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While quantitative uncertainty analysis is important, we are more concerned in our research 
with appreciating the system environment that underlies the context from which such 
quantitative uncertainty is derived. Such context is defined differently in different literature. 
For examples, Mensing [57] defines it as the model of the world, Aven [61] calls it the 
qualitative assessment of the situations that constitute the “background knowledge” and 
Hammonds et al [58] refers to it as the qualitative analysis to characterise the environment. 
However, all of them agree that such context cannot be assessed quantitatively. Instead, they 
have to consider such context in a qualitative manner and epistemic uncertainty is expected as 
they will not have perfect knowledge of this context. Hence, it is evidenced that qualitative 
assessment of the context is crucial even in quantitative treatment of uncertainty. This 
motivates us to focus our research on the qualitative aspect of epistemic uncertainty.  
 Concepts in Safety Management 
Besides uncertainty, the other key focus in our research is safety management. Two of the key 
concepts in safety management are safety assessment and safety assurance. In our context, we 
define safety assessment as the processes and techniques to conduct safety analysis, while 
safety assurance is concerned with the degree of confidence over the results obtained from the 
safety assessment. In this section, we will first describe the definitions, processes and 
techniques in safety assessment under section 2.2.1. Next, we would describe the concept of 
safety assurance in section 2.2.2. Finally, in section 2.2.3, we would survey the extent that 
uncertainty and its management are explicitly mentioned in existing safety standards.  
 Safety Assessment 
One challenge of managing safety is the lack of standardisation in the definitions, standards 
and techniques to conducting safety. In this section, we introduce the common definitions in 
safety assessment. This will be followed by a survey of safety assessment processes across a 
system lifecycle. To conclude, we describe safety techniques that are currently being applied 
to identify hazards that are relevant to our research. 
2.2.1.1. Definitions 
An example of a lack of standardisation is the differences in safety terminology from different 
literature. For comparison, the terminology of safety from DoD MIL-STD-882E on System 
Safety [62] and the UK MoD Defence Standard 00-56 [63, 64] are presented in Table 7. It is 
interesting to note that different versions of a standard may define the same term differently. 
This is evidenced in the comparison of issue 4 and issue 6 of Defence Standard 00-56 (see 
Table 7). 
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Table 7. Terminology of Safety 
Terms Def Stan 00-56 (issue 6) Def Stan 00-56 (issue 4) MIL-STD-882E 
Assurance 
 
(not defined) Adequate confidence and evidence, 
through due process, that safety 
requirements have been met 
(not defined) 
Safe Freedom from 
unacceptable or 
intolerable levels of harm.  
Risk has been demonstrated to have 
been reduced to a level that is 
ALARP and broadly acceptable or 
tolerable, and relevant prescriptive 
safety requirements have been met, 
for a system in a given application 
in a given operating environment. 
Freedom from conditions 
that can cause death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage 
to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the 
environment. 
Risk (same as issue 4) Combination of the likelihood of 
harm and the severity of that harm. 
A combination of the 
severity of the mishap and 
the probability that the 
mishap will occur. 
ALARP  
(As Low As 
Reasonably 
Practicable) 
(defined in separately 
document) 
A risk is ALARP when it has been 
demonstrated that the cost of any 
further Risk Reduction, where the 
cost includes the loss of defence 
capability as well as financial or 
other resource costs, is grossly 
disproportionate to the benefit 
obtained from that Risk Reduction. 
(not defined) 
Safety 
Requirement 
(same as issue 4) A requirement that, once met, 
contributes to the safety of the 
product, service or system or the 
evidence of the safety of the 
product, service or system. 
(not defined) 
Harm Adverse impact on people, 
including fatality, physical 
or psychological injury, or 
short or long term damage 
to health.  
Death, physical injury or damage to 
the health of people, or damage to 
property or the environment. 
Mishaps: An event or series 
of events resulting in 
unintentional death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage 
to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the 
environment. 
Accident (same as issue 4) An event, or sequence of events, 
that causes unintended harm. 
 
Incident (same as issue 4) The occurrence of a hazard that 
might have progressed to an 
accident but did not.  
Hazard (same as issue 4) Potential to cause harm, e.g. A 
physical situation or state of a 
system, often following from some 
initiating event that may lead to an 
accident. 
A real or potential condition 
that could lead to an 
unplanned event or series of 
events (i.e. mishap) resulting 
in death, injury, occupational 
illness, damage to or loss of 
equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment. 
Safety Case (same as issue 4) A structured argument, supported 
by a body of evidence that provides 
a compelling, comprehensible and 
valid case that a system is safe for a 
given application in a given 
operating environment. 
 
System (same as issue 4) A combination, with defined 
boundaries, of elements that are 
used together in a defined operating 
environment to perform a given 
task or achieve a specific purpose.  
The organization of 
hardware, software, material, 
facilities, personnel, data, 
and services needed to 
perform a designated 
function within a stated 
environment with specified 
results. 
From Table 7, we observe that many of the terms are related to each other. The key ones are 
summarised here: 
• Safety assurance is determined by having adequate confidence and evidence that 
safety requirements have been met. 
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• Safety requirement is a requirement that, once met, contributes to the safety of the 
product. 
• A system is considered safe if it is free from unacceptable or intolerable levels of 
harm. 
• Harm or mishap is an event or series of events resulting in unintentional death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment. 
• Risk is a combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm. 
• An accident is an event, or sequence of events, that causes unintended harm; while an 
incident is the occurrence of a hazard that might have progressed to an accident, but 
did not. 
• Hazard is the potential to cause harm, often following from some initiating event that 
may lead to an accident. 
The definitions described in this section would serve as the foundation for our research when 
describing the safety assessment for safety-critical system. 
2.2.1.2. Processes  
Since safety assessment is to manage the risk that arises from hazards, safety assessment 
processes would be focusing on managing both risk and hazard. While different literature may 
describe such processes differently, the cycle of safety assessment processes is generally 
similar. We have referenced the UK MoD Defence Standard 00-56 [63, 64] and listed these 
key processes in Table 8.  
Table 8. Cycle of Key Safety Assessment Processes (extracted from DEF-STD 00-56) 
Processes Definition 
Hazard 
Identification 
Identify and list the hazards and accidents associated with a system. 
Hazard 
Analysis 
Describe in detail the hazards and accidents associated within a system, and defining 
accident sequences 
Risk 
Estimation 
Systematic use of available information to estimate risk 
Risk 
Evaluation 
Systematic determination, on the basis of tolerability criteria, of whether a risk is 
broadly acceptable, tolerable or unacceptable, and whether it is ALARP or whether 
any further Risk Reduction is necessary 
Risk 
Reduction 
Systematic process for reducing risk 
Risk 
Acceptance 
Systematic process by which relevant stakeholders agree that risks should be 
accepted. 
Epistemic uncertainty can emerge from any of the safety assessment processes in Table 8, 
from identifying the hazards to accepting the assessed risk. As observed in the definitions, 
none of the processes explicitly consider the presence and impact of epistemic uncertainty. 
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Hence, our approach can help to create this awareness and focus to manage epistemic 
uncertainty throughout the system lifecycle. 
For a safety-critical system, safety assessment can be repeated multiple times through its 
developmental lifecycle. We have chosen to base our research on the ARP 4761 standard [7], 
which is an industrial standard for conducting safety assessment to certify civil aircraft. The 
standard describes three phases where safety assessment is applied across the system lifecycle: 
Function Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and 
System Safety Assessment (SSA). In other words, the safety assessment processes described 
in Table 8 are repeated whenever FHA, PSSA and SSA are conducted separately at different 
milestones of the system lifecycle. 
Function Hazard Assessment (FHA). According to ARP 4761, the FHA is a safety 
assessment to “a systematic, comprehensive examination of functions to identify and classify 
failure conditions of those functions according to their severity”. The FHA is usually 
conducted at the start of a system lifecycle, during early design phase. The aim of the safety 
assessment is to assess the risk of each failure condition (or hazard) and develop the relevant 
safety requirements in respond to the risk. In ARP 4761, the safety assessment processes in 
FHA is as follow: 
• Identify all the functions associated with the system of interest 
• Identify and describe failure conditions associated with these functions 
• Determine the effects of the failure conditions 
• Classify failure condition effects based in its level of risk 
• Assign requirements to the failure conditions  
• Identify supporting material required to justify the effect classification 
• Identify method to verify compliance with the failure condition requirements 
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). According to ARP 4761, the PSSA is a “top 
down approach to determine how failures can lead to the functional hazards identified by the 
FHA, and how the FHA requirements can be met”. The PSSA is normally conducted 
continuously on components throughout the preliminary design phase of the system lifecycle. 
It considers deriving safety measures to meet the safety requirements. The outputs from PSSA 
are feedforward as inputs to the SSA during system development. The main processes in PSSA 
according to ARP 4761 are: 
• Complete the list of safety requirements. 
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• Determine whether the system architecture and design, can reasonably be expected to 
meet the safety requirements and objectives (the safety assessment processes would 
be adopted here) 
• Derive the safety requirements for the design of lower level items  
System Safety Assessment (SSA). According to ARP 4761, the SSA is a “a systematic, 
comprehensive evaluation of the implemented system to show that relevant safety requirements 
are met”. The SSA is conducted to verify that a system that has been developed conforms to 
the safety requirements generated from the FHA and PSSA. It is usually conducted in the 
development phase of the system lifecycle, after the conceptual and design phases. The main 
processes of SSA according to ARP 4761 are: 
• Verify that the design requirements established in the FHA are met 
• Validate that the classification established for the system effects are justified 
• Verify that the safety requirements called out in, or derived from design requirements 
and objectives are met 
In our research, we focus on these three phases (i.e. FHA, PSSA and SSA) to illustrate the 
many safety assessments that could have been conducted across a system lifecycle.   
2.2.1.3. Techniques  
There are many techniques currently available to help safety analysts during safety assessment. 
Some are well established methods applied in industry, while others are part of ongoing 
research. For example, the ARP 4761 standard mentions many industrial safety assessment 
techniques such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram (DD), Markov 
Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects 
Summary (FMES), Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) and 
Common Modes Analysis (CMA). 
As it is impossible to describe all safety assessment methods, we have chosen to highlight the 
ones used in our research, namely FTA and FMEA. Both methods are selected because they 
are the techniques commonly used in FHA, PSSA and SSA. In addition, we also highlight the 
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) technique that is currently under research. STPA 
is selected as it is a useful technique to consider multiple viewpoints from component to system 
level.  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FTA is a “deductive failure analysis which focuses on one 
particular undesired event and provides a method for determining causes of this event” [7]. It 
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is used to “determine the root causes and probability of occurrence of a specific undesired 
event” [65]. The analysis starts with an “undesired top-level hazard event” and systematically 
discovers “next lower level which could cause this event”. This continues until a “Primary 
Event” is uncovered or until safety requirements for the “top-level hazard event” are satisfied. 
A Primary Event, according to ARP 4761, is defined as “an event which for one reason or 
another need not been further developed”. An example of a fault tree is shown in Figure 7, 
where the element fails because there is a functional fault and the protective mechanism is 
inoperative. FTA will be applied on our research in chapter 6t 
 
Figure 7. Example of a Fault Tree (extracted from ARP 4761) 
The four main steps of FTA to construct a fault tree according to the standard are: 
• State the undesired top-level event. 
• Develop the upper and intermediate tiers of the fault tree that are minimum, 
immediate, necessary, and sufficient to cause the top-level event to occur. 
• Develop each fault event until the root causes are established or until further 
development is deemed unnecessary. 
• Establish probability of failure budgets or failure rate budgets, evaluate the ability of 
the system to comply with the safety objectives, and redesign the system if deemed 
necessary. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). A FMEA is a “systematic method of 
identifying the failure modes of a system, item, function, or piece-part and determining the 
effects on the next higher level of the design” [7]. It is a bottom-up evaluation that looks at the 
impact of every failure mode identified. The results from the FMEA can be amalgamated to 
form the Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES). A FMES is a “summary of lower level 
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failure modes with the same effects from the FMEAs”. According to Ericson [65], the FMEA 
methodology can be summarised in Figure 8. The input and output from FMEA are as shown 
after running through the FMEA processes described in the middle. A typical worksheet that 
records the output from a FMEA is shown in Figure 9. FMEA will be applied on our research 
in chapter 6. 
 
Figure 8. FMEA Methodology (extracted from Ericson [65]) 
 
Figure 9. Example of FMEA Worksheet (extracted from ARP 4761) 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). STAMP is an accident 
causality model that is based on the study of systems that are interdependent of each other. It 
is applied in safety assessment by considering factors such as software, human, technology 
and organisation. These are factors that directly or indirectly affect the safety of social-
technical system. According to Leveson [66], the basic activity in STAMP is to find constraints 
in the system. In a STAMP model, the cause of accident is considered as “the result of a lack 
of constraints imposed on the system design and on operations”.   
The hazard analysis technique that is based on STAMP is known as Systems-Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA). STPA uses control loops to identify constraints that, when violated, leads to 
unsafe situations. There are many applications of the STPA model and one of them is the 
research on safety-critical UAV system by Chen and Lu [67]. They summarise the STPA 
process as follows: 
Input 
Design knowledge 
Failure knowledge 
Failure modes type 
Failure rate 
FMEA Process 
Evaluate design 
Identify potential failure modes 
Evaluate effect of each failure mode 
Document process 
Output 
Failure modes 
Consequences 
Reliability  
Hazards and risk 
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• Identify hazards and high-level Safety Constraints 
• Develop hierarchical Safety Control Structure to identify Control Actions  
• Assess each control action to discover unsafe behaviour as Unsafe Control Actions  
• Identify the potential causes leading to the Unsafe Control Actions 
The possible faults in a typical control loop, or what is known as Control Flaws (CFs) for 
STPA, are listed in Figure 10. STPA will be applied on our research in chapter 5. 
 
Figure 10. Typical Control Flaws for a Controlled Loop (extracted from STPA Primer) 
STPA provides a useful model to consider multiple viewpoints from component to system 
level. By using control loops, it allows the user to explicitly annotate causal relationships that 
can potentially lead to hazardous situations. However, like many safety assessment techniques, 
STPA assumes that these causal relationships are known relationships and does not provide 
the flexibility to include epistemic uncertainties (i.e. known unknowns) that may need to be 
tracked through-life due to lack of information at the point of assessment. While STPA 
consider a spectrum of factors such as software, human, technology and organisation, the 
discovery of plausible causal relationships from the unknown unknowns is not systematic as 
it is still dependent on the experience and expertise of the users during the analysis. The desire 
to use STPA to consider multiple viewpoints may even exacerbate uncertainty during the 
safety assessment. Hence, our research into managing epistemic uncertainty can be a plausible 
approach to complement the STPA when considering multiple viewpoints. 
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As mentioned at the beginning of the section, since FTA, FMEA and STPA are applied widely 
in either the industry or safety research, we would also be using them as examples of safety 
assessment techniques in our research to manage uncertainty. Besides being commonly used, 
we have chosen these three techniques as they are models that we can apply at component and 
system level.   
 Safety Assurance 
In chapter 1, we have briefly mentioned risk, confidence and uncertainty in safety assessment. 
Risk evaluation in safety assessment depends on two factors: probability of the expected 
mishap occurring and the severity of the mishap if it occurs. Usually, the severity of a mishap 
is well understood, such as personal injuries or infrastructure damages. The probability of 
occurrence depends on understanding the possible causes and how the causes can lead to the 
mishap. This is affected by the ability to know the causes, to be aware there could be other 
unknown causes and to know where to find the unknown causes (which many of these could 
be impossible to quantify). In this section, the focus is on the measuring and managing of 
confidence in safety assessment, which is also known as safety assurance. 
2.2.2.1. Measuring Confidence  
The impact of uncertainty on risk evaluation was discussed by McDermid in his paper on 
software uncertainty [68]. Ideally, he mentions that “safety engineering assumes that 
probabilities reflect aleatoric uncertainty, i.e. “randomness”, which can be characterised by 
a stochastic model” and that “we implicitly assume ergodicity – that past failure behaviours 
are good predictors of the future.” With the assumptions of ergodicity and aleatory 
uncertainty, the probability of risk can be quantified using mathematics formulae such as 
probability density functions (PDF). 
However, McDermid raises the concern that the “shape of the PDF or even its mean” may 
not be identifiable due to epistemic uncertainty or in his words “the imperfect knowledge of 
the system or the stochastic model”. He presents an interesting formula that was developed by 
Keynes [69] to explain epistemic uncertainty. Keynes introduced the concept of confidence 
between two propositions, a and b, which can be expressed as:  
V(a/b) = Kr/(Kr + Ir) 
He explains that “Kr is the relevant knowledge about b, and Ir is the relevant ignorance, i.e. 
things we would like to know, but currently don't. The bigger V the greater confidence there 
is that proposition a follows from premise b”.  While it looks simple, the formula provides a 
means to explain the relationship between epistemic uncertainty and confidence. The lower 
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the epistemic uncertainty (i.e. the lower the ignorance Ir), the greater the confidence about the 
proposition since V increases. Based on this argument, McDermid states that there is a need 
to invest efforts to “learn more about the models” and gain more confidence so as to reduce 
the epistemic uncertainty.  
As a conclusion to his research, McDermid suggests that “from an ethical perspective, 
professional safety engineers and the research community need to embrace the difference 
between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty”. He advocates that stakeholders involved in 
developing a system have the duty to ensure uncertainties about the system are explicitly 
identified and managed. 
Observations.  McDermid argues that other than quantifying the risk, the confidence in the 
risk assessment is also an integral part of the safety assessment. In safety, confidence in the 
risk assessment is often referred to as safety assurance.  
2.2.2.2. Managing Confidence  
To understand safety assurance, we revisit the concept of confidence that has been discussed 
in section 1.2. According to Jelen [8], assurance refers to the “degree of confidence that needs 
are satisfied”. Applying this to safety, Jelen states that safety assurance focuses on getting 
sufficient confidence that one is satisfied with the safety assessment, rather than the assessment 
itself. In other words, assurance serves as a “measure of confidence in the accuracy of a risk 
measurement.” Hence, if the safety assessment in the previous section aims to answer the 
question – “How safe am I?”, then safety assurance seeks to answer the question – “How 
confident am I with the answer to ‘how safe am I’?” Supporting a similar argument, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) defines safety assurance as activities under its Safety 
Management System that “systematically provide confidence that organizational outputs meet 
or exceed safety requirements” [9].  
To gain confidence, one must have sufficient knowledge during safety assessment to make a 
credible argument to claim that a system is safe. Hence, the lack of such knowledge, or 
epistemic uncertainty, has direct influence on the confidence in a safety assessment. In their 
survey on safety assurance [70], Duan et al from the University of Minnesota and Pennsylvania 
state that it is necessary to deal with uncertainty in order to gain confidence in a safety 
assessment, which is defined as assurance case. They proceed to categorise the ways that 
“researchers have reasoned about uncertainty in assurance cases” into qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. According to Duan, the qualitative approach to manage epistemic 
uncertainty is to “reason it away” and the quantitative approach is to design actions that 
increase confidence so as to reduce uncertainty.  
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For qualitative reasoning, Duan brings out the work by Kelly [71] on “argumentation structure 
for assurance cases” and the use of Goal Structuring Notation to help describe assurance case. 
In such an approach, epistemic uncertainty is managed by reviewing and restructuring the 
assurance case to provide reasons for removing the uncertainty. Following similar qualitative 
approaches introduced by Kelly, Hawkins et al. constructed the “assured safety argument" 
whereby an assurance case can be divided into safety assurance case and confidence case [72]. 
The confidence case serves as a mean to argue about the confidence in specific portions of the 
safety assurance case where more justifications are needed.  
For quantitative approaches, Duan introduces the research on Baconian Probability by 
Goodenough et al. [73]. Goodenough et al identify “sources of doubt” that could reduce 
confidence in assurance case and called them defeaters. The approach is to either remove such 
defeaters or rationalise that they are not affecting confidence on the assurance case. Duan et al 
assess that using a single number of probability in such quantitative approaches can be “too 
coarse of an approach” since it does not consider “the subtle nuances in reasoning about 
uncertainty”.  
In a separate study, Cyra and Gorski [74] caution that the level of uncertainty can be so high 
that it prevents the ability to make decisions. They state that confidence can be so low until “it 
is not a strong reject or accept on the decision scale, but it also has a fairly high level of 
uncertainty, casting doubt onto any decision that could be made”. As a result, the decision 
maker may have to wait until more information is available to resolve the epistemic uncertainty 
and increase the confidence in the analysis. 
Observations.  While there are both qualitative and quantitative approaches to manage safety 
assurance, the assumption seems to be that there are ways to either “reason the uncertainty 
away” or create immediate solution to reduce the uncertainty (thereby increases the 
confidence). In complicated safety-critical systems, uncertainty may not be reducible. Even if 
it can be reduced, it may not be immediate as critical information may not be available. By 
focusing on defeaters, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that the uncertainties are 
known unknowns. The potential of unknown unknowns is not considered even though such 
epistemic uncertainties can be safety-critical and potentially impact the confidence in the 
safety analysis.    
 Treatment of Uncertainty in Safety Standards  
As a form of assurance, confidence of the safety analyst with a safety assessment can be 
increased by showing compliance with certain safety standards. In our survey, we have 
reviewed three safety-related standards that are related to the military and airborne systems 
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safety management:  DEF STAN 00-56, MIL-STD-882E and DO-178C. We search for either 
consideration or management of uncertainty while carrying out safety assessment. We also 
look for any mentioning of key words such as unknown, change, deviation, identification and 
tracking.  
DEF STAN 00-56.  For DEF STAN 00-56 [63], Safety Management Requirements for 
Defence System, is used by UK MOD to manage safety assessment and assurance. It 
comprises two portions: requirements (part 1) and guidance (part 2). The standard provides 
guidance to contractor to comply with safety requirements during system acquisitions. While 
there are no explicit mentioned of uncertainty, the following are sections that are of interest:  
• Section 7.1 – Deviation from General Requirement. It is mentioned that “for any 
intended deviations, the tenderer should indicate how their approach will meet the 
intent of this Standard”. However, uncertainty would often lead to unintended 
deviation and the management of unintended deviation is not covered in the Standard.  
• Section 11.4 – Hazard Tracking. The Standard dictates that contractor needs to 
implement a hazard log to track hazards. While this could be the mean to track 
uncertainty, it wasn’t explicitly included.  
• Section 11.7 – Failure Modes. Although it was mentioned that “a normal function or 
previously identified safe failure mode … is used in different context, can lead to 
emergent hazardous behaviour”, there was no follow up explanation of managing 
such emergent hazards. 
• Section 14 – Supply and Change Management.  Under the section on change control, 
it is stated that “the contractor shall define in the SMP, a change control system so 
that the safety impact of any planned or unplanned change can be identified and 
assessed”. The section proceeds to emphasis on the need to proactively identify, 
address, plan, monitor and incorporate changes to the system. While such changes 
could be due to uncertainty, there wasn’t any direction on how such uncertainties can 
be identified in the first place.  
MIL-STD-882E.  MIL-STD-882E [62], System Safety, is applicable to agencies within the 
US Department of Defence (DoD). It is used for “identifying hazards and assessing and 
mitigating associated risks encountered in the development, test, production, use, and disposal 
of defense systems”. It is the equivalent of DEF STAN 00-56 used by UK MOD. The following 
are observations regarding the Standard: 
• Paragraph 4 – General Requirement. Under managing lifecycle risk, the Standard 
states that risk efforts should consider “changes, but not limited to, the interfaces, 
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users, hardware and software, mishap data, mission, and system health data”. 
Specifically, for software safety requirements, the Standard advocates that if there are 
expected tasks to be performed to meet a certain level of rigour but were unspecified 
or incomplete, the risk associated with them shall be documented explicitly for 
tracking. However, there is no requirement to explicitly document these incomplete 
tasks or what we considered as uncertainties.  
• Task 101/103/106/202 – Hazard Management. In task 101, hazard identification is 
stated but no mention of incomplete knowledge. Although there are attempts to guide 
the identification of hazards such as (1) the possible “functional disciplines” in task 
103 to include “system safety, range safety, fire protection engineering, environmental 
engineering, explosive and ordnance safety, chemical and biological safety, …” and 
(2) the potential contribution to mishap during preliminary hazard analysis in task 202 
“e.g. system components, energy sources, interface and control, COTS, operating 
environment and health hazards”, the list seems to be disorganised and only served as 
examples. Hazard tracking is described in task 106, which can serve as the mean to 
track uncertainty. It is also stated that any “newly recognised hazards and significant 
changes in controlling the risk of known hazards” should be documented in the 
periodic progress report. 
• Task 304 – Request for Deviation. It is stated that “each hardware and software 
deficiency report to identify potential new hazards or modifications to existing risk 
levels”. Again, while deviation is being considered, it is not monitoring scenarios 
where hazards are still not established due to uncertainty in the assessment. 
DO-178C.  DO-178C [75], Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification, guides the software production for airborne systems and equipment to carry out 
its function “with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness 
requirements”. In other words, the Standard focuses on the safety assurance of the software 
production.  
• Section 2 – System Aspects Relating to Software Development. This section mentions 
that system safety assessment process, which comprises the functional hazard 
assessment, preliminary system safety assessment and system safety assessment, 
would identify the hazards that translate to system requirements that are related to 
software. Such requirements would also be under “safety monitoring” to “protect 
against specific failure conditions” throughout the software lifecycle. While such 
requirements would influence the software development, there isn’t any explicit 
  
61 
considerations when the hazards or requirements are not well defined due to 
uncertainty.  
• Section 7 – Software Configuration Management. While there are formal processes to 
manage software configurations as part of software change review and control, there 
is no established processes to manage changes to the software requirements due to 
incomplete knowledge about the system. To elaborate, epistemic uncertainty about a 
system may result in unspecific software faults. Without a clear definition of the 
software fault, it is difficult to define the software requirements to mitigate the fault.  
• Section 8 – Software Quality Assurance. In the software  quality assurance process, 
audit should be conducted to ensure that any “deviations from the software plans and 
standards are detected, recorded, evaluated, tracked and resolved”. It is also 
emphasised that “early detection of process deviations assists efficient achievement of 
software life cycle process objectives”. Like other standards, the deviations are not 
explicitly referring to uncertainty in the system. 
Observations.  There is no explicit mention of uncertainty management in the safety standards 
that we have surveyed. Since there are recommended processes in each standard to track 
changes and hazards, we can consider enhancing these processes to track uncertainty 
throughout the system lifecycle. However, there could be potential trade-offs, like having 
additional time and manpower, to track such uncertainty. It is also important to make the 
distinction between hazard and uncertainty, as based on the knowledge available, one would 
be more confident about the risk associated with a hazard vis-à-vis the risk associated with an 
uncertainty.  
 Modelling of Safety-Critical Systems (SCS)  
As technology advances, more and more systems in domains like defence, air traffic 
management, railway transport, nuclear power plant, offshore drilling and health care are 
becoming highly networked and complicated. These systems can be considered as safety-
critical systems as “any failure can potentially lead to the loss of life and damage to property 
or environment” [76]. For example, in the defence industry, networks of large-scale safety-
critical systems (often being referred to as Network Centric Warfare or System-of-
Systems1[77]) have been revolutionising the applications of military technology as machines 
and computers are used to carry out complicated and time-critical tasks. These machines are 
                                                 
1 The System-of-Systems (SoS) refers to a set of systems that are cooperating for a common purpose 
while simultaneously working as independent entities. 
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inter-connected to form larger inter-dependent systems and continuing to expand in numbers 
and complexity as the armed forces attempt to accomplish more challenging missions.  
In this section, we focus on three key concerns regarding safety-critical system that are 
important to our research. First, we survey the growing challenges due to uncertainty in such 
systems (see section 2.3.1). Next, we present common models that are constructed to represent 
the real world where safety-critical systems reside (see section 2.3.2). Besides modelling the 
system, it is equally important to appreciate ways to analyse safety-critical systems (see section 
2.3.3). Lastly, we are interested in the ways that such systems are being managed through-life, 
from development till operation (see section 2.3.4). 
 Growing Challenges of Uncertainty in SCS 
As we focus on epistemic uncertainty, it is important to appreciate what are the challenges in 
modern systems that make such uncertainty a growing concern. We focus our discussions on 
two key characteristics that are commonly associated with systems having epistemic 
uncertainty, namely adaptive and emergence.  
2.3.1.1. Adaptive 
Systems with uncertainties do not remain static. They evolve with time. Managing uncertainty 
will be challenging and unpredictable especially when the system is evolving. According to 
Trapp and Schneider in their study of “Open Adaptive System” [78], changes in adaptive 
systems could either refer to the environment or the internal states of the system. 
Change in Environment. The environment can refer to any factors (e.g. social, natural, 
political, economic) outside a system that can potentially have influence on it. Even if the 
system does not change its structure or configuration, the uncontrollable change in the 
environment can impact the safety of the system (e.g. weather change). Monitoring the 
environment in safety assessment is crucial as illustrated by Habli [79]. In his research, he 
monitored changes in the environment as part of the assurance model of safety-critical product-
line. Another way to model changes in the external environment is to make use of agent-based 
simulation. 
Another author who acknowledges the impact of environment is Endsley [80]. She introduces 
the 3-level Situational Awareness (SA) model that comprises 3 processes to manage 
environmental changes: “(1) Perceive the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space to assess the level of relevancy, (2) Comprehend their meaning to assess the level 
of significance, and (3) Project their status in the near future to provide prediction.” 
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Separately, to monitor the environment, Nwiabu [81] suggests a template to track six relevant 
items of information (goal, plan, identity, location, distance and time) as the system evolves. 
He mentions that the lack of awareness of changes in the environment is a key challenge when 
analysing a system. However, Nwiabu has not elaborated further on how his template can be 
integrated as part of system analysis.  
Change within the system. Another form of adaptation involves the change within a system, 
such as its structure, pattern or behaviour. Subsystems or components within a system can 
evolve and change the state of the system. There could also be changes in the way a system is 
being configured. The following are interesting studies on managing uncertainties due to 
changes within a system.  
• In analysing software risk of adaptive components, Kajtazovic  [82] recommends a 
three-step process using concepts in contract binding, consistency analysis and 
dynamic deployment. The three steps involve “define the attributes or components 
that affect safety, allow changes to an extent (e.g. constraint programming) to which 
there are no safety impact, allow the changed attribute or components to be loaded 
only into the final version of the software”. 
• The Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) concept under DO-297 [83] for avionics 
system is another component-level approach to manage the uncertainty from adaptive 
components. It focuses on certifying only modular components that have been 
modified, without the need to re-certify all the modules in the system. 
2.3.1.2. Emergence 
In chapter 1, we have provided several examples of disasters due to uncertainty. While the 
faults for each of these disasters are unique, one common observation is that it is extremely 
difficult to narrow down to a specific failure mode. Unlike simple systems where traditional 
safety analysis method can use linear reductionist approach to deduce the root causes, the 
failure modes in complicated safety-critical systems may not be easily identifiable. Reiman 
[84] observes that effects from such complicated system have “several parallel contributing 
factors, instead of one or few causal chains as in linear systems”. Dekker [85] also believes 
that “the behaviour of such complex system cannot be reduced to an aggregate of the 
behaviour of its constituent components”. Hence, even if one root cause has been identified, 
decision makers may face the frustration of not being able to fully comprehend the entire 
chains of casual relationships that can lead to a mishap. 
Systems with uncertainties can behave differently at system level compare to individual level. 
This is known as having emergent behaviour at the system level, which does not exhibit itself 
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at the component level. Emergent behaviour may not be predictable due to the presence of 
epistemic uncertainty. Ghorbani [86] describes emergence as a global behaviour that is “being 
more than the sum of the individual components”. Since emergence cannot be attributed to a 
single component, reductionist methods like modularisation and reconfiguration may not be 
effective in analysing such behaviour.  
Ulieru  [87], in his study on engineering emergence, provides a comparison between traditional 
and emergence engineering approach (Table 9). 
Table 9. Comparing Traditional and Emergence Engineering (extracted from Ulieru) 
Traditional Engineering Emergence Engineering 
System has well-defined design, 
production and functional phases 
System has blurred boundaries between different phases with 
adaptable architectures 
System’s performance must be 
specified 
Consider performance as an emergent property that cannot be 
predefined. Besides functional performance, the ability to 
stabilise the system through feedback as a result of emergent 
behaviour should be monitored.  
Consider system’s emergence as 
an undesirable “threat” 
Focus on influencing global emergent behaviour around 
desired performance 
Use top-down deterministic 
approach to design distributed 
system 
Focus on the interaction among subsystems and the 
environment towards a collective emergent behaviour with a 
higher purpose, which cannot be identified in the behaviour 
of individual parts 
Applying emergence to safety, it implies that emergent behaviour can lead to potential safety 
hazard as such behaviour cannot be detected easily with reductionist analysis. To manage 
emergent hazards, Redmond [88] attempts to define the different types of emergent hazard in 
a system as a reference for safety assessment (Table 10). While the list may not be 
comprehensive, it serves as a basis when considering emergent behaviours. Redmond’s 
categorisation exemplifies the effort to help decision makers pay attention to emergent 
behaviour during safety assessment so as to reduce surprises. 
Table 10. Types of Emergent Hazard (extracted from Redmond) 
Types of Hazard Definition 
Reconfiguration Results from the transfer of a complex system from one state to another 
Interface One subsystem causes a mishap in another subsystem by transferring a 
failure or partial performance over a defined interface, possibly through 
another subsystem. 
Resource Results from insufficient shared resources or resource conflicts 
Proximity Caused by the operation, failure or partial performance of another 
subsystem that is transferred to the victim subsystem by a means other than 
a defined interface 
Interoperability Command, response or data of one subsystem is interpreted by a second 
subsystem in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent of the first 
subsystem 
Observations.  For a safety-critical system going through the acquisition lifecycle, adaptive 
and emergent behaviours can create epistemic uncertainties throughout the lifecycle. Being 
aware of the challenges due to these two behaviours would help in our research to manage the 
epistemic uncertainties.  
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2.3.1.3. Illustrations 
An example of a complicated safety-critical system is Air Traffic Control (ATC) at an airport. 
ATC is part of a bigger safety-critical system that comprises the ATC tower, the airport 
terminals, ground management systems and the numerous aircrafts departing and arriving at 
the airport. These systems must integrate closely with each other to ensure the safe operation 
of the airport. The following two incidents at Swanwick ATC illustrate the impact of 
unforeseen technical failures in a highly complicated airport operation.  
• Incident One.  On 7 Dec 2013, a technical failure in the voice communication system 
(VCS) at the Swanwick ATC tower resulted in a major disruption of close to 300 
cancelled flights, hundreds of delayed flights and thousands of stranded passengers. 
National Air Traffic Services (NATS)2 reported that the VCS failure causes the 
Swanwick area control not being able to switch from night (5 airspace sector) to day 
configuration (20~25 sectors) in order to handle the heavier day-time air traffic [89]. 
The investigation concluded that there were gaps in both the engineering and operation 
responses when unforeseen failures occurs in interconnected systems operating in 
complicated environment [90].  
• Incident Two.  Approximately one year later on 12 Dec 2014, another air traffic 
disruption at the same Swanwick ATC also resulted in numerous flight cancellations 
across Heathrow, Gatwick and London City [91]. This time, the System Flight Servers 
failed when more workstations were being brought online during the transition 
between normal and standby operation [92]. This affected air traffic control as it was 
impossible for controllers to access aircraft flight plans. NATS has announced that the 
failure is unprecedented in its 13 years of operations.  
Observations.  Both incidents highlight the difficulties in managing system safety in 
complicated environment. There will be intense pressure when failures occur and rightfully so 
since safety-critical systems are utilised in situations where there are severe consequences (e.g. 
danger to passenger and disruption to commercial flights) when the systems fail. It is also 
possible that certain failures may never manifest themselves during system development as it 
is impossible to predict and conduct safety assessment on all operational scenarios (e.g. 
overloading of the ATC System Flight Servers). One way of mitigating such risk could be to 
create an open and active sharing of uncertainties about safety throughout the system lifecycle 
from development to operation so as to better anticipate and identify such “blind-spots” during 
safety assessment. 
                                                 
2 National Air Traffic Services (NATS) is a commercial entity that provides air traffic navigation 
services to aircraft flying through UK controlled airspace and it operates the ATC tower at Swanwick. 
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 Types of SCS Model 
Models are used to represent the structure, pattern and behaviour of a system. While there are 
many ways to model safety-critical systems, we have classified them into three model types 
and illustrated each type with examples. A summary of the three types of model is listed in 
Table 11. The challenges of considering epistemic uncertainties in safety-critical systems will 
be highlighted in each of the model.  
Table 11. Types of Model to Represent Safety-Critical Systems 
Model Types Constructs  Examples  
Domains Different domains that a complex system 
operate in such as social, technical, cyber.  
Socio-Technical System 
Cyber-Physical System 
Part-whole Duality behaviour of simultaneously represent a 
system as part of a greater system, or as a 
whole with its constituent of subsystems  
System-of-Systems 
Holon model 
 
Architecture 
Framework 
Large-scale and multiple views of complex 
military system using matrices and diagrams  
 
MoDAF 
DoDAF 
 
2.3.2.1. Domain-Specific Model 
In domain-specific models, a safety-critical system is represented by domains that it is 
operating in, such as social, political, technical, physical and cyber. We will illustrate with two 
common domain-specific models, namely socio-technical system and cyber-physical system. 
Socio-Technical System. A common safety-critical system that is modelled based on the 
domain construct is the Socio-Technical System (STS). According to Baxter [93], STS was 
introduced by Emery and Trist in 1960 to describe a system that involves a “complex 
interaction between humans, machines and the environmental aspects of a work system”. This 
implies that people, machines and context must be considered when developing such system. 
Recently, there are two variants of STS being introduced to describe large-scale enterprise. 
These are the Large-Scale Complex IT System (LSCITS) [94] and the Ultra-Large-Scale 
Systems (ULSS) [95]. The LSCITS considers large-scale independent STS (such as financial 
systems) that are owned and managed by different organisations but might come together as a 
“coalition of systems”. Separately, the ULSS refers to a system with “interdependent webs of 
software-intensive systems, people, policies, cultures, and economics”.  
Modelling the social aspect of STS is particularly challenging. Consider modelling a through-
life acquisition of military system as a STS. Such a system involves defence acquisition where 
multiple stakeholders collaborate to develop and operate machines that interoperate with one 
another throughout the system lifecycle. Through our research, authors have raised their 
challenges in modelling such systems, especially when defining the interactions between the 
social aspect (i.e. human element) and the technical machines. For example, Sommerville [94] 
cautions that technical specifications and system requirements that are referenced to build 
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components under a STS can be incomplete and incorrect, as users would interpret and adapt 
the system unpredictably in practice.  
There are also reports that raise concerns of unsafe behaviour because of unknown interactions 
between stakeholders due to uncertainties in the STS. To illustrate, we highlight three 
examples raised by various authors of the uncertain situation surrounding STS that can result 
in unsafe behaviour.  
• Uncertainty due to Diverse Opinions.  Atkinson [96] mentions that, in a multi-
stakeholders STS, different parties may perceive and manage a situation differently 
from their own perspectives often to their own benefits. This may lead to unsafe 
behaviour which is unexpected. He also says that such uncertainty would be more 
pronounced for long-term and large-scale system acquisition which has higher chance 
of having more stakeholders. Since uncertainty is difficult to quantify, Atkinson 
proposes that it is necessary for “management flexibility and tolerance of vagueness” 
in order to manage such uncertainty. In other words, making decision that is flexible 
will be more suitable in a highly uncertain system in anticipation of downstream 
surprises. While such decisions may not be the most optimal, it can still be timely and 
acceptable to meet safety requirements. 
• Uncertainty due to Automation.  Johnson [97] uses the Uberlingen and Linate 
incidents to highlight the danger of miscommunication between operators, system 
engineers and contractors. In his examples, information regarding maintenance 
activities and system configurations of highly integrated avionics systems was not 
communicated accurately and it resulted in major failures in air traffic management. 
Johnson believes that increased automation causes the operators to lose situation 
awareness as they may not be adequately expose to application processes. In addition, 
high-level system integration also prevents operators having the opportunity and 
ability to understand diverse subsystems. Ideally, multiple parties (e.g. operators, 
engineers and maintenance officers) must work closely together even with increase 
automation since none of the stakeholders has complete knowledge of the whole 
system. Unfortunately, this may not be the practice in actual operation due to various 
reasons like geographical and time constraints. 
• Uncertainty due to Risk Homeostasis.  When modelling a STS, it is widely assumed 
that human beings would want to reduce safety risk whenever possible. However, 
Wilde [98] argues that, in any activity, people may “accept a certain level of 
subjectively estimated risk to their health, safety, and other things they value, in 
exchange for the benefits they hope to receive from that activity (e.g. drug use, 
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recreation or sports)”. This is the theory of Risk Homeostasis. Wilde believes that 
“people alter their behaviour in response to the implementation of health and safety 
measures, but the riskiness of the way they behave will not change, unless those 
measures are capable of motivating people to alter the amount of risk they are willing 
to incur.” It is important to appreciate the danger of risk homeostasis and be proactive 
to solicit and manage the risk appetite of different stakeholders.  
Cyber Physical System. Another type of domain construct to model safety-critical system is 
the Cyber Physical System (CPS). CPS can be considered as a system that “integrate the 
dynamics of the physical processes with those of the software and communication, providing 
abstraction and modelling, design, and analysis techniques for the integrated world” [99]. 
According to Sampigethaya [100], the physical domain refers to the physical subsystems and 
environment, while the cyber domain can be a “potential mix of digital computing, storage, 
software and data networks”. He illustrated this construct using an aviation system (Figure 
11). The cyberspace elements interact with the physical world (e.g. infrastructure, hardware, 
human, processes) through an interface of controller, sensors and actuators. 
 
Figure 11. Example of CPS in Aviation (extracted from Sampigethaya) 
Using a similar CPS modelling approach, Banerjee [101] introduces a mapping between the 
computing subsystems and physical subsystems to extract the interactions between the 
subsystem interfaces. In his example, the computing subsystems represent software modules 
while the physical subsystems are sensors that detect the physical environments. Banerjee also 
introduces two terms to describe the physical interactions of these subsystems: region of 
impact (intended interaction between subsystems) and region of interest (unintended 
interactions that may lead to side-effect). He used such a model to analyse the safety of medical 
devices, such as the Body Area Network, that were used to monitor and communicate vital 
signs of patients.  
Observations. Both STS and CPS modelling have their challenges when it comes to modelling 
uncertainty. For the STS, we have already highlighted concerns raised by various authors of 
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the uncertain situation surrounding STS that can result in unsafe behaviour. For the CPS 
modelling, while his approach is systematic, Banerjee’s mapping is more relevant to physical 
properties that can be mapped using mathematical abstractions (e.g. temperature fluctuation 
and thermodynamic) that link computing units to physical phenomenon. It is difficult to apply 
in system where the physical dynamic may not be so well-defined using formulae and physic 
laws. In addition, the physical domain is described qualitatively with incomplete information. 
Uncertainty about the system is expected even though there are attempts to quantify its 
characteristics such as temperature and location.   
2.3.2.2. Part-Whole Model 
In part-whole model, subsystems in a safety-critical system can be considered as “a component 
of one or more higher level systems or as whole which has other lower level components as 
parts” [102]. We will illustrate with two common part-whole models, namely system-of-
systems and holon model. 
System-of-Systems. One popular part-whole construct for safety-critical systems is the 
System-of-Systems (SoS) model which describes a set of subsystems that are cooperating 
while simultaneously working as independent entities [77]. Such subsystem can in turn 
represents a system that is formed by a collection of components or sub-systems. According 
to Maier [103, 104], SoS is described as having the following unique characteristics: 
operational and managerial independence of individual subsystem, geographic distribution, 
emergent behaviour and evolutionary development. As SoS is used to describe large-scale 
system that is highly dispersed, it is understandable that geographical distribution is 
highlighted as a key property. Besides geographical distribution, the other characteristics are 
similar to the two challenges highlighted earlier in section 2.3.1: agile and emergent. 
Harvey [105] cautions that “as subsystems of the SoS can be independently operated and 
managed, there would be a delicate and dynamic balance of responsibilities at individual 
subsystem level, across boundaries of subsystems and upward at the global level for the entire 
complex system”. Harvey’s concern raises the issue of ownership and responsibility for 
outcomes like safety for the SoS as subsystems leave and join the SoS dynamically.  
Holon Model. Another part-hole construct that is less commonly applied in industry is the 
holon model. Two of such models are the part-whole state diagram and the phantom system 
model.  
• Part-whole State Diagram.  Pazzi [102] uses the holon model to partition and simplify 
subsystems representation. He models two behaviours in separate diagrams: 
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individual behaviour within each subsystem and global behaviour due to interactions 
among subsystems.  
• Phantom System Model.  Haimes [106] introduces the phantom system model that 
models a system with the assumption that there would be certain specific relationships 
or “shared states” between any two or more subsystems. Examples of such “shared 
states” include a shared database, the decision of one subsystem that has impact on 
another subsystem or a collective decision from the collaboration between 
stakeholders of different subsystem. Haimes recommends passing the knowledge of 
the specific relationships (e.g. commonalities, interdependencies, interconnectedness) 
from these “shared-states”, as well as states that are not shared between subsystems, 
to the overall “meta-model” to “explore and learn” about the overall complicated 
system.  
Observations.  Both models do not receive wide spread application in the industry as it is a 
tedious and abstract approach to derive the models. However, both models do surface 
uncertainties faced by a subsystem, such as due to the dynamic behaviour of its embedded 
components (when considering the subsystem as a whole) and the external influence when 
integrating with other subsystems in a complicated environment (when considering the 
subsystem as a part). 
2.3.2.3. Architectural Framework  
A formal way to model large-scale military safety-critical systems is the use of architectural 
framework. Specifically, in the military, the US Department of Defence Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) and the UK Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MoDAF) are 
preferred models in the military that use matrices and diagrams to capture the different 
perspectives or views of a system. These views “represent different stakeholders in the 
military procurement, planning and implementation of military system” [107].  
Both frameworks are similar except for the inclusion of some customised views in each of 
them. These frameworks provide a standardised way to organise system architecture into 
consistent views that aim to complement each other in describing the system. Some of the 
more common views include the Operation (OV), Systems (SV) and Technical (TV) views. 
Benade [108] provides an illustration of the MoDAF architectural views as shown in Figure 
12. 
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Figure 12. Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MoDAF) (extracted from Benade) 
Observations.  While MoDAF/DoDAF provide a consistent architecture to model a large-
scale system, they lack the maintenance and traceability capabilities to track system behaviour 
throughout its lifecycle. For example, Bartolomei [109] argues that these frameworks capture 
complementary snapshots of the system but do not focus on the interdependencies and 
relationships between activities and processes. Similarly, Wrigley [110] states the concern that 
the DoDAF OV view is only showing a single operational context, without considering that 
the collection of subsystems only support a capability temporarily and a subsystem may be 
supporting multiple capabilities requirement simultaneously.  
These frameworks also do not consider uncertainties in the system. Such architectural views 
would require time and effort to construct, which are more feasible during system 
development. Constructing such views for safety assessment during operation may not be 
suitable as decisions must be made rapidly in an operating environment. 
 Analysis of SCS Models 
In this section, we focus on two approaches that are being applied to analyse SCS models. We 
have categorised them into the use of past experiences and modularisation.  
2.3.3.1. Use of Past Experiences 
The first approach uses past experiences as a reference to predict future behaviour of a safety-
critical system. Some common techniques involve the use of cases, patterns and blueprints. 
• Case-Based Reasoning.  Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is a decision support tool that 
“compares the current problem with similar previously experienced concrete 
problems and solutions” [111]. Such an approach is used when there is a lack of 
domain knowledge to provide formal representation of the different scenarios or 
system configurations. A typical representation of the CBR process is shown in Figure 
13. CBR can be used in safety assessment by comparing new case (e.g. a new 
  
72 
configuration or new safety case) with those stored in the case repository. If there is a 
match, the retrieved case from the repository would serve as a reference either to draw 
lessons from or to help in the assessment of the new case. 
 
• Pattern. Another technique to capture past experiences is to use patterns. Alexander 
[112] describes pattern as “abstracted solutions to recurring design problems in a 
given context”. Rauhamki [113] introduces several functional patterns in machine and 
industrial process control that aim to “document solutions and approach to 
implementation by capturing explicit and tacit knowledge”. Other examples include 
Kazman’s [77] integration pattern for new system in a SoS and Wei [114] software 
safety requirements pattern to be used for safety analysis. 
• Blueprint. Blueprint is a specific type of pattern that can include information such as 
hardware modules, software applications and system configuration. For example, 
Jolliffe [115] implements a system blueprint for IMA described in section 2.3.1.1. It 
was developed by choosing the “best bit” from each hardware, software and 
configuration blueprints based on a set of mapping and optimisation rules. The 
selected system blueprint needs to be certified safe, before being “loaded” into the 
system based on certain integration rules.  
Observations.  Relying on past experiences is important as it harnesses collective wisdom 
from other experts and is not limited by the knowledge of an individual doing the assessment. 
The use of past experiences to support and guide safety analysis is attractive but there is a 
danger of believing that an outcome from a previous experience that matches the current event 
will occur again. For example, a used case from the past may have epistemic uncertainty 
associated with it, that makes it different from the current event and results in different 
Figure 13. Typical Process Flow for CBR 
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outcome. Such uncertainty may not be documented and the safety analysis may lead to a wrong 
assessment. 
2.3.3.2. Modularisation  
A second approach is the use of modularisation to analyse safety-critical system. This 
approach decomposes a system into independent modules that can represent either a subsystem 
or a combination of subsystems with a given structure, pattern or behaviour. These modules 
will be added to, or removed from, the system depending on the changing conditions. We shall 
illustrate two separate studies that utilise modularisation, namely product-line engineering and 
modular certification.    
• Product-line engineering.  In a safety-critical system, there could be subsystems or a 
group of subsystems that are permanent features (e.g. the control tower in the air traffic 
management system) and there are subsystems that joined the complicated system 
temporarily (e.g. aircraft arriving and departing the airport). One approach is to define 
a reference architecture where subsystems are pre-defined as core assets and the 
relevant assets will only be selected at some specific “binding time” later to represent 
the safety-critical system. Such an approach is known as product-line engineering. 
The SEI-CMU3 describes such a software product-line in a similar manner as “a set 
of software-intensive systems that share a common, managed set of features satisfying 
the specific needs of a particular market or mission and that are developed from a 
common set of core assets in a prescribed way”.  
 
Figure 14. A Product-Line Engineering Approach [79] 
Habli [79] introduces a similar approach to assure safety in a safety-critical product 
line (see Figure 14). He derives reusable core assets from environmental context, 
system feature and reference architecture. However, this approach has its limitation as 
the binding of the assets into the “product” must occur during the “product derivation 
process”, which is within the developmental phase rather than during operation. 
Furthermore, the configuration or “permitted variation” for the product-line must be 
                                                 
3 Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University 
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pre-defined. It may not be possible to derive such an exhaustive set of configurations 
for a complicated safety-critical system. 
 
 
Figure 15. Concept of Modular Certification (extracted from Trapp) 
• Modular Certification. Modular certification can be applied to safety-critical system 
whereby subsystems are modelled as independent modules and certified safe at the 
module level before being aggregated to be certified at the system level. This approach 
is highlighted by Trapp [78] as a concept to model adaptive system for safety 
assurance (see Figure 15). The Industrial Avionics Working Group has also proposed 
a modular and incremental approach for safety certification [116] for aviation 
components. It assumes that the “cost of re-certification of change is related to the 
size and complexity of the system being changed”. By modularising a system, it is 
hoped that the scale and complexity of change can be reduced, which makes the re-
certification cheaper.  
Observations.  Modularisation can help to provide flexible solutions to meet changing context 
of a system where boundaries between subsystems are well defined. The key challenge is when 
the boundaries between subsystems became blurred and not well defined. For example, in 
section 2.3.1.1, both Kajtazovic’s recommendation and the IMA concept aim to ensure change 
is incremental and does not necessitate a re-evaluation back to the development phase of the 
software. The intent is to develop timely and acceptable solution in anticipation of future 
uncertainties. However, this assumes that components are modular and there are minimal 
interactions between modular components.  
For safety, modularisation may increase the risk of losing critical information or knowledge 
of the system as a whole. A system can comprise perfectly safe subsystems that may not be 
designed to operate together. This would potentially make the system unsafe. Such failure is 
not easily spotted and tracked, as it emerges only when the system is observed as a whole 
rather than as individual subsystem. Such emergent behaviour has been elaborated in section 
2.3.1.2. 
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 Through-life Management of SCS  
In this section, we describe the typical lifecycle phases that a safety-critical system would 
experience, as well as the kind of known challenges in managing such system throughout its 
lifecycles. Both are important when we construct an approach to manage epistemic uncertainty 
throughout the system lifecycle.   
2.3.4.1. Phases in Through-Life Management 
A system can be considered as a “combination, with defined boundaries, of elements that are 
used together in a defined operating environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific 
purpose” [63]. To achieve such a task or purpose, a system often needs to go through multiple 
phases in time as part of its lifecycle. Consider the military, a system is realised usually by 
following the system acquisition lifecycle. A full-scale system acquisition lifecycle includes 
multiple phases, milestones and decision points that shape the development of a system till its 
operationalisation. Two examples of military acquisition lifecycles are shown in Figure 16. 
They are the UK MoD CADMID acquisition cycle and the US DoD Defence Acquisition 
Process.  
 
Figure 16. Categorisation of System Acquisition Lifecycle in Defence 
In general, a system moves from the development to the operation phases as it matures 
throughout its lifecycle. Both phases are subjected to uncertainty while exhibiting different 
system characteristics. The following table provides a general comparison of the two phases 
according to MOD JSP 886 and DoDI 5000.02.  
Table 12. Comparison of Development and Operation Phases 
Characteristics System Development System Operation 
Typical processes  Design, plan, production, testing, and 
deployment 
Operation, maintenance and support, 
retirement, phase-out and disposal 
Decision-cycle Long. Decision may be made in days or 
months after several trials and reviews  
Short. Usually demands real-time 
analysis under time pressure. 
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Characteristics System Development System Operation 
Challenges in 
information 
management 
Potential information overload due to 
numerous paperwork, activities and 
milestones. 
Potential incorrect information due to lack 
of proper handover of system knowledge 
Incomplete or imperfect information to 
make time-critical decision. 
 
Human Dynamics Multiple stakeholders involve with different 
responsibilities. 
Stakeholders change as system transits to 
different stages of the life-cycle. 
Usually same group of individuals (e.g. 
operators and maintenance engineers) 
that operates the system. 
Mostly operators with field experience, 
rather than system experts with in-depth 
technical knowledge  
Example of 
challenges 
System design and requirements evolve 
throughout the system lifecycle 
Difficult to test interoperability with other 
systems which could already been in 
operation. 
Challenge of scalability due to resource 
constraints in order to consider all 
operational scenarios  
Trade-offs between performance and 
risk-adverse options in safety analysis. 
Manage surprise due to emergent 
behaviour that will only surface when the 
systems interoperate dynamically with 
each other.  
Verification carried out in static 
development is not comprehensive 
enough to be used for real-time dynamic 
environment. 
There are other flexible ways of acquiring capabilities that have been introduced either due to 
urgent need to meet operational requirements or a lack of budget for full-scale capability 
development. Such alternate approaches are commonly known as agile acquisition. For 
example, the MoD acquisition handbook [117] mentions that, besides full-scale acquisition, 
one can conduct system acquisition in the following ways: 
• Incremental acquisition.  This means that the system is developed in stages, with those 
components “providing the most benefits or at an acceptable risk” being first to be 
introduced.  
• Evolutionary acquisition.  Instead of developing the system elements in stages, one 
can also develop the capabilities of a system in phases. It aims to “provide rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the user, while recognising the need to improve 
future capability”. This approach demands a “consistent and continuous definition of 
requirements through active feedback and the exploitation of mature technology”.  
For example, the MOD Light Protected Patrol Vehicle program was managed as a form of 
agile acquisition known as Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR), whereby an “80% 
solution” was targeted to meet the need of rapid acquisition [118, 119]. While there wasn’t a 
clear definition of this “80% solution” in the report, it demonstrated the pressure to deploy a 
capability urgently to meet operational requirement. The report did emphasise that such 
urgency might indirectly lead to increase safety risk when the project team streamlined some 
of the system engineering processes as a trade-off for urgent implementation.  
Observations.  When selecting an acquisition approach, there is a tendency to select an 
efficient solution by identifying a minimal acceptable level of acquisition activities to deliver 
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the operating system in view of resource limitations. Such acquisition activities usually focus 
on ensuring system performance first, rather than system safety. Hence, it is common that 
uncertainty observed during safety assessment would not be tracked throughout the acquisition 
lifecycle. 
2.3.4.2. Integrating Safety and System Lifecycles 
Within a system acquisition lifecycle, there could be multiple iterations of the safety 
management lifecycle. Bozanno [120] mentions that there are two complementary roles for 
safety management in system acquisition, the early “constructive” role during system 
development to guide design activities; and the later “destructive” role during system 
integration and operation to determine if system is indeed safe. Ideally, these “constructive” 
and “destructive” roles are carried out using similar safety assessment processes as shown in 
Table 8 throughout the system acquisition lifecycle.  
 
Figure 17. Example of Integrating Safety and System Lifecycles 
Based on IEC615084, a suitable diagram to summarise the relation between safety assessment 
and system acquisition lifecycles is extracted from Chambers & Associates5 [121] (see Figure 
17). In the diagram, the system development management is similar to the system acquisition 
                                                 
4 ISO/IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related 
systems 
5 Chambers and Associates (C&A) Pte Ltd is a “systems engineering consulting, contracting and 
training organisation providing project services to a wide variety of industry sectors”. 
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lifecycle. The figure shows the safety assessment processes being called upon multiple times 
throughout the system acquisition from development to operation.  
Separately, Barlow [122] also reiterates the importance of integrating acquisition and safety 
processes for a successful acquisition. In addition, he mentions the potential “lock-in” risk 
especially in the early stages of the project. As industry partners are usually ahead in the 
understanding of the system design in the early stages, they may seek to tie down (or “lock 
in”) the operators’ expectation of the system and limit the system capability early in the design 
stage. This will make it difficult for operators to modify the system design during system 
development downstream. Hence, he advocates that safety must be considered early and 
through-out the system lifecycle. For the complex Next-Generation Air Transportation 
Systems (NextGen), Baheti [123] also supports the position that it is important to consider 
safety throughout the system lifecycle, especially during initial design, implementation, 
maintenance and modification.   
Observations.  While there is evidence of established safety processes with materials such as 
safety reports, standards and safety manuals to support system acquisition; there are still 
challenges in integrating safety and acquisition throughout the entire lifecycle. This is 
especially challenging for large-scale and long-term acquisition projects which usually involve 
many stakeholders with different perspectives and experiences. This is made worse with the 
presence of epistemic uncertainty throughout the system lifecycle due to a lack of knowledge 
among the stakeholders during safety assessments.  
2.3.4.3. Uncertainty in Through-Life Management  
In this section, we will illustrate common situations that may result in epistemic uncertainty 
during through-life management of safety-critical system. One example is the diverse list of 
possible causes of epistemic uncertainty stated by Atkinson [96] in his research on project 
management: 
• Novelty of design and technology 
• Diverse and conflicting stakeholders’ expectations  
• Failure to anticipate concurrency of activities and capture dependency relationships 
• Ineffective communication and knowledge management with changing stakeholders 
throughout system lifecycle 
• Lack of continuity in personal and responsibilities when managing different 
interoperating systems 
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• Incomplete and imperfect information  
• Lack of systematic process to capture corporate knowledge and lessons learned 
Taking healthcare as another example, the need to pay greater attention to uncertainty for 
safety-critical system was highlighted in the ECRI’s6 report of “top ten health technology 
hazards for 2014” [124]. In the report, the top ten hazards in health care include failures in 
technical systems (e.g. data integrity failures in IT systems) and neglecting change 
management for technical network. The key recommendations to counter such failures include 
raising awareness among different medical stakeholders on how their actions can affect other 
“operations, patient care and work processes” and engendering different stakeholders to work 
together and mitigate the risk when using complicated networked medical devices.  
Separately, in his comparison of large-scale healthcare systems across US and UK, Johnson 
[125] mentions several challenges that may lead to uncertainties related to the system:  
• Tensions between optimisation at global versus local levels,  
• Potential hazards due to system failure when staff increasingly rely on complicated 
technical system, and  
• Lack of accurate and shared situational awareness among stakeholders to make 
informed decision.  
Lipsitz [126] sums up the uncertainty in health care as a “non-linear, dynamic and 
unpredictable” system that needs greater attention compared to simple linear system. Such 
network of health care components includes the hospital, patience, medical devices, 
rehabilitation centres, etc., that may interact independently and yet produce unintended 
adverse consequences like drug reactions, infections and death. Like health-care, Lipsitz 
suggests that other safety-critical systems can first consider explicitly the challenges facing 
the system and then use it to create the awareness of potential hazards in such circumstances.  
In another study to discover the uncertainties from project management, Saunders [46] 
conducted a survey with project managers in UK nuclear and civil aerospace industry. He 
generated a list that includes environmental, individual, complexity, information, temporal, 
capability and regulatory factors. While the sample size was small and the survey was only 
conducted in the UK, the survey result did reinforce the diverse challenges that are facing 
project managers. As part of his conclusive remark, Saunders argues that there is a lack of 
“orientate and focus” techniques for decision makers to be better aware of the impact due to 
                                                 
6 The Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) carries out applied scientific research in healthcare to 
improve patient care in US and Europe. 
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the uncertainty. The right information was not collected timely to detect potential changes in 
a project and reduce the element of surprise. 
Observations.  To summarise, safety-critical system experiences multiple phases and each 
phase brings with it many epistemic uncertainties that may be cascaded throughout the system 
lifecycle. Such uncertainties may directly or indirectly impact the safety of the system. As 
shown in this section, the diverse list of uncertainties makes it difficult or almost impossible 
for any individual to be aware of all these uncertainties that can affect a safety-critical system. 
Borrowing Rumsfeld’s definitions in section 2.1.1.2, there will be many unknown unknowns 
that could be discovered which are beyond the knowledge of any individual. There is a need 
to tap on the collective wisdoms from other experts as a leverage during hazard analysis to 
identify potential hazards even with the presence of epistemic uncertainty (i.e. known 
unknowns).   
 Summary 
In this chapter, we have surveyed the literature from two important concepts that affect our 
research: uncertainty and safety. While we find out more on each domain separately, we also 
want to survey literature that deal concurrently with both domains of uncertainty and safety 
(e.g. the extent that uncertainty is being surfaced and managed in safety assessment). To put 
into the context that we have surfaced in chapter 1, we scope our survey to focus on safety-
critical system, which is also the type of system that we will be dealing with in our research.  
Through our survey, we have also decided to focus on the qualitative assessment of uncertainty 
even though quantitative assessment is equally important. This is because many uncertainties 
are difficult to quantify, and qualitative assessment is usually required to support quantitative 
values to provide a more comprehensive assessment (e.g. to provide the context). Our focus 
on qualitative assessment may potentially be the foundation for any uncertainty management.   
With the observations in this chapter, we would be better prepared to develop the principles 
and models to manage epistemic uncertainties in safety assessment. Moving on, we would 
focus on modelling such epistemic uncertainties in the next chapter, before we propose the 
approach to manage these uncertainties. 
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Chapter 3 – Principles and Models to Manage Epistemic 
Uncertainties 
 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introduction and subsequently elaborated in the literature survey under 
chapter 2, uncertainty can be classified as aleatory or epistemic [10] – aleatory uncertainty is 
about randomness; epistemic uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge. Epistemic uncertainty 
can be due to things we know we do not know (known uncertainties), or things we do not 
know we do not know (unknown uncertainties) [11]. In practice, stakeholders never 
completely know if they have full data or knowledge about the system and its environment 
when modelling them.  
Although epistemic uncertainty is unavoidable, we should reduce the undesired effects of 
known and unknown uncertainties during safety assessment. We have argued in chapter 1 that 
if epistemic uncertainties were not tracked and addressed appropriately, it can eventually lead 
to accidents. If these uncertainties were managed better during safety assessment, these 
accidents might had been averted. 
As explained in section 1.3, we will suggest answers to the following three pertinent questions 
that would affect how epistemic uncertainties can be managed: 
Q1. WHAT aspects of the epistemic uncertainties do we want to manage? 
Q2. WHERE do these epistemic uncertainties reside in safety assessment model?  
Q3. HOW can we better manage the epistemic uncertainties as part of the system 
lifecycle?  
We elaborate on each question here: 
• Focus on ‘WHAT’: Three Principles to Manage Epistemic Uncertainties. The first 
step in studying epistemic uncertainties is to define what are important to focus on in 
managing epistemic uncertainties in safety assessment. We have defined three 
important principles to develop the eventual approach. The reasons that these 
principles are important are also presented. These will be elaborated in section 3.2. 
• Focus on ‘WHERE’: Two Underlying Models to Manage Epistemic 
Uncertainties. For system engineering, it is common to use system models such as 
circuit diagram and system operational envelope to represent a system. It is also 
common to use safety causal models such as Fault Trees and Swiss Chess model 
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during risk analysis. However, these models are mostly isolated models that do not 
directly show the relationship or influence between system and safety-related 
elements. Hence, we will introduce two underlying models to identify where are the 
critical relationships among system and safety-related elements that epistemic 
uncertainties can be found and managed. The Conceptual Model of System Safety 
(CMSS) can be used to represent relationships between system and safety-related 
elements, whereas the Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA) 
can be used to locate epistemic uncertainties among causal relationships in safety 
assessment. Both models will be described in section 3.3. 
• Focus on ‘HOW’: Concrete Approach to Manage Epistemic Uncertainties. An 
approach on how to manage epistemic uncertainties as part of the ongoing through-
life system engineering process is proposed based on the three guiding principles and 
two underlying models. It is known as the Target-Analysis-Goal (T.A.G.) approach 
which will be elaborated in chapter 4.  
Notations to Represent Relationships.  In this chapter, we will frequently refer to the 
following three common relationships7 – association, inheritance and aggregation. The 
notations to represent these relationships are shown in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18. Key Relationships between Elements: Association, Inheritance and Aggregation 
Association represents dependency between objects such as a pilot flies the helicopter or a 
soldier operates the missile. Inheritance refers to a ‘is a’ relationship, such as a helicopter is 
an aircraft, a missile is a weapon. Aggregation refers to a ‘has a’ relationship, such as a 
helicopter has rotating blades as a part, a missile has warhead as a part.  
 Principles to Manage Epistemic Uncertainties   
In this section, we will describe and justify the importance of the three principles to develop 
the eventual approach. These three principles are presented below:    
                                                 
7 These notations are adopted from the UML modelling language that is used to visualise the design of 
a system. 
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1. Epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessment should be 
identified (justification in section 3.2.1).  
2. Epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessment should be 
documented (justification in section 3.2.2). 
3. Epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessment should be 
tracked and addressed in a systematic manner through-life (justification in section 
3.2.3). 
 Principle 1: Epistemic uncertainties should be identified  
We have established three reasons why it is important to identify the epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models of safety assessment. These reasons are summarised here and will be 
elaborated in the following section. 
• Epistemic uncertainty is inherent in safety assessment 
• There is no commonly practised approach of identifying epistemic uncertainty in 
safety-critical system 
• Safety assessment is more complete by recognising and identifying plausible 
uncertainty than assuming that there is no uncertainty  
3.2.1.1. Epistemic uncertainty is inherent in safety assessment 
As systems get more complicated, it is increasingly challenging to be aware or anticipate every 
characteristic and behaviour of the systems as they interact with other systems and the 
environment.  
For safety assessment, it is common to use models to represent a system and its environment 
as the analysis becomes complicated. System designs, safety assessment techniques, 
engineering theories and concept of operations are some of the common but diverse types of 
models that safety assessment depends on. In our research, we consider model to be abstraction 
of the real world for the purpose of analysis. 
The statistician George Box once said, “All models are wrong but some are useful.” [127]. 
This may sound misleading depending on how the word “wrong” is being interpreted. We 
believe that what Box means is that a model is “wrong” because it cannot completely represent 
the real world (since epistemic uncertainty is inherent in safety assessment, especially for 
complicated safety-critical systems8 [128]); not that it is not suitable to use a model in an 
                                                 
8 The modelling of safety-critical system is described in chapter 2.3.  
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analysis. He follows up by explaining that while a model cannot represent the real world 
completely (i.e. by being “wrong”), a model can still be “useful” when it is able to serve its 
purpose. We agree that a model is still relevant as long as the part of the real world that is not 
represented in the model does not affect the purpose of the model.  
Box was using strong language to communicate the idea that a model is an abstraction of the 
real world. Model abstraction is important as the intent of a model is to represent and simplify 
the real world for analysis. The importance of model abstraction was also emphasised by Joan 
Robinson in her famous saying in 1965 [129], "A model which took account of all the 
variegation of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one."  
One of the key challenges of model abstraction is that there is no single best way to simplify 
a model as it depends on the purpose of the model. This is analogous to the example whereby 
there is no single best way to simplify a map away from the scale of one to one, as it depends 
on the purpose of the map. This is illustrated by Kolmar in his book: Principles of 
Microeconomics [130]. He illustrated with an example: a map that represents the actual 
altitude with multiple contour lines may not be useful for a driver; however, these contour 
lines become very important to a hiker in determining the gradient of his hiking track.  
Hence, in the case of a model, the critical question is really what we are trying to accomplish 
with the model and if the right abstraction has been made so that the model is useful to 
accomplish its purpose. Since models are necessarily abstract, we must elide detail from our 
models to make them usable for its purpose. However, every elision will most likely 
accompanied with either an assumption that the detail we have elided doesn't matter to our 
purpose or a ram-uncertainty that the elided detail doesn't ‘significantly’ impact us in 
achieving our intended purpose (the comparison between assumption and ram-uncertainty is 
further elaborated in section 3.2.2.1). For safety assessment, the purpose of having models is 
for causal modelling as explained in section 1.2.3. To conclude, we are faced with the 
challenge of having epistemic uncertainty (or ram-uncertainty) in safety assessment because 
the model we use is naturally an abstraction of the real world. 
Example.  For example, a system flight trial is often conducted using a scaled down model of 
the operating environment when a system is tested for its air-worthiness. The result is often 
extrapolated during theoretical analysis to predict the safety of the system in the actual 
operating environment.  
In chapter 2.3.1, we have described that the adaptive and emergent behaviours as key causes 
of epistemic uncertainties in safety-critical systems. For the modelling of such systems, as a 
result of both adaptive and a lack of appreciation of the emergent behaviours, we have 
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narrowed down to two issues that make epistemic uncertainties inherent when modelling such 
system: temporal and model capabilities. 
Temporal. During safety assessment, stakeholders may not have the time to wait for all 
relevant information or data to be available before making a safety decision. When there are 
epistemic uncertainties, stakeholders have to make decision based on past experiences and 
collective wisdoms among those who are present.  
Example.  For example, in the final hours where the management team had to decide if they 
should go ahead with the launch of the CHALLENGER space shuttle, some of the more 
experienced engineers were absent and not able to provide technical advice. Nevertheless, the 
team had to decide even if expert or important information was not available.  
Also, in a system lifecycle with multiple milestones, certain information about the system may 
only be available at the later stage of the lifecycle.  
Example.  For example, the actual concept of operation may not be finalised during the initial 
design phase. Hence, stakeholders can expect epistemic uncertainties especially during early 
design phase where information may only be available later, such as during testing or 
integration with other systems. 
Modelling Capability. For a single system, such as an aircraft platform, safety assessment 
largely focuses on simple and deterministic events such as component failure within the 
system. Interactions among subsystems of a social-technical system are more complicated and 
much less predictable than a simple individual system. Compared to simple systems, 
complicated safety-critical systems can behave in many more ways or scenarios, some may 
not even be modelled. Without the capability to build models that can comprehensively 
represent the complicated safety-critical systems, stakeholders can expect epistemic 
uncertainties during safety assessment.  
Example.  For example, when a new helicopter is integrated with other types of air platforms 
to provide a network of fighting capabilities, not all the possible operational scenarios have 
been conceptualised. This could be an iterative process whereby the operational concept 
becomes more mature as the helicopter is being developed. Hence, the requirement models 
that are used to represent the helicopter and its interactions with other systems to provide the 
fighting capabilities would have to evolve with time. Naturally, there will be epistemic 
uncertainties in these models since their capabilities to represent the safety-critical system 
depend on the maturity in understanding the eventual operational scenarios.  
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3.2.1.2. There is no commonly practised approach of identifying epistemic 
uncertainty in safety-critical system 
We have mentioned earlier that epistemic uncertainty can be due to things we know we do not 
know (known uncertainties), or things we do not know we do not know (unknown 
uncertainties). There are two key shortfalls about the way epistemic uncertainty is being 
managed now in system safety lifecycle. 
First, safety stakeholders tend to ignore unknown uncertainty. During safety assessment, 
stakeholders must make assessments under a myriad of challenging conditions due to a lack 
of time, expertise and information. While stakeholders acknowledge the existence of unknown 
uncertainties, it is reasonable to expect that they would prefer to focus on what they are aware 
of based on their collective wisdom and experiences regarding uncertainties, that is, the known 
uncertainties. In other words, given the limited resources, the assessment would tend to focus 
more on known uncertainties in safety assessment.  
Example.  For example, in the RSAF safety assessment for new system, what could be 
uncertain to the safety analysts is the detailed specifications of an existing equipment that is 
unavailable at the point of assessment. As the equipment has been operating for many years 
and the specification may not be easily retrievable, there may be tendency to assume the 
equipment is safe since it has been operating in the existing environment for many years. This 
uncertainty can be safety-critical if the equipment cannot safely interoperate with the new 
system.  
In summary, there isn’t a common and systematic approach to identify unknown uncertainty 
associated with a system that can be safety critical in current safety assessment.  
Secondly, safety stakeholders tend to ignore the evolution of known uncertainty.  As for 
known uncertainty, there is a possibility to ignore and not track it. Such information may be 
disregarded because it could be deemed not safety-critical at the time it was acquired. 
However, uncertainty can vary over time as the stakeholders’ knowledge about the system and 
its environment changes throughout the lifecycle. A system that is deemed simple and 
predictable during design phase may become complicated and uncertain when it starts to 
interact more with other systems. 
Example.  For example, in the RSAF safety assessment for new system, a subject matter 
expert (SME) in air traffic control of an airbase may not be present during a safety assessment. 
While this may be acknowledged, the absence of the SME is usually not explicitly documented 
and tracked after the safety assessment session. As a result, there may not be enough attention 
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on the uncertainty of operating the new system in the airbase under various air traffic 
conditions. This known uncertainty may become safety-critical downstream as the new system 
starts to operate in the airbase with heavy air-traffic condition (which demands a safety 
assessment on the safety of flight in such condition).  
Also, some uncertainties need time before stakeholders can determine if they are safety-
critical. For example, the safety assessment may involve preliminary documents with 
uncertainties about requirements and design features that can only be validated later as part of 
system development.  
In summary, there isn’t a common and systematic approach to identify changes to known 
uncertainty that may become safety critical in current safety assessment. 
3.2.1.3. Safety assessment is more complete by recognising and identifying plausible 
uncertainty than assuming that there is no uncertainty 
Safety assessment is about making predictions. Prediction is best when there is as much 
knowledge about the system as possible. One way of building up knowledge is to gather as 
much information related to the system as possible. Acknowledging the presence of 
uncertainty in the information that is used in the safety assessment is also a form of knowledge. 
Rather than having false confidence that there is always perfect information during safety 
assessment, it is better to create the awareness and build in the necessary risk tolerance for the 
uncertainty. 
Overconfidence in a model used during safety assessment can be catastrophic. The worst 
scenario could be a misplaced sense of confidence that the underlying models in system safety 
are adequately representing the real world where the system is operating, which may lead to 
unsafe situation down the acquisition cycle.  
Example.   For example, in her research on the CHALLENGER space shuttle accident [1] 
(section 1.1.1), Vaughan highlighted the “overconfident belief in the assumed safety of the 
shuttle launch through the years”. Unfortunately, such overconfidence of the existing model 
of operating the space shuttle became one of the reasons that desensitised the management 
from identifying the abnormal O-ring behaviour.  
A useful model is one that is explicit about its limitation and associated uncertainty. 
While the statistician George Box acknowledged that models are useful even if they are 
“wrong”, he cautioned that users need to be aware of the extent where a model can become 
‘not useful’. The capability of a model to be useful can be limited by the presence of epistemic 
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uncertainty in the model. As stated in chapter 2.2.2, McDermid emphasises that professional 
safety engineers and the research community involved in developing a system have the duty 
to ensure uncertainties about the system are explicitly identified and managed. By being honest 
and explicit about the uncertainties within a model (e.g. what is included/not included in the 
model, what is known about the model), stakeholders can better apply the model during safety 
assessment.  
 Principle 2: Epistemic uncertainties should be documented.  
We have established three reasons why it is important to document the epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models of safety assessment. These reasons are summarised here and will be 
elaborated in the following section. 
• There is no established approach of documenting the nature of the uncertainties within 
a model in safety assessment 
• Documentation of uncertainties in a model reduces the danger of ignoring safety-
critical uncertainty  
• Documentation of uncertainties reduces confirmation bias by being open about the 
reasons to believe and the reasons to doubt an assessment  
3.2.2.1. There is no established approach of documenting the nature of the 
uncertainties within a model in safety assessment 
In safety assessment, we are concerned with uncertainty associated with risk assessment, or 
ra-uncertainty for short. And the specific ra-uncertainty that we are focusing on is the 
recognised absence of knowledge associated with the models that are used to predict safety 
risk. We call this risk assessment models uncertainty, or ram-uncertainty for short. Before we 
proceed to consider uncertainty, it is important to   distinguish between uncertainties and 
assumptions.  
An assumption is usually accepted by a safety analyst as long as it is reasonable, even though 
it may not be certain. Using ISO 15026-2 Systems and Software Engineering—Systems and 
Software Assurance standard [131] as a reference, assumption is considered as a claim that 
“appears in an assurance case as evidence” that is provided “without any reason why it is true”. 
OMG Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [132] states that an assumption is 
considered as a claim that is “assumed to be true” and “is intentionally declared without any 
supporting evidence or argumentation”. 
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Assumptions are commonly used in safety assessment when there is a lack of knowledge in 
certain areas. For example, Weaver [133] mentioned in his research on safety case that 
assumptions “can be considered legitimate and acceptable where there is a genuine lack of 
information or lack of understanding that cannot easily be resolved at the time the safety case 
is presented”. In summary, assumptions are always associated with an absence of knowledge 
- i.e. for something to classify as an assumption there must be an uncertainty.   
 
Figure 19. Relations between Uncertainty and Assumption 
In the context of risk assessment, the presence of a ram-uncertainty does not automatically 
imply the existence of an explicitly stated assumption (see Figure 19). The figure shows that 
there are at least three possible scenarios with regards to ram-uncertainty and the associated 
assumptions. Each of the scenarios has its issues as explained below:  
• Scenario A: Unidentified ram-Uncertainty. A perhaps obvious but less considered 
scenario is when a ram-uncertainty is not being identified. An unidentified ram-
uncertainty can mean that one may not even realise that he is operating with potential 
assumption. As a result, there lies an unidentified assumption. In our research, we aim 
to develop an approach to discover such uncertainties that the safety analysts are 
initially unaware of, so as to transform them into identified uncertainties. Once these 
uncertainties become identified, they would naturally fall under either of the next two 
scenarios (i.e. uncertainties with either implicit or explicit assumptions). 
• Scenario B: Identified ram-Uncertainty dismissed with a questionable assumption of 
unimportance. Another scenario is when an identified ram-uncertainty does not lead 
to an explicit assumption. A common explanation is that the ram-uncertainty may be 
assessed not to pose a substantial safety risk to warrant an explicit assumption 
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regarding the uncertainty. For example, a stationary radar system that is planned to 
operate in Singapore may not have been tested in winter (i.e. low operating 
temperature with potential of snow). This uncertainty will usually be discarded as 
unimportant since Singapore is a tropical country that does not experience winter. 
Hence, the performance of the radar in winter needs not be proven since it is currently 
assessed to not be a credible scenario. However, while an explicit assumption may 
appear not to be necessary, it does not mean that there is no assumption being made. 
Minimally, there is at least the default, implicit assumption that “this known 
uncertainty does not impact safety and need not be tracked as an explicit assumption”. 
In our research, we are concerned with the validity of such an implicit assumption that 
the identified ram-uncertainty is unimportant, especially when there could be a lack 
of knowledge at the point of making the assessment.   
• Scenario C: Identified ram-Uncertainty managed with a questionable explicit 
assumption. The most obvious scenario is when explicit assumption is introduced 
when a ram-uncertainty is identified during risk assessment. Usually, such explicit 
assumption will be systematically documented and tracked. For example, to manage 
the uncertainty about whether a new system can perform in all operating environment, 
an explicit assumption can be introduced to commit that this new system will only be 
operating in situations that have been tested positively during system trial. No one 
knows if the new system will be used in other situations in the future, but the explicit 
assumption helps to commit the current allowable operating environment. In our 
research, we are also concerned with the validity of such explicit assumptions 
associated with the identified ram-uncertainty throughout the system lifecycle, 
especially when there could be a lack of knowledge at the point of making the 
assessment.  
For example, an established way to manage assumption is the Master Data Assumption List 
(MDAL) in project management. The MDAL is being used by NATO to manage life cycle 
costing. According to the NATO technical report [134], the MDAL aims to capture data and 
assumptions that are used to make estimation. While the intent is good, the description in the 
technical report does not provide details or any structured approach to consider uncertainty 
across the lifecycle of a system.  
If both the assumption and the identified ram-uncertainty are tracked together, it will give the 
safety analysts the opportunity to reflect on questions such as “how much doubt do we have 
about the assumption regarding this uncertainty?” and “how unsafe can it be if our assumption 
about this uncertainty is wrong?”.  
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Example.  For example, back to the example in scenario C. Hypothetically, there could be (1) 
uncertainty about the duration of which the system will be operated daily, and (2) uncertainty 
about the manpower requirement to operate the system. If the system is only tracked by the 
assumption “the system will only operate in a situation that has been tested in the system trial”, 
without explicitly stating the two associated uncertainties concerning duration of daily 
operation and manpower demand; we lose the wider potential of tracking identified 
uncertainties that may affect the validity of the system trial. When one gathers more 
information later to clarify these uncertainties, the system trial may need to be revisited if 
either (1) the daily operation is longer than the trial period or (2) the number of persons needed 
to operate the system is more than that during the trial. 
Lack of detail regarding the cause of uncertainties.  Even when uncertainties are being 
considered during safety assessment, there isn’t a model to consider the cause of the 
uncertainty. Understanding the cause of the uncertainty will help in the subsequent tracking of 
the uncertainty. In our research, we focus on two possible causes where the epistemic 
uncertainty can reside: condition of interest (which represent nodes) and causal path (which 
represent linkages). We will discuss more about these two causes of uncertainty when we 
introduced one of the underlying models to manage epistemic uncertainties in section 3.3.2.  
3.2.2.2. Documentation of uncertainties in a model reduces the danger of ignoring 
safety-critical uncertainty  
Danger of fixing assessed risk in models.  Stakeholders may be “lock-in” to a model and 
ignore safety-critical uncertainty as they cannot adapt in time when the uncertainty poses a 
safety risk further down the lifecycle. Models are used to identify and represent system 
structures, behaviours and changes over time. For example, system structural diagram, concept 
of operation document and hazard analysis techniques are models that are commonly used 
during safety assessment. Stakeholders would have to conform to the processes defined in 
these models, as well as accept the assumptions, justifications and epistemic uncertainties that 
often accompanied the models. As a system evolves throughout the lifecycle, model 
uncertainties may become safety-critical. However, stakeholders may not be able to adapt in 
time because either they are not aware of the uncertainties or they choose not to track the 
uncertainties throughout the lifecycle as they are not aware of the hazard posed by the 
uncertainties.  
Example.  Considering the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) that follows the Concept, 
Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-service, and Disposal (CADMID)  acquisition 
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life cycle [4] (see also chapter 2.3.4.1), a safety report comprising multiple safety requirements 
is usually produced at each milestone of the lifecycle (see Figure 20).  
 
While the safety report at each gate provides important safety requirements, it has an 
unintended danger of ignoring the epistemic uncertainties in the models whenever decision is 
being made at each of the acquisition gates. For example, in the research posted by Barlow 
[122], he warns that ‘when a MoD project goes through Initial or Main Gate, the IP (industrial 
partner) is nominally ahead of the MoD’s needs in terms of their understanding of the design 
and will consequently seek to tie down the customer’s expectation of what is achievable. This 
disconnect can introduce ‘locked in’ risk if not fully understood.’ According to Barlow, this 
‘locked in’ refers to the finalised design requirements that are to be manufactured and the risk 
is about the ‘disconnect’ between the evolving operating requirements and these fixed design 
requirements that are going to be implemented. Such operating requirements may evolve 
multiple times throughout the system lifecycle, such as when either new tactics are discovered 
during demonstration or new system is added into the operation. In his research paper, Barlow 
provides an example of such a disconnect between an indicative engineering design lifecycle 
and the MoD CADMID cycle as shown in Figure 21.  
Take for example at the Main Gate, the system to subsystem design requirements may have 
already been finalised for manufacturing. However, as can be seen from the MOD’s CADMID 
lifecycle, the demonstration of the operating concepts has yet to begin. Very often, for military 
system, operating concepts can change or new ones can be discovered during the 
demonstration phase. This can change the original operating concepts. In such a situation, if 
uncertainties about the original operating concepts are not being tracked systematically, they 
may get ignored when the same operating concepts get modified subsequently, such as during 
the demonstration phase. This may have safety concern as the system has already been 
designed according to the original operating concepts.   
 
Figure 20. MoD CADMID Cycle 
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Such asynchronous processes to develop systems are common in the military and uncertainty 
can be expected. We can imagine a military example whereby at the Main Gate phase, a system 
may have been designed for the navy according to a datalink message format recognised by 
the navy. At this point, there could be uncertainty about the possibility that the system may 
interoperate with the airforce in the future that may have a different message format. Currently, 
such uncertainty may not be systematically documented and tracked at the Main Gate as part 
of uncertainty management. This may become a safety-critical concern down the acquisition 
lifecycle when the operating concept includes interoperation with airforce system (with its 
unique message format). Such uncertainty has a high chance of being overlooked as multiple 
stakeholders (navy and airforce) are involved without an established documentation of the 
uncertainty. One potential safety concern is that the navy message format may define a target 
as friendly, while the airforce message format may consider the same target as hostile, leading 
to possible fratricide. 
To reduce the 'lock-in' risk at each milestone, it is important to document as much as practically 
possible what are the known uncertainties, as well as what are considered or not considered 
during the safety analysis. Every decision or claim made during the analysis is usually justified 
by certain arguments. Stakeholders should regularly question if the arguments remain valid 
throughout the system lifecycle.  
Figure 21. MOD’s CADMID vs Design Lifecycle 
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Stakeholders need to actively acknowledge such lack of information and manage the 
corresponding uncertainty accordingly. Creating such awareness of 'lock-in' risk would help 
to reduce potential false sense of confidence throughout the lifecycle. 
By documenting epistemic uncertainty in a model, we create the flexibility not to commit (or 
“lock-in”) to the details about the uncertainty (such as the context and impact relating to the 
uncertainty) by explicitly acknowledging that there are some details about the uncertainty that 
is not available during the instance of analysis. Such information may only be available at a 
later phase of the system lifecycle. This is like the concept of underspecification in system 
modelling. For an underspecified model, important variables may be intentionally omitted (see 
section 2.1.2.3 on underspecification) either to create flexibility or due to uncertainty. For our 
context, such variables are omitted because the safety analysts do not have enough knowledge 
at the point of assessment. However, variables that have been omitted should be recorded in 
the form of uncertainty. In addition, this is useful only when stakeholders create a traceability 
record that allows a stakeholder to revisit the uncertainties throughout the lifecycle by 
systematically documenting the uncertainty and the analysis to manage the uncertainty. 
3.2.2.3. Documentation of uncertainties reduces confirmation bias by being open 
about the reasons to believe and the reasons to doubt an assessment  
In safety, making a decision in the presence of model uncertainty is a risk-based judgement 
against the likelihood of finding something either negative or worst-case scenario. However, 
finding such negative or worst-case scenarios are based on subjective judgement from the 
stakeholders regarding what is known and what is included; which may not correspond to the 
worst-case situation. With subjective knowledge and experience, there is a tendency to search 
for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions, which is commonly 
known as confirmation bias. Whenever stakeholders make decisions in the presence of 
uncertainties, there is a danger that confirmation bias would influence their decision.  
Example.  For example, during early design phase where information may not be complete, 
and developers subconsciously assume certain concept of operations based on legacy systems 
or past experiences; they may start collecting data to confirm their beliefs and assumptions. 
Such subjective judgement may cause the stakeholders to miss other safety-critical conditions, 
which get even more obscured due to uncertainty. Such confirmation bias happened in the 
CHALLENGER space shuttle accident,  whereby the management ended up discarding danger 
signs (e.g. low external temperature)  that could had pointed to safety concern on the O-ring. 
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Natural inclination in safety assessment is to focus on areas with greater certainties and known 
uncertainties, which is susceptible to bias. To counter confirmation bias, it is important to 
consider both the reasons to believe, as well as the reasons to doubt, an assessment. This is 
analogous to having a ‘red team’ that challenges the claims, norms, assumptions and decisions 
made during a safety assessment. Being explicit in documenting epistemic uncertainties is one 
of such ‘red team’ approaches to challenge the findings from current safety assessment 
techniques. By documenting the areas where there is a lack of information, stakeholders can 
provide the safety assessment with a more holistic and realistic analysis to discover more 
hazards that could plausibly be safety-critical. 
 Principle 3: Epistemic uncertainties should be tracked and 
addressed in a systematic manner through-life. 
We have established three reasons why it is important to track and address the epistemic 
uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessment in a systematic manner through-
life. These reasons are summarised here and will be elaborated in the following section. 
• The nature (and responsibility) of system safety is that it demands a systematic and 
through-life management of knowledge  
• Epistemic uncertainties in system and safety causal models can change with time  
• The capability to address uncertainty when it is safety-critical has the potential to 
increase the confidence in the safety assessment 
3.2.3.1. The nature (and responsibility) of system safety is that it demands a 
systematic and through-life management of knowledge 
In the previous section, we have highlighted the importance of documenting the uncertainties 
as a form of traceability and accountability. However, it is not enough to conduct a one-time 
documentation. We need to use this information as a leverage to improve the management of 
knowledge as part of the system safety process. In chapter 2, we have briefly described the 
through-life system safety process for system acquisition and the responsibility of safety 
analysts and system engineers to reduce uncertainty as much as possible. System safety for 
complicated system acquisition is not about making a one-time binary decision about safety 
(i.e. safe or not safe) but rather a continual stream of safety assessments that identify hazards 
and formulate mitigating actions to manage the residual risk.  
In such safety assessment, safety analysts would have to make safety decisions within the 
available time and resources (e.g. manpower and available information) before the acquisition 
process can continue down the system life-cycle. Even without complete knowledge of the 
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system models, especially of complicated systems, safety analysts are expected to still assess 
if a complicated system is safe to operate.  
This is echoed by Sommerville et al in their research on large-scale complex IT systems [94]. 
Sommerville et al consider such systems as a coalition of systems whereby “the systems in the 
coalition may change unpredictably, may be completely replaced and the organizations 
running these systems may themselves go out of existence. Coalition ‘design’ involves 
designing the protocols for communications and each organization using the coalition 
orchestrate the constituent systems in their own way. However, the designers and managers 
of each individual system have to consider how to make their systems robust enough to ensure 
that their organizations are not threatened by failures or any undesirable behaviour elsewhere 
in the coalition.” In our context, complicated systems can be considered as a coalition of 
systems and our safety assessments throughout the systems life-cycle are the continual 
attempts to sieve out failures or undesirable behaviour in the coalition.  
 
Figure 22. The RSAF Island Air Defense System [135]  
For example, in the RSAF Island Air Defense system of systems (IAD SoS) [135] there are 
multiple sensors, weapons, command and control and decision making systems interoperating 
with each other to provide the enhanced IAD SoS capability (refer to the pictorial view of the 
IAD SoS in Figure 22). The IAD SoS can be considered as a coalition of systems. Each system 
in the IAD SoS is developed and delivered independently according to its own system life-
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cycle. When safety assessment is carried out at a specific moment, different systems would be 
at different phases of their lifecycle. For example, when a safety assessment was conducted 
for the IAD SoS in 2017, the RBS 70 system was already a legacy system with a wealth of 
data and knowledge; the SPYDER weapon system had just been delivered into operation; and 
the AEROSTAT sensor balloon had yet to be delivered.    
For such safety assessment to be effective across multiple systems at different levels of 
development and maturity, safety analysts need to reduce the lack of knowledge or epistemic 
uncertainties about the system models, so as to make a confident safety assessment. The 
decision to investigate an unknown situation should also be made systematically by focusing 
on areas that can help to increase the confidence in the safety assessment by soliciting more 
information. With the push towards agile development to shorten software development cycle, 
it is even more important that epistemic uncertainty is managed more effectively and 
efficiently so that safety analysts can make decisions more confidently. 
3.2.3.2. Epistemic uncertainties in a system and safety causal model can change with 
time  
Uncertainty regarding any given system element can vary over time as the stakeholder’s 
knowledge about the system and its environment changes throughout the system engineering 
lifecycle. For example, we present here two of the ways that epistemic uncertainties may 
change. 
Uncertainties can intensify or diminish with time.  Some uncertainties may become lesser 
with time, e.g. as testers produce test results, operators clarify the expected operating 
environment and new component developers lock down their interface specifications. Such 
relevant information can allow stakeholders to make better judgement about safety risk, albeit 
at a later phase of the system lifecycle. Alternatively, a system that is deemed simple and 
predictable during design phase may become more complicated and uncertain when it starts 
to interact more with other systems. Also, some uncertainties need time before stakeholders 
can determine if they are safety-critical.  
Example.  For example, the safety assessment may involve preliminary documents with 
uncertainties about operational concepts, requirements and design features that can only be 
validated later as part of system development.  
Addressing an uncertainty can lead to new uncertainty.  The uncertainty that remains after 
a safety analysis has been undertaken can be considered as residual uncertainty and it may 
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evolve. When mitigating argument or evidence is presented with regards to an uncertainty, a 
new residual uncertainty may be created.  
Example.  For example, imagine that there is uncertainty about the operating profiles of an 
aircraft. After performing the flight trial, it has been ascertained that it is indeed possible to fly 
the aircraft under the predefined operating profiles. However, during the safety assessment, it 
was shared that the profile was flown by an experienced pilot and no one was sure if a junior 
pilot could carry out the same flight profiles. As a result, this leads to a new uncertainty about 
the ability of less experienced pilot to fly the stipulated operating profiles. This is a scenario 
whereby addressing the original uncertainty eventually leads to the discovery of a new 
uncertainty. This new uncertainty must be tracked and addressed until there is more 
information regarding the experience level needed to fly the operating profiles. 
Tracking the uncertainties will enable stakeholders to provide timely intervention to address 
potential impacts in a systematic manner. If there is no tracking, one may lose information that 
eventually becomes safety-critical.  
3.2.3.3. The capability to address uncertainty when it is safety-critical has the 
potential to increase the confidence in the safety assessment 
To be confident with the safety assessment, we need to have sufficient knowledge to exploit 
the system models and safety causal model (as explained in section 1.2.3), besides having the 
knowledge to apply established safety techniques. For example, in the case of FTA safety 
technique, the safety causal model that is used will determine the cause and effect relationships 
in the FTA. If there is epistemic uncertainty about the safety causal model, it will directly 
affect the confidence in applying the FTA safety technique.  
Confidence in a safety assessment can be increased if we explicitly acknowledge and reason 
about the presence of uncertainty within that assessment, rather than allow the variable level 
of confidence in different aspects of the assessment (e.g. certain causal influences) to remain 
implicit. Without making uncertainty explicit, the reader has a significant challenge (relying 
effectively on their own ability to regenerate the result) in determining the confidence they 
should place in the assessment. 
One way to raise the confidence in the safety assessment result is to be aware of what is certain, 
what is uncertain and what needs to be done about the uncertainty about the safety causal 
model. This allows the safety analysts to intervene and address a situation when uncertainty is 
risky enough to be safety-critical. This provides the additional assurance beyond the 
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conventional safety assessment that focuses on evaluating the residual risk and developing 
mitigation actions for the identified hazards. 
In this thesis, we are looking into methods to encourage thinking ahead of time, observing 
control and influence dependency and deriving taxonomy of how to consider the dependency. 
However, it is important to note that having more information about the uncertainties in the 
underlying models of system safety increases confidence but will not directly make a system 
safer. Whether the additional information makes the system safe or unsafe depends on the 
follow-on hazard analysis and the safety actions carried out using the results of the analysis. 
 Underlying Models to Manage Epistemic Uncertainties 
In this section, we focus on representing the “epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models 
of safety assessment”, which has been a common theme in all the three principles of managing 
epistemic uncertainties. This has been briefly explained in Table 3 of section 1.3 when we 
introduced our research strategy. We introduce two underlying models that are important but 
not commonly expressed explicitly in safety assessment (see Figure 23). The CMSS concerns 
the high-level system domain, while the CRMSA is specifically focusing on the safety domain. 
We will use these two models to recognise critical relationships in safety assessment where 
epistemic uncertainties may reside.  
• Conceptual Model of System Safety (CMSS).  In the system domain, we use the 
CMSS to represent critical relationships between system and safety-related elements. 
This is adopted from the IEEE 42010 standard that models architectural description 
for system elements. We have modified the description to better represent the 
influence of safety elements and the associated epistemic uncertainties. To do that, the 
model includes three types of elements: system, safety and uncertainty elements, as 
shown in Figure 23. The model will be described in greater detail under section 3.3.1. 
• Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA).  In the safety domain, 
safety assessment is carried out with the aim of identifying causal relationships that 
could be hazardous. Our CRMSA consists of causal conditions that represent the 
causal relationships when identifying hazards. A causal condition can exhibit causal 
relationship with potentially many other conditions. Examples of causal conditions in 
the safety domain include cause, effect, hazard and accident (see Figure 23). The 
model will be described in greater details under section 3.3.2. 
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Figure 23. The two Underlying Models of Safety Assessment 
 Conceptual Model of System Safety 
As mentioned earlier, the CMSS is adopted from the IEEE 42010 standard that is used to 
model architectural description for system elements. For system safety, it is not sufficient to 
consider system or safety causal models in isolation. We have modified the IEEE 42010 
architectural description to better represent safety elements and the associated epistemic 
uncertainties; and their relationships with system elements. The CMSS is constructed 
progressively in three steps as follows:  
• Considering the relationships among system elements (see section 3.3.1.1). 
• Considering the relationships between system and safety elements (see section 
3.3.1.2). 
• Considering the relationships between system, safety and uncertainty elements (see 
section 3.3.1.3). 
3.3.1.1. Relationships among System Elements  
We begin by modelling the relationships between system elements in a typical system 
acquisition environment. We choose to adopt the IEEE 42010 standard that is used to represent 
system description. The standard IEEE 42010: “Systems and software engineering – 
Architecture description” describes “the manner in which architecture descriptions of systems 
are organised and expressed” [20]. It provides a common way to express a system and its 
relationships with other elements generically, such that it can be applied in different domains. 
This is useful for our research as the generic model in IEEE 42010 is easily accessible and can 
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serve as a baseline to describe a system. The model can subsequently be expanded to include 
safety and uncertainty.  
 
Figure 24. Conceptual Model of System Description according to IEEE 42010 
The diagram in Figure 24 shows the system elements and their relationships extracted from 
IEEE 42010 standard. In the diagram, the system of interest (or ‘system’ for short) is modelled 
using a system description. The stakeholders and their concerns influence how a system and 
its environment will be modelled by the system description. The stakeholders are parties 
interested in the system and their interests are known as system concerns. Per the standard, 
system concerns can surface throughout the system engineering life cycle “from system needs 
and requirements, from design choices and from implementation and operating 
considerations”. A system concern could result from “stakeholder needs, goals, expectations, 
responsibilities, requirements, design constraints, assumptions, dependencies, quality 
attributes, architecture decisions, risks or other issues pertaining to the system”.  
For our research, we focus on two key elements in the system description: system view and 
system viewpoint.  
• System View.  The system view represents how the system behaves in a descriptive 
manner. Per the standard, a view is “a representation of one or more structural aspects 
of an architecture that illustrates how the architecture addresses one or more 
concerns held by one or more of its stakeholders.” The system description represents 
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the system using one or more system views. System model is the most common 
example of a system view used in system engineering. 
• System Viewpoint. A system view addresses one or more concerns from the 
stakeholders based on a system viewpoint. A viewpoint is defined in the standard as 
“a collection of patterns, templates, and conventions for constructing one type of 
view.” The system viewpoint exhibits two important associations: it frames the system 
concerns for the stakeholders and governs the conventions for the system views. In 
other words, the viewpoint “establishes the conventions for constructing, interpreting 
and analysing the view to address concerns framed by that viewpoint.” Examples of 
viewpoint conventions include languages, notations, model kind, modelling methods 
and analysis techniques. For example, a system model (which is an example of a 
system view) uses conventions that are governed by a system model type (which is a 
kind of system viewpoint). Such system model type determines the expressive power 
of the system model.  
Example.  As an illustration, we consider an example of integrating a military weapon with 
other complicated command and control (C2) systems. We use the IEEE 42010 template to 
describe the system elements related to the weapon system (see Figure 25).  
As part of system engineering, the weapon would have gone through various milestones in its 
lifecycle from development to operation. Throughout the lifecycle, multiple stakeholders 
would have been involved to address various system concerns such as operational 
performance, availability, security, reliability; as well as safety concern that we are most 
interested with. System models such as weapon system structure, weapon system 
specifications and initial concept of operation are used to represent the real world when 
addressing system concerns. These system models are constructed based on patterns, templates 
or conventions from system model types such as flow diagram, organisation hierarchy chart 
and data reporting format. 
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Figure 25. Example of Conceptual Model of System Description 
3.3.1.2. Relationships between System and Safety Elements  
While the IEEE 42010 standards provide a conceptual model to represent system elements, it 
does not explicitly consider safety. Hence, for safety assessment, we need to extend the 
standard to include elements that are important for the domain of system safety. We need to 
consider how these safety elements can either influence or be influenced by system elements. 
To do that, we augment the system elements described in the previous section with their 
corresponding safety counterparts (see Figure 26). We have also introduced two distinct 
relationships between the system and safety elements: inheritance and association9. 
Inheritance relationships.  The structure, properties and behaviours of safety elements are 
inherited from their corresponding system elements. This implies that a safety element is an 
instance of system element that focuses on the issue of safety. Specifically, we have the 
following five “is a” inheritance relationships: 
• Safety system of interest is a system of interest,  
• Safety stakeholder is a stakeholder,  
• Safety concern is a system concern, 
• Safety causal model type is a system model type, and 
                                                 
9 These relationships have been explained in section 3.1. 
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• Safety causal model is a system model   
 
Figure 26. Interactions between System and Safety Elements 
Since safety elements are inherited from system elements, we can expect the interactions 
among the safety elements to mirror that of the system elements. Hence, we can make the 
following conclusions regarding the safety elements. 
• Safety system of interest (or “safety system” for short) refers to the part of the system 
that is considered during a safety assessment.  
• The safety stakeholders are parties interested in the safety system during the safety 
assessment. They can include contractors, safety analysts, system managers, 
operators, maintenance engineers and end users.  
• The safety stakeholders’ main safety concern is to prevent any harm that may result 
in death, injury or damage to property under the safety system. This usually involves 
assessing the risk of potential hazards and coming out with mitigation measures.  
• Like system models, safety causal models are constructed to address safety concerns.  
• Safety causal models are governed by conventions from specific safety causal model 
types. Such model types would also frame the safety concerns that can be discovered 
by safety stakeholders. 
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Association relationships.  We can observe from Figure 26 that safety elements can be 
influenced by other system elements of the same type as the safety elements. We have 
identified five of such associations in safety-critical system and provided examples for each 
of them in Table 13. 
Table 13. Association between Safety Elements and System Elements of the same Type 
No. Element 
Type 
Association Example 
1 System  Other system of 
interest can 
influence a safety 
system of interest 
Legacy systems using the same resources (such as 
bandwidth and manpower) as the safety system of 
interest may have safety impact even if these legacy 
systems are not directly considered in the safety 
assessment.  
2 Stakeholder Other stakeholder 
can influence a 
safety 
stakeholder 
Safety stakeholders can be influenced by other system 
stakeholders (such as external contractors, senior 
management and other company agencies) not directly 
involved in the safety assessment. 
3 Concern Other system 
concern can 
influence a safety 
concern 
Operational concern (especially in the military) can 
influence the acceptable level of risk in safety.  
4 Viewpoint Other system 
model type can 
influence a safety 
causal model 
type 
The STAMP/STPA safety causal model type is based 
on system dynamic and control theory, which can be 
considered as distinct system model types. 
During initial system development, the presence of 
system function diagrams (system model type) makes it 
suitable to use Functional Hazard Analysis (safety 
causal model type) to identify the preliminary hazards 
list. 
5 View Other system 
model can 
influence a safety 
causal model 
A fault tree analysis (safety causal model) may depend 
on an Interface Control Diagram (system model) to 
establish the independency between components. A 
sneak circuit analysis (safety causal model) may not be 
possible when the system circuit diagram (system 
model) is not available.  
From the above examples, it can be concluded that safety assessment for safety-critical 
systems is incomplete if the safety analysts only consider the safety elements. The safety of a 
system can be affected by other non-safety elements, such as other systems, stakeholders, 
system concerns, system viewpoints and system views. These elements may not be considered 
or readily available during safety assessment. Our model helps to create this awareness among 
safety analysts to identify not only safety elements in safety assessment, but also the system 
elements that influence these safety elements.  
Example.  To illustrate, we will continue with our running example of integrating a military 
weapon with other C2 systems. In this step, we populate Figure 25 with safety elements to 
show the interactions between system and safety elements (see Figure 27).  
As part of system safety engineering, safety assessments are conducted at various milestones 
across the weapon system lifecycle from development to operation. Multiple safety 
stakeholders are involved in assessing safety concern (which is also one of the system 
concerns). These stakeholders include project manager, contractors, pilots, controllers, 
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maintenance engineers, safety analysts and end users. They are also part of the system 
stakeholders.  
One of the common safety concerns is the extent of residual risk identified from safety causal 
models. This is addressed by using safety causal models to analyse the safety of the weapon. 
An example of a safety causal model is the causal relationships during Failure Modes and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) conducted to identify hazards from operating the weapon. It is based 
on the FMEA methodology which is a kind of safety causal model type. Examples of hazards 
include components failure, unsafe operator behaviour, unexpected software interaction, 
incorrect or insufficient operator practice and undesired change in external environment. Such 
hazards can be identified from causal relationships between entities, states, behaviours and 
events that are related to the weapon and its environment. Such causal relationships would 
often take reference from a set of causal mechanisms that the safety stakeholders are aware of, 
which would serve as another kind of safety causal model type. We will discuss more about 
causal relationships in section 3.3.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Example of Interactions between System and Safety Elements 
3.3.1.3. Relationships between System, Safety and Uncertainty Elements  
A safety assessment can cease to be useful when it doesn’t address the safety concerns of the 
stakeholders. This can happen when the system and safety causal models do not accurately or 
adequately represent the real world and yet the stakeholders depend on the models to make 
decision during safety assessment. This can happen when stakeholders are not aware of such 
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model inadequacies due to a lack of knowledge, i.e. the presence of epistemic uncertainty. 
This is often unavoidable as epistemic uncertainty is inherent in safety assessment.  
In our research, we consider that when a model has epistemic uncertainties, it will make the 
model less adequate to represent the real world for a specific purpose. For example, uncertainty 
in the inputs to a specific technique (e.g. Fault Tree Analysis) that is based on a certain safety 
assessment model will make the analysis less capable to assess the actual risk in a system. This 
would make the FTA less adequate to serve its purpose as a tool to assess the safety of the 
system. The capability of a model to be adequate is often a subjective judgement [136] that is 
based on many concerns. In our work, we focus on two concerns related to uncertainty: (1) 
uncertainty in the model coverage (or type) and (2) uncertainty in the model instance. 
Uncertainty in model coverage focuses on ‘creating the right model’ and uncertainty in model 
instance focuses on ‘creating the model right’. We describe both uncertainties in details here. 
Uncertainty in the Capability of Model Types.  Capability of model types concerns the 
system viewpoints that bound the knowledge available to create the model. For example, when 
analysing the operational safety of a system, the concepts of operation will encapsulate the 
operational viewpoint from where different operational models (e.g. missions) can be created. 
Two important questions to ask about the capability of the model types during safety 
assessment are: 
Q1: “Do we know enough of the system and the associated safety concerns which we want 
to address?”  
Q2: “What aspects do we have to consider in the model to address our safety concerns?” 
When there is uncertainty in the capability of model types to represent the real world, we call 
this the “model type uncertainty”. The model type uncertainty focuses on the uncertainty in 
the collection of patterns, templates, and conventions for constructing system model. In 
addition, the model type uncertainty can also exist in the conventions for constructing, 
interpreting and analysing uncertainty. Hence, model type uncertainty can affect the 
expressive power of both the system and its corresponding uncertainties.  
Uncertainty in the Capability of Model Instances:  Capability of model instances, or model 
view, concerns the appreciation of the real world at the point of conducting the safety 
assessment, regardless if the model viewpoint is adequate. Having a comprehensive viewpoint 
does not assure that a model represents all important aspects of the real world at the point of 
assessment. For this case, it is common for safety analysts to ask the following:  
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Q3: “How do we know if it is worth modelling aspect X of the system right now (rather 
than at some later date where we may know more about it)?”  
For safety assessment, such uncertainties can reside either in the system or safety causal model. 
One of the most common cause of epistemic uncertainties for safety assessment is in the 
system models. We call this “system model uncertainty”. This is especially so for 
complicated safety-critical systems where it is challenging for system models to accurately 
and adequately represent the real world. Hence, it is common for system models to contain 
system model uncertainty. Since safety causal model is also a kind of system model, it follows 
that safety causal model would logically contain uncertainty. We label such uncertainty in 
safety causal model as “safety causal model uncertainty”.  
 
Figure 28. Conceptual Model of System Safety 
To summarise, three types of uncertainty elements have been defined, namely model type 
uncertainty, system model uncertainty and safety causal model uncertainty. We have inserted 
the three uncertainty elements into the interaction between system and safety elements to form 
the final CMSS model (see Figure 28). These three uncertainty elements are important as they 
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would guide the safety analysts where to look for uncertainties during systems safety 
assessment. This would be considered as the cause of uncertainties when we implement our 
approach in the next chapter. 
Example.  Back to the running example for the weapon integration, the following are 
examples of possible uncertainties in the safety assessment that fall into the three types of 
uncertainty elements (see Figure 29). 
Model Type Uncertainty.  Uncertain about the types of interface to be considered between 
systems, asking question like “are there other interfaces yet to be considered between the 
weapon and C2 system A besides the known ones, such as communication, physical and 
electrical interfaces?”. 
System Model Uncertainty.  Uncertain about the functional linkages between system 
elements, asking question like “does weapon have other electrical linkages with C2 system A 
that have not been captured by the system circuit diagram?”. 
Safety Causal Model Uncertainty. Uncertain about the causal relationship with other legacy 
systems when identifying failure effect using FMEA, asking question like “will operating the 
weapon with legacy system B in extreme weather condition lead to an electrical overload 
hazard?”.   
In summary, the CMSS can be used by safety analysts to visualise the relationships between 
different elements involved in the safety assessment for the weapon integration. Most 
importantly, it provides a means to describe the possible sources where in the model epistemic 
uncertainties can reside when system and safety causal models are applied during the safety 
assessment. It is also useful to appreciate the relationships between these epistemic 
uncertainties, system elements and safety elements.   
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chart  
 
Figure 29. Example of CMSS applied on Weapon System Safety Assessment 
 Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment  
In the previous section, we have developed the CMSS to identify where in the model that 
epistemic uncertainty can affect safety assessment. This is important but not enough to 
describe the nature of epistemic uncertainties during hazard identification. We need to be more 
specific in locating where the epistemic uncertainties can reside when identifying hazards. 
To do that, we use the ‘Condition’ concept to develop a model that focuses on the causal 
relationship in safety assessment. The ‘Condition’ concept is adopted from the Wilson’s safety 
data model [21] and Habli’s product-line functional failure model [79]. Next, we use the 
Coleman’s layered concept of having a boat of causal pathways [22] to tag the safety elements 
in a causal relationship to the corresponding system elements. Finally, we combine both 
concepts to form our Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA). Both 
concepts and the CRMSA are described in detail in this section. 
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3.3.2.1. The “Condition” Concept 
The “Condition” concept is based on the safety data model introduced by Wilson. In his model, 
conditions have causes and consequences. A condition is defined by him as “an abstraction 
for capturing some ‘state of affairs’ – event or state, in the system or its environment”. 
Hazards, failure conditions and faults are examples of safety conditions. Wilson considers the 
modelling of causes and consequences as entities rather than as relationships or attributes to 
cater for various causes and consequences generated by different safety assessment techniques. 
He also rationalised that it is a more “convenient’ and ‘clean’ approach to consider the causes 
and consequences as standalone entities. Each condition also has its unique safety properties 
like likelihood, severity and risk.  
 
Figure 30. The 'Condition' Concept adopted from Wilson's Safety Data Model 
This concept is similar to the Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rule that is used in domains that 
represent system by events. For example, Almeida et al [137] highlight that such ECA rule 
can be found in “business workflow [138], manufacturing control [139] and web applications 
[140]”. The rule has three parts: an event, a condition, and an action. It states that when an 
event is detected, proceed to evaluate the condition; and the action shall be executed if the 
condition is satisfied. According to Almeida, such an event can be “database operation, an 
external incoming event or a timed or untimed temporal event”. In the safety domain, the cause 
is the event, the causal relationship is the condition and the consequence is the action. 
The “Condition” concept was further developed by Habli when he defined his product-line 
functional failure model (see section 2.3.3.2 for a detailed description of the product-line 
model). However, unlike Wilson, Habli defines causes and effects as “as types of relationships 
with which a condition can be associated”. He explains that “modelling of causes and effects 
as relationships rather than as separate elements reduces the complexity involved in 
representing instances in which a condition within a product-line is both a cause of one 
condition and an effect of another”. We agree with Habli that modelling causes and effects as 
relationships are more appropriate than Wilson’s model, especially when we monitor 
complicated causal relationships during a safety assessment.  
Habli also provided specific examples for safety conditions by referring to the Aerospace 
Recommended Practice ARP 4754 [141]. The list of safety conditions includes failure 
condition, failure mode, failure, malfunction, common mode failure, hazard, cascading failure 
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and fault. Each safety condition has causal relationships with other conditions (which can 
either be the cause or the consequence associated with the safety condition). In addition, a 
causal relationship occurs only when certain assumptions regarding the environment within 
which this causality occurs hold, i.e. the causal relationship must be “in context of” a 
“condition” regarding the environment.  
It is important to monitor safety conditions as exemplified in the ARP 4754. However, it is not 
sufficient to only track safety conditions when we manage epistemic uncertainties in safety 
assessment. Many of such uncertainties are related to conditions that may not or have yet to 
transit to some states of affair that are risky enough to be considered as safety conditions. We 
use a more encompassing term to describe such conditions as ‘causal mechanisms’. Causal 
mechanisms include known safety conditions and uncertain conditions that may be safety-
critical but cannot be determined yet due to a lack of knowledge. In addition, even known 
safety conditions (either causes or consequences) can evolve with the system lifecycle and 
become uncertain. With these considerations, we have modified Habli’s functional failure 
model described in chapter 2 to include the potential presence of uncertainties in the context 
of through life safety assessment. In fact, this is the same uncertainty elements that we have 
defined in section 3.3.1.3. 
 
Figure 31. Causal Relationship in Safety Causal Model 
Our approach to analysing causal relationships in a safety causal model can be summarised in 
Figure 31. From the diagram, a ‘Causal Relationship’ has a ‘Cause Condition’ (a subtype of a 
‘Condition’) which can lead to one or more ‘Consequence Condition’ (also a subtype of a 
‘Condition’). Such causal relationship holds only in the context of certain ‘Causal 
Mechanism’, which is also a subtype of a ‘Condition’. Due to a lack of knowledge during 
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safety assessment, such ‘Condition’ can consist of ‘Uncertainty element’ that represents the 
epistemic uncertainties when considering the state of affairs in the system or its environment.   
To summarise, we have focused the attention on uncertainty in the causal relationship that is 
identified during safety assessment. This uncertainty can manifest either in the safety causal 
model (known as safety causal model uncertainty), system model (known as system model 
uncertainty) or the system viewpoint that governs the uncertainty (known as model type 
uncertainty). We have also specified that in such causal relationship, it is the cause condition, 
consequence condition and the causal mechanism that can potentially be uncertain.  
3.3.2.2. Extending Causal Relationship to System Elements 
As discussed in section 3.3.1, safety assessment involves both safety and system elements. 
Hence, we need to extend the causal relationship in a safety assessment to represent the system 
elements that influence or are influenced by the conditions in the safety assessment. To do 
that, we have adopted the Coleman’s “boat” model of causal pathways [142, 143] to represent 
such multi-tiered relationships between system and safety elements (see Figure 32).  
 
Figure 32. Coleman’s Boat of Causal Pathways 
The Coleman model, which is commonly applied in the social and biological domains, 
comprises two levels of association between elements - the macro and micro level.  
• Macro-level Association.  The macro-level association is a high-level concept that 
shows the relationship between system elements. For example, in biology, some 
scientists may work at the macro-ecosystem level (e.g. between human and animals) 
which can be highly abstract. One such association could be “human eats animal”.  
• Micro-Level – Action-Formation Mechanisms. Other scientists may work at the 
micro-organism level such as investigating organs and cells in the circulatory system. 
At this level, the action-formation mechanisms provide a means to describe specific 
causal relationships that are present where an element’s ‘action’ leads to another 
element’s ‘formation’. This is similar to our concept of representing causal 
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relationships between conditions in safety causal model. For example, a causal 
relationship “fire cooks food” could be a specific micro-level causal relationship for 
the macro-level “human eats animal” relationship (see Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33. Example of a Coleman’s Boat of Causal Pathway 
3.3.2.3. Applications 
 
Figure 34. Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment 
We apply a similar layered concept like the Coleman’s model in our Causal Relationship 
Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA) (see Figure 34). To appreciate the model, we apply 
the CRMSA on a simple safety assessment example about an engineer performing a runway 
repair (see Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35. Illustration of CRMSA 
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Example.  We break the example into two aspects: system and safety domains. 
System Domain.  In safety assessment, causal relationships are derived from some macro-
level association at the system perspective. This is like the relationships between system and 
safety elements that we have introduced in the CMSS. In the runway repair example, the two 
system elements are “the engineer” and “the runway repair”, where the former (which is a type 
of system resource) is expected to perform the latter (which is a type of system function) at 
the system level. 
Safety Domain.  As explained in section 3.3.2.1, a causal relationship between two causal 
conditions exists in the context of some causal mechanisms. This causal relationship is like 
the “action-formation mechanisms” under the micro-level perspective of the Coleman’s 
model. The causal mechanism provides the narrative or instantiation of how causal conditions 
can influence each other. For the runway repair example, a potentially safety-critical causal 
mechanism between the engineer (being considered as a human causal condition) and the 
runway repair function (being considered as a process causal condition) is the level of 
expertise. In other words, there is safety concern that the uncertainty may result in a lack of 
expertise by the engineer in carrying out the process of runway repair. This situation may 
potentially become a hazard. 
 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented the theoretical foundation to manage epistemic 
uncertainties. The chapter answers two questions that we have defined in the beginning, i.e. 1) 
“WHAT aspects of the epistemic uncertainties do we want to manage?” and 2) “WHERE do 
these epistemic uncertainties reside in safety assessment model?”.  
To answer the “WHAT”, we have explained the need to identify, document, track and address 
epistemic uncertainties.  
We need to identify epistemic uncertainties because 
• Epistemic uncertainty is inherent in safety assessment 
• There is no commonly practised approach of identifying epistemic uncertainty  
• Safety assessment is more complete by recognising and identifying plausible 
uncertainty than assuming that there is no uncertainty  
We need to document epistemic uncertainties because 
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• There is no established approach of documenting the nature of the uncertainties within 
a model 
• Documentation of uncertainties in a model reduces the danger of ignoring safety-
critical uncertainty  
• Documentation of uncertainties reduces confirmation bias by being open about the 
reasons to believe and the reasons to doubt an assessment  
We need to track and address epistemic uncertainties because 
• The nature (and responsibility) of system safety is that it demands a systematic and 
through-life management of knowledge  
• Epistemic uncertainties in system and safety causal models can change with time  
• The capability to address uncertainty when it is safety-critical increases the confidence 
in the safety assessment 
To answer the “WHERE”, the CMSS and CRMSA are constructed to help users locate 
epistemic uncertainties during safety assessment. Most importantly, the CMSS and CRMSA 
are used to emphasise that epistemic uncertainties in safety assessment reside in the underlying 
system and safety causal models. The system models are necessarily to represent the real 
world. When there is insufficient information regarding the real world, the system models will 
have uncertainty. The safety causal models are used during the conduct of safety assessment. 
Similarly, epistemic uncertainty can be exacerbated if there is insufficient information 
associated with the safety causal models.     
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Chapter 4 - An Approach to Identify, Document, Track 
and Address Epistemic Uncertainties 
 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have established the principles that are important to manage 
epistemic uncertainties: identify, document, track and address. Following that, we shall make 
use of these principles in this chapter to develop a concrete approach to manage epistemic 
uncertainties in safety assessment. For the approach to be effective, it is developed based on 
three desired outcomes: comprehensive, targeted and feasible. 
Outcome 1: Be Comprehensive.  To be comprehensive, the approach should be able to 
manage both known and unknown uncertainties. As explained in section 2.1.1, known 
uncertainties are uncertainties that stakeholders are aware of and unknown uncertainties are 
uncertainties that stakeholders are not even aware of. In our approach, we will proactively 
manage the risk due to uncertainties associated with safety assessment. In traditional safety 
assessments, the focus is usually on known uncertainties where stakeholders have more 
confident with their safety impacts. When there is pressure to perform within limited 
resources, stakeholders would most likely be more confident to analyse safety concerns based 
on known uncertainties than to analyse unknown uncertainties, such as worrying about an 
emerging technology that none of the stakeholders is aware of. However, not having the 
capacity or confidence to focus on unknown uncertainties does not mean unknown 
uncertainties are not safety-critical.  
Outcome 2: Be Targeted.  To be targeted, the approach should differentiate the management 
of certainties and uncertainties. In other words, we advocate that stakeholders should 
differentiate causal relationships in safety assessment that are plausible-but-uncertain from 
those that are more certain, instead of treating all the same in traditional safety assessment 
approach. The following provides a contrast between the traditional approach and our 
approach of managing epistemic uncertainty: 
• Traditional Approach.  In traditional safety assessment, some safety analysts would 
carry out risk assessment on issues and conditions without putting a lot of focus on 
ram-uncertainty. This was echoed by McDermid [68], when he commented that ‘the 
fundamental assumptions which underpin the classical approaches to safety analysis 
do not reflect the importance of model uncertainty.’ He further suggests that safety 
engineers should “recognise the need to analyse the uncertainty in the environment 
(the demands to which the system is subjected) and to employ a proper balance 
  
118 
between analysing the system and its environment”, as well as “investigate and refine 
the risk assessment methods to include model (epistemic) uncertainty, especially as 
this is likely to be the dominant area of risk in many (e.g. software intensive) 
applications.” 
There are also examples where ram-uncertainty has been recognised in existing safety 
assessment techniques but are not always fully documented and managed. For 
example, in a research by Ferdous et al [144], they raise the issues of uncertainty in 
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA), a popular technique in safety assessment to evaluate 
the likelihood, consequences and risk of adverse events. QRA can be based on event 
(ETA) and fault tree (FTA) analyses and Ferdous et al describe two known 
uncertainties regarding the QRA. The first known uncertainty is that the likelihood 
values of input events are based on “probability distributions that are often hard to 
come by and even if available, they are subject to incompleteness (partial ignorance) 
and imprecision”. The second known uncertainty is that the interdependence among 
the events (for ETA) or basic events (for FTA) may not be guaranteed, which is an 
assumption for the method to be valid. While both uncertainties are known, Ferdous 
et al observe that both uncertainties may not always be tracked and often assumed not 
to affect the safety assessment “for the purpose of simplicity”.   
• Our Approach.  In our approach, we advocate that epistemic uncertainty, or what we 
refer to as plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships in safety, should not be 
discarded. This is important as the level of certainty may not have direct correlation 
with the level of risk related to the causal relationships. Instead of discarding it, 
plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships should be managed differently from more 
certain causal relationships. For example, there could be plausible-but-uncertainty 
causal relationship about the effect of a weapon system on another legacy system 
which is not established in the current concepts of operation. Instead of ignoring this 
uncertainty, it should be captured as a plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship and 
managed through life. This calls for the commitment to track uncertainties in existing 
safety techniques till the relevant information is available down the lifecycle. The aim 
is to encourage stakeholders to defer judgement on potentially safety-critical causal 
relationships, rather than discard them early. This is important as the stakeholders may 
not fully appreciate the risk of the epistemic uncertainty in a complicated system at 
the point where it was first being considered.  
Outcome 3: Be Feasible.  To be feasible, the approach should be integrated with existing 
safety assessment techniques. As part of the system safety lifecycle, it is less disruptive if the 
management of epistemic uncertainties is integrated into existing processes as much as 
  
119 
possible. Furthermore, the efforts to manage the uncertainties should be reasonably efficient 
such that the approach is still practical to be applied by industry. By being less disruptive, 
stakeholders can be more receptive to the approach and be more supportive in managing such 
uncertainties. This enables stakeholders to easily recognise the core of the new approach and 
apply it in their safety assessments. In our approach, we aim to simplify as much of the core 
concepts and consolidate them into a single user guide so that it is convenient for the 
stakeholders to refer to during safety analyses. To summarise, by being feasible, we introduce 
two requirements that the approach must achieve:  
• The approach needs to be useful to complement existing processes and still provide 
its intended purpose, and  
• The approach needs to be practical whereby the amount of effort to implement it is 
reasonable for the user, given the benefit gained. 
 Overview of the Target-Analysis-Goal (T.A.G.) Approach 
In the previous chapter, it has been determined that epistemic uncertainties need to be 
identified, documented, tracked and addressed. In this chapter, we shall introduce the Target-
Analysis-Goal (T.A.G.) approach to help stakeholders accomplish these principles. We name 
it the T.A.G. approach as it comprises three steps according to the three principles in chapter 
3: identify Target, document Analysis, as well as track and address Goal.  
The T.A.G. approach is summarised in Table 14. On the left are the principles to be achieved 
according to chapter 3. In the middle, we list our initial requirements as part of the T.A.G. 
approach to help achieve the principles. On the right is the expected actions to be carried out 
by stakeholders to make use of the initiatives to achieve the desired principles.  
For example, to better identify epistemic uncertainties (the first principle), we have developed 
a taxonomy of causal mechanisms to help recognised uncertainties that may not be covered in 
the original safety assessment. The users would have to use the taxonomy as reference to 
conduct the physical identification.  
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Table 14. The T.A.G Approach to Proactively Manage Epistemic Uncertainty 
S
T
E
P
  
Principles 
Target-Analysis-Goal (T.A.G.) approach 
Elaborated in 
Initial Requirements Stakeholders’ Actions 
1 
Identify Target  
Epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models 
of safety assessment 
should be identified 
Taxonomy of causal 
mechanisms for 
stakeholders to recognise 
epistemic uncertainties not 
covered in original 
assessment 
Use the taxonomy of 
causal mechanisms to 
identify plausible-but-
uncertain causal 
relationships in safety 
assessment 
Section 4.2 
2 
Document Analysis  
Epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models 
of safety assessment 
should be documented 
Process and factors to 
prioritise epistemic 
uncertainties analysis so as 
to document the findings in 
existing safety assessment 
technique 
Prioritise and document 
epistemic uncertainties as 
part of existing safety 
assessment techniques 
Section 4.3 
3 
Track and Address Goal  
Epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models 
of safety assessment 
should be tracked and 
addressed in a systematic 
manner through-life 
Method to develop 
actionable goals to track 
epistemic uncertainties 
through-life and address 
when some thresholds are 
met 
Implement the initiatives 
to fulfil the action plan to 
track and address 
epistemic uncertainties 
through-life 
Section 4.4 
 When Is T.A.G. Approach Applicable in Safety Assessment? 
Recall that in chapter 1, we introduced the concept of risk and confidence, as well as the 
understanding that it is possible to track known epistemic uncertainty in safety assessment 
only when the risk due to the uncertainty can be tolerable. With regards to the T.A.G. approach 
(see Table 14), the two steps of identifying and documenting epistemic uncertainties should 
be conducted in parallel with the ongoing risk analysis. As for the third step of tracking and 
addressing the epistemic uncertainties, it can happen through two scenarios: 
• Scenario 1. Clarity in the epistemic uncertainty can reduce the assessed risk such that 
it becomes tolerable or acceptable.   
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• Scenario 2. While the assessed risk is tolerable, there is not enough confidence in the 
risk analysis to make it acceptable due to the epistemic uncertainty. 
The way T.A.G. approach is integrated with existing safety assessment is shown in Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36. Integrating T.A.G. Approach into Existing Safety Assessment 
The extent of risk tolerance depends on the phase in the system lifecycle in which the 
uncertainty is discovered. For example, an uncertainty about the system design during the early 
conceptual phase of the system lifecycle tends to be tolerable since there is still time to reassess 
the risk further down the system lifecycle when the system design is more definite. In contrast, 
an uncertainty about the operational concept during deployment flight trial may need to be 
resolved quickly since there is not much time till the operation phase of the system. For 
example, we can expect a higher risk appetite for the uncertainty about the system design 
during conceptual phase, vis-à-vis the uncertainty about the operational concept during flight 
trial. As a result, it may be more applicable to use the T.A.G. approach to track uncertainty 
during conceptual phase than during flight trial. Having said that, the T.A.G. approach can still 
be used to track the uncertainty about the concept of operation by specifically annotating the 
urgency of the tracking, if the risk is assessed to still be tolerable. 
In the remaining sections, we will define the three steps under the T.A.G. approach. 
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 Initiative 1: A Taxonomy of Causal Mechanisms to 
Identify Uncertainty Target 
  
Figure 37. T.A.G. Approach First Step: Identify Target 
To support step 1 of the T.A.G. approach, we develop a taxonomy of causal mechanisms (see 
Figure 37) to identify plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship. Recall from Figure 36 that 
Step 1 of the T.A.G. approach to identify epistemic uncertainties should be integrated with 
risk analysis in existing safety assessment techniques. The aim is to recognise epistemic 
uncertainties that have not been covered in the original safety assessment. 
The first principle of managing epistemic uncertainties states that the epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models of safety assessment should be identified (see section 3.2.1). To be 
identified, stakeholders must first be able to recognise these uncertainties, be it initially known 
or unknown Safety assessment involves finding causal conditions that could be hazardous. As 
discussed in section 3.2.1, safety assessment inherently contains uncertainties. A taxonomy 
can actively prompt the stakeholders to recognise those plausible-but-uncertain causal 
conditions in safety assessment and help stakeholders identify safety-critical epistemic 
uncertainties early. 
To recognise these uncertainties, the stakeholders should be aware of where to search for them. 
There is a lot of understanding of the nature of causal relationships from collective wisdom. 
In the spirit of good safety engineering practice, the taxonomy of causal mechanisms that we 
are creating aims to harness the maximum effect of prior knowledge about credible causal 
mechanisms, especially those that may reveal certain types of unsafe situations related to the 
system of interest. This is akin to the ‘observability-in-depth’ principle under system safety 
[145] to identify hazards. The principle advises stakeholders to scan the horizon in depth for 
as many scenarios as possible that can transit a system to an increasingly hazardous state. This 
encourages stakeholders to shift the boundary of knowledge from not knowing to knowing 
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about critical epistemic uncertainty, through surfacing and modelling of previously unknown 
uncertainty. 
Besides knowing where to search, stakeholders need to do the search in an effective and 
efficient way in view of limited resources. 
• Searching in an Effective Way.  To be effective, the search space should be as 
comprehensive as possible. A taxonomy can do this by specifying a reasonable 
coverage of diverse issues to help stakeholders recognise a wide range of safety-
critical concerns and causal relationships.  
Since most of the literature about safety are specialised in their domains, none of them 
can serves as an isolated and complete guide to discover all types of hazards. For 
example, Shappel’s Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
[146] provides a detailed review of issues related to human such as complacency, 
distraction and confusion; but does not consider technology issues that can also cause 
hazards. His work can be complemented by O'Halloran’s taxonomy of Failure 
Mode/Mechanisms Distribution (FMD) [147] that lists the possible safety-critical 
issues resulting from technical properties such as kinetic, chemical and electrical. In a 
different study, Endsley’s taxonomy of situation awareness error [80] focuses on 
information and decision making, which provides another dimension of causal 
mechanism.  
Specifically, in the military domain, the Defence Lines of Development (DLoD) is a 
useful reference to consider when conducting military system development. This is 
supported by the studies from Yue and Henshaw [148] and Burton, Paige, Poulding 
and Smith [149]. Both groups of author highlighted that the DLoD components (i.e. 
Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Concepts & Doctrine, Organisation, 
Information and Logistics) are fundamental components to guide military through life 
capability management for the UK Ministry of Defence. To make the search more 
comprehensive, we have also included similar capability management considerations 
from the Department of Defence in Australia (known as ‘Fundamental Inputs to 
Capability’) [150], United States (DOTLMPF) [151] and Canada (PRICIE) [152]. 
To create a credible taxonomy, an extensive literature review of different subjects that 
are related to safety was conducted (see Annex A for the range of literature surveyed). 
The literature review involved identifying potential causal mechanisms that may result 
in unsafe situations. These causal mechanisms covered a wide range of topics such as 
system safety, human factor ergonomic, project uncertainty, taxonomy of safety-
related subjects and situational awareness. 
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• Searching in an Efficient Way.  To be efficient, stakeholders should be guided in 
some ways to narrow down the search for uncertainties whenever they have some 
ideas of where to search. Currently, most stakeholders depend on random experiences 
or unsystematic brainstorming among those that are present during the safety 
assessment to discover known uncertainties. Without a systematic way of searching, 
the process may end up being laborious and inefficient. Our taxonomy helps the 
stakeholders to narrow their search by grouping the causal mechanisms into primary 
and secondary causal conditions for more efficient searching.  
From the initial list of causal mechanisms and the suggested classifications within the 
literature, six primary causal conditions were defined: Human, Organisation, 
Technology, Process, Information and Environment (see Table 15). This list is 
collectively known as the Human, Organisation, Technology – Process, Information, 
and Environment (HOT-PIE) taxonomy.  
Table 15. Descriptions of the Six Primary Causal Conditions in HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
No. Primary Causal 
Condition 
Description 
1 Human (section 
4.2.1) 
People that directly or indirectly influence the system. They 
include managers, users, maintenance engineers, contractors, 
senior leaderships and operators.  
2 Organisation 
(section 4.2.2) 
A discrete, relatively stable group of individuals linked by 
relatively stable patterns of interaction and pursuing common 
objectives affecting the system [153] 
3 Technology 
(section 4.2.3) 
Application of scientific knowledge in practice, especially for 
system acquisition in our context.  
4 Process (section 
4.2.4) 
A systematic series of operations that are performed to produce 
or service something.  
5 Information 
(section 4.2.5) 
Data that are conveyed or represented in such a way to produce 
knowledge in a system. 
6 Environment 
(section 4.2.6) 
The surroundings within which the system operates. 
From the six primary causal conditions, we further subdivide them into fifteen 
secondary casual conditions (see Table 16) that comprises over three hundred of 
possible causal mechanisms (see the full list in Annex K). While this may not be the 
only way to sub-divide the primary causal condition based on the causal mechanisms 
consolidated, having such subdivision would help stakeholders narrow down to an 
area of interest when they have some ideas where to search.  
In the rest of section 4.2, we shall describe these causal mechanisms in detail based on the six 
primary causal conditions. 
Table 16. HOT-PIE Primary and Secondary Causal Conditions 
Primary Secondary  Primary Secondary 
Human H1: Manpower  Process P1: Nature  
H2: Mental state  P2: Phase  
H3: Action   
Organisation O1: Management  Information I1: Knowledge  
O2: Policy  I2: Error 
O3: Resource   
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Primary Secondary  Primary Secondary 
Technology T1: Machine  Environment E1: Physical  
 
T2: Property  
 
E2: Non-physical  
T3: Support   
 
 Primary Causal Condition: Human 
We have subdivided the Human primary causal conditions into three secondary causal 
conditions: Manpower, Mental state and Action (see Table 17). The focus of each secondary 
condition is explained in the table. 
Table 17. Causal Mechanisms under the Human Primary Causal Conditions 
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
H1: Manpower 
(capability of the 
individuals to work on 
the system) 
expertise[154-156] staffing[146, 154, 156-160] mix[158] 
ownership[154] experience[154, 158] leadership[142, 146] 
skill[146, 156, 158, 159, 161-163] ability[158] characters[164] 
individualistic[165] demographic[165] cultural[165] 
obligation[166] survivable[158] stakeholders[66, 156, 167-169] 
user[170] turnover[156] education[156] 
H2: Mental state 
(frame of mind of the 
individuals working on 
the system) 
escalation[142] brokerage[142] free rider[142] convention[142] 
norm[142] selective benefit[142] morale and motivation [142, 
156, 158] social[163, 171] deliberate[161] esteem[166] 
complacency[146] stress[146] overconfidence[146] fatigue[146] 
distraction[80, 146] confusion[146] health[158] comfort[158] 
visual limitation[146] illness[146] injury[158] disability[158] 
hearing limitation[146] cognitive[158] physical[158, 172] 
sensory[158] team dynamic[158, 159] aptitude[158] 
emotional[172] psychic[173] conflict of interest[156] lack 
purpose[156] perception[80, 174] memory fail[80] poor mental 
model[80] incorrect mental model[80] reliance on default[80] 
H3: Action (activity 
conducted by an 
individual on the 
system)  
operation[155] network[142] broadcast[142] rumour[142] 
communication[146, 154, 156, 159] open[159] interrelation[159] 
atmosphere[159] engagement[173] coordination[146] 
omission[80, 161] commission[161] extraneous act[161] 
observation[164] interpretation[164] overcommit[166] 
performance slip[175] specification slip[175] lapse-forgot[175] 
lapse-overlook[175] rest[146] preparation[146] intentional 
violation[159, 163, 176] behaviour[173] lack involvement[156] 
influence[174] 
Example.  As an illustration, Expertise is one of the causal mechanisms under the secondary 
casual condition of Manpower (H1). We can refer to references [154-156] for more details 
about how the subject of Expertise can cause uncertainties related to Human causal conditions. 
For example, in the RSAF safety assessment for new system, the absence of some SMEs 
during safety assessment can potentially means that certain important safety concerns were 
not surfaced. This uncertainty is captured using the CRMSA model in Figure 38 for 
illustration.  
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Figure 38. Illustration of a Human Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Primary Causal Condition: Organisation  
We have subdivided the Organisation primary causal conditions into three secondary causal 
conditions: Management, Policy and Resource (see Table 18). The focus of each secondary 
condition is explained in the table. 
Table 18. Causal Mechanisms under the Organisation Primary Causal Conditions  
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
O1: Management (factors 
affecting the control of the 
system) 
supervision[142, 146, 155] audit[142] communication[164] 
structure [146, 164, 168, 174, 177] levels of domain[174] role 
ambiguity and conflict[165] schedule[165] demand[166] 
feedback and refine[146] company[160] project size[156] 
project uniqueness[156] project density[156] 
O2: Policy (principle of 
actions adopted by the 
system) 
regulation and control[142, 160, 167, 174] job future and 
security[165, 166], culture and climate[146, 156, 162, 165, 
177, 178] reward and recognition[165, 166] incompatible 
goals[156, 159, 176] trade-off[159] ambiguous goal[156] 
narrow goal[156] expectation[156] customer satisfaction[170] 
O3: Resource (supporting 
assets that are needed for 
the system to function 
properly) 
training facility[142, 155, 164, 170, 176] material[154, 155, 
162] supplier management[142, 156, 169] support facility[146, 
156, 161, 170, 172] time phase[157, 161] time step[157, 161] 
project urgency[156] allocation[146] monetary[146, 156] 
instructional[158] unrealistic time frame[156] outsource 
management[156] infrastructure[163, 170] test 
equipment[178] test procedure[178] 
Example.  As an illustration, Supervision is one of the causal mechanisms under the secondary 
casual condition of Management (O1). We can refer to references [142, 146, 155] for more 
details about how the subject of Supervision can cause uncertainties related to Organisation 
causal conditions. For example, for the RSAF IAD SoS [135] mentioned in section 3.2.3.1, 
multiple systems may interoperate with each other to provide the enhanced IAD SoS 
capability. Junior operators for each system may only have knowledge for their own system, 
while the senior operators have additional knowledge to supervise interoperability with other 
systems within the IAD SoS. In certain situation, there could be uncertainty about the 
supervisory level needed to operate a system if the actual complexity of the operation (e.g. the 
  
127 
type of systems involved) is not confirmed. This uncertainty is captured using the CRMSA 
model in Figure 39 for illustration.  
 
Figure 39. Illustration of an Organisation Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Primary Causal Condition: Technology 
We have subdivided the Technology primary causal conditions into three secondary causal 
conditions: Machine, Property and Support (see Table 19). The focus of each secondary 
condition is explained in the table. 
Table 19. Causal Mechanisms under the Technology Primary Causal Conditions  
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
T1: Machine (a 
component that has a 
definite function and 
perform a task under 
the system) 
hardware capability[155, 157, 163, 167, 169, 174, 176, 177] 
hardware compatibility[178] technical[168, 171, 179] equipment 
[146, 161, 164] interface[146, 164] link[163] node[163] 
display[146] construction[162] software[147, 157, 163, 167, 169, 
174, 177, 178] communication[147, 170, 176] engineering[66] 
mobility[163] traffic[163] area coverage[163] services[170] 
tool[170] technique[170] abstraction[154] working range[154] 
tech change[154, 156] innovation[154] complexity[146] 
availability[159] function[159] standardisation[159] features[156] 
customisation[156] interdependency[163] 
T2: Property (technical 
attribute, quality, or 
characteristic) 
energy[157] kinetic[154] biological[154] acoustical[154] 
chemical[154] electrical[154] mechanical[154] electro-
magnetic[154] thermal[154] radiation[147, 154] bonding[147] 
buckling[147] change in property[147] corrosion[147] 
cracking[147] deformation[147] fatigue[147] seizure[147] 
impact[147] rupture[147] voiding[147] wear[147, 178] 
breakdown[147] contamination[147] diffusion[147] 
degradation[147] incorrect current[147] punch through[147] 
leak[178] loose[178] drift[178] synchronisation[178] 
T3: Support (assistance 
to actual work) 
system design[162, 176] tool design[165] tool usability[165] work 
area design[165] task design[146, 176] medium[163] 
Example. As an illustration, System Design is one of the causal mechanisms under the 
secondary casual condition of Support (T3). We can refer to references [162, 176] for more 
details about how the subject of System Design can cause uncertainties related to Technology 
causal conditions. For example, in the  CHALLENGER space shuttle accident, one of the 
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concerns was the uncertainty surrounding the behaviour of the O-ring under cold temperature. 
Unfortunately, this design uncertainty was not raised sufficiently to create the awareness that 
it might cause catastrophic failure to the space shuttle. This uncertainty is captured using the 
CRMSA model in Figure 40.  
 
Figure 40. Illustration of a Technology Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Primary Causal Condition: Process 
We have subdivided the Process primary causal conditions into two secondary causal 
conditions: Nature and Phase (see Table 20). The focus of each secondary condition is 
explained in the table. 
Table 20. Causal Mechanisms under the Process Primary Causal Conditions  
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
P1: Nature (types of 
systematic operations 
performed in the 
system) 
segregation[154] systematic[154] oversight[146, 154] procedure 
[146, 154, 157, 159, 161, 162, 164, 167, 176-178] practice[154, 167] 
overload[80, 165] control[157, 165] autonomy[165, 172] 
repetitiveness[165, 174] feedback[165, 172] ability to learn[165] 
input[157] output[157] lower level failure[163] cascade failure[163] 
delay[163] 
P2: Phase (a distinct 
period in the system’s 
lifecycle) 
design and plan[164, 179] validation[154] verification[154] 
manufacturing[66] operation[66] risk management[154, 156, 158, 
176] review[154] maintenance[159, 176, 178, 179] 
housekeeping[176] inspection[179] supervision[179] work[160, 170, 
171, 177] training[159, 161] execution and operation[146, 161, 170, 
178] mis-operation[161] task[165, 168, 169] sense-making[170] 
decision making[170] thinking[170] 
Example.  As an illustration, Autonomy is one of the causal mechanisms under the secondary 
casual condition of Nature (P1). We can refer to references [165, 172] for more details about 
how the subject of Autonomy can cause uncertainties related to Process causal conditions. For 
example, for the RSAF IAD SoS [135], we have mentioned that junior operators may only 
have knowledge for their own system, while the senior operators have additional knowledge 
to supervise interoperability with other systems. The organisation needs to recognise the 
limitation of the junior operators’ knowledge and calibrate the level of autonomy given to 
  
129 
them in operating the system either during standalone mode or integrated mode with other 
systems. Unfortunate, this calibration can only be confirmed when the concept of operation is 
finalised, which may only happen later in the system lifecycle. This uncertainty about the level 
of autonomy given to junior operators is captured using the CRMSA model in Figure 41 for 
illustration.  
 
Figure 41. Illustration of a Process Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Primary Causal Condition: Information 
We have subdivided the Information primary causal conditions into two secondary causal 
conditions: Knowledge and Error (see Table 21). The focus of each secondary condition is 
explained in the table. 
Table 21. Causal Mechanisms under the Information Primary Causal Conditions  
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
I1: Knowledge (facts and 
skills acquired to 
understand the system) 
procedure[155] standard[155] method[155] assumption[161] 
policy[146, 169] rule[162, 167] guideline[157] 
precondition[157] type of info[164] manual and checklist[146] 
protocol[159, 163] roles and responsibilities[156] best 
practice[156] data[156] concept[156] no fault found[178] 
rationalities[174] evidence[174] values[174] fluctuation[174] 
customer requirements[170] codified information[170] 
I2: Error (the state or event 
of being wrong) 
application error[175] assumption error[175] syntax 
error[175] requirement error[175] lack of distinction[175] lack 
of awareness[175] insufficient knowledge[175] situational 
awareness error[159] incomplete specification[156] conflicting 
requirements[156] info processing problem[156, 170] data 
unavailable[80] data not detected[80] decisional error[174] 
executional error[174] 
Example.  As an illustration, Standard is one of the causal mechanisms under the secondary 
casual condition of Knowledge (I1). We can refer to references [155] for more details about 
how the subject of Standard can cause uncertainties related to Information causal conditions. 
For example, in the NIMROD aircraft example, there was concern about compliance with 
standards by subcontractors during modification of the aircraft [180]. In Russell’s paper, he 
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mentioned that some subcontractors might not be ISO9000 series complaint and the MOD was 
unable to verify that since it was depended on the next higher level of subcontractor to check 
the standards of those below them. Russell warned that “although the contractor certified to 
manufacture parts, they did not take on the role of testing parts they had sub-contracted, 
relying on the subcontractors own internal testing”.  This uncertainty is captured using the 
CRMSA model in Figure 42 for illustration.  
 
Figure 42. Illustration of an Information Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Primary Causal Condition: Environment 
We have subdivided the Environment primary causal conditions into two secondary causal 
conditions: Physical and Non-physical (see Table 22). The focus of each secondary condition 
is explained in the table. 
Table 22. Causal Mechanisms under the Environment Primary Causal Conditions  
Secondary Conditions Causal Mechanisms  
E1: Physical (relating to 
physics or the operation of 
natural) 
network[142] ambient condition[161, 164] weather[146, 161] 
orientation[161] size[161] location[161] elevation[161] 
operating condition[158, 164] noise[146, 165] lighting[146, 
165] vibration[146, 165] pollution[165] heat[146] 
terrestrial[163] meteorological[163] cosmological[163] 
E2: Non-physical (not 
tangible or concrete) 
cultural[155, 170, 177] social[167] attitude[155] 
economic[142, 156, 163, 167, 177] competitiveness[170] 
political[142, 156, 163, 167, 169, 177] regulatory[170, 177] 
legal[156, 167] contract[142] propaganda[142] duration[161] 
delayed[161] alternative[166] strategic interest[166] 
government[160] complexity[156] security[163] 
Example.  As an illustration, Operating Condition is one of the causal mechanisms under the 
secondary casual condition of Physical (E1). We can refer to references [158, 164] for more 
details about how the subject of Operating Condition can cause uncertainties related to 
Environment causal conditions. For example, in the NIMROD disaster, the air-to-air refuelling 
modification was introduced in 1989 to allow the aircraft to change its operating condition 
such that it can extend its reconnaissance capability. There could have been added vigilance 
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regarding the uncertainty that a change in operating condition might become dangerous. It was 
unfortunate that the modification was, according to the Haddon report [181], “in breach of 
Defence Standard 00-970” as the blow-off valves and fuel pipes for air-to-air refuelling were 
fitted too close to other components on the aircraft that can pose catastrophic fire risk. This 
uncertainty is captured using the CRMSA model in Figure 43 for illustration.  
 
Figure 43. Illustration of an Environment Related Uncertainty represented with CRMSA 
 Apply the Taxonomy to Recognise Uncertainty 
With the HOT-PIE taxonomy, stakeholders can apply it during risk analysis to recognise 
plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. While the HOT-PIE taxonomy can help to review 
known uncertainties (e.g. finding other causal mechanisms related to the known uncertainties), 
its strength lies in prompting the discovery of unknown uncertainties during safety assessment, 
which the stakeholders may not have discovered by using the existing safety assessment 
techniques. The intent of HOT-PIE taxonomy is to prompt stakeholders to shift unknown 
uncertainties into known uncertainties so that they can start making assessment if the 
uncertainties are safety critical.  
Example.  For example, in section 4.2.6, the HOT-PIE taxonomy may be able to prompt the 
NIMROD project team to consider the Operating Condition causal mechanism under the 
Environment primary causal condition. This might have prompted the safety analysts to 
consider the impact, trade-off and uncertainty of having air-to-air refuelling capability on the 
aircraft for extended operation. A follow-up on this uncertainty could have exposed the design 
flaw in the system modification of having the cross-feed duct too close to the fuel pipe.  
To help stakeholders recognise uncertainty, we consider three questions here that can better 
prepare stakeholders to decide when to use the taxonomy and where to look out for epistemic 
uncertainties. 
• When does epistemic uncertainty occur in a safety assessment? 
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• Where does epistemic uncertainty occur in a safety assessment? 
• Where does epistemic uncertainty occur in a causal relationship?  
4.2.7.1. When does Epistemic Uncertainty Occur in a Safety Assessment? 
Epistemic uncertainty occurs when there is a lack of knowledge during a safety assessment. 
This happens when the relevant information is either not available or not sufficient. Using the 
RSAF safety assessment from section 1.1.3 as an example below: 
Examples where information is not available include: 
• contractor does not have equipment specification that is provided by sub-contractors, 
• expertise not present during the safety assessment, and 
• unable to predict all the operation profiles that the system will operate in. 
Examples where information is not sufficient include: 
• using preliminary system design instead of the final one, 
• using initial concept of operation before the final concept is available further down the 
lifecycle, and 
• using flight trial report that only consists of 3 flight profiles out of the desired 4, as the 
last flight profile was not conducted due to bad weather.  
Epistemic uncertainty can also be present if there is suspicious that reliable information now 
may not be accurate or sufficient in the future. Usually, stakeholders are alert to epistemic 
uncertainty when there is insufficient information to support a safety assessment. However, 
even when an information provided for a safety assessment is sufficient during an analysis, 
the accuracy of the information may change with time and affect the validity of the safety 
assessment.  
4.2.7.2. Where does Epistemic Uncertainty Occur in a Safety Assessment? 
This has been discussed extensively in section 3.3.1 under the CMSS model. To recall, 
epistemic uncertainty can occur in information that may or may not be generated solely for the 
safety assessment.  
Firstly, epistemic uncertainty could be from information that is generated solely for the safety 
assessment, i.e. in the safety causal models. This includes experimental results, flight trial 
observations and contractors’ answers to safety queries.  
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Secondly, epistemic uncertainty could be from information that is generated from other 
analyses beyond the safety assessment, i.e. in other system models. For example, in the 
CHALLENGER space shuttle accident, the launching temperature was part of the data 
retrieved from the space shuttle system (i.e. a form of system model), rather than part of the 
safety causal model. Other examples of information not directly related to the safety 
assessment include personal experiences, mental models, system design documents and 
equipment specifications.  
4.2.7.3. Where does Epistemic Uncertainty Occur in a Causal Relationship?  
In section 3.3.2, we have established that safety assessment is carried out with the aim of 
identifying causal relationships that could be hazardous. Uncertainties in such causal 
relationships can be in two areas: nodes and linkages. To help in explaining the differences, 
we have reproduced the CRMSA model described in chapter 3 as a reference (see Figure 44): 
 
Figure 44. Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment 
Uncertainty about Nodes. Uncertainty in safety assessment can be located on the nodes in a 
causal relationship, when they do not have prior relationship with one another. From Figure 
44, this can refer to the system elements in the system domain or the causal conditions in the 
safety domain. For example, there may be a new platform (which is a new system element 
node) joining a network of systems which can create uncertainty about the safety of the whole 
network. In the safety domain, stakeholders may recognise that maintenance engineers can 
operate the system wrongly and dangerously using the maintenance mode, which can be a 
system hazard. This may not have been considered before and hence, an unsafe maintenance 
by the engineers can constitute a new causal condition node.  
Uncertainty about Linkages. Uncertainty in safety assessment can also be located on the 
linkage in a causal relationship. From Figure 38, this can refer to the influence between system 
elements in the system domain or the causal mechanism in the safety domain. For example, 
for a technical safety assessment, there may be uncertainty about the network messages 
between a newly installed system element and a legacy system element. This can happen when 
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information about the network interfaces between the new and legacy systems are not 
sufficiently provided by the system manufacturers. As a result, this creates uncertainty during 
the hazard analysis on the network messages communicated between the two systems. 
 Initiative 2: A Systematic Prioritisation Process to 
Document Uncertainty Analyses 
  
Figure 45. T.A.G. Approach Second Step: Document Analysis 
To support step 2 of the T.A.G. approach, we introduce a process and factors to prioritise 
uncertainty analyses that stakeholders would be conducting after identifying these 
uncertainties (see Figure 45). Such a prioritisation process is needed to help stakeholders to 
systematically document the epistemic uncertainty discovered from the previous step. 
The second principle of managing epistemic uncertainties states that epistemic uncertainties 
in the underlying models of safety assessment should be documented (see section 3.2.2). Such 
documentation should trace the reasons why uncertainties are chosen to be investigated further 
and be integrated with existing process as much as possible. 
We have mentioned in section 3.2.2.1. that there is no established approach to documenting 
uncertainties in current safety assessment techniques. In the beginning of this chapter, we have 
also emphasised the importance of integrating any new approach with existing safety 
assessment techniques. For Step 2 of the T.A.G. approach, we aim to integrate our process 
with the risk analysis process in existing safety assessment techniques. This will be elaborated 
In section 4.3.1.   
With limited resources during system development, stakeholders may end up discarding less 
certain causal relationships during safety assessment and run the danger of ignoring safety 
critical uncertainties (see section 3.2.2.2). We have also raised the concern that stakeholders’ 
do not usually document the reasons they choose or discard causal relationships for analysis 
during safety assessment (see section 3.2.2.3). Since prioritisation is unavoidable in 
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complicated system lifecycle where resources are limited to accomplish the many tasks, it is 
important to document such considerations for traceability reason. To be explicit about such 
selections, we have developed factors for stakeholders to consider when prioritising which 
uncertainty analyses they would manage first. For example, there may not be enough 
manpower or expertise to manage a certain uncertainty; or there may not be enough time to 
investigate an uncertainty due to an imminent deadline. These factors shall be elaborated in 
section 4.3.2. 
 Process to Integrate Uncertainty Management in Existing 
Techniques 
To understand the process to integrate the T.A.G. approach in existing safety assessment 
techniques, we will first describe a generic process of how through-life safety assessment is 
currently conducted (see section 4.3.1.1). This is followed by a description of the generic 
process of managing epistemic uncertainties in through-life safety assessment (see section 
4.3.1.2). 
4.3.1.1. Generic Process of Through-life Safety Assessment 
In section 2.2.1, we have described the typical safety assessment process in system 
development lifecycle. Taking the example of the MoD CADMID acquisition lifecycle 
mentioned in chapter 3, there are multiple milestones across the lifecycle where safety 
assessments are conducted. Such assessments would result in the generation of safety artefacts 
such as safety case evidence and reports. Safety artefacts are something that are observed or 
intentionally produced during safety assessment. As illustrated in Figure 46, multiple safety 
cases are generated at every milestone, which are refined with the latest assessment about the 
safety of the system.   
 
Figure 46. MoD CADMID Cycle 
Using the CADMID lifecycle as an example, we have developed a process flow to show a 
generic process of safety assessment throughout the system lifecycle (see Figure 47).  
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Figure 47. Generic Process Flow for Through-Life Safety Assessment 
From the figure, we can see that safety assessment generally consists of three steps 
(represented by the rectangular boxes).  The requirement to conduct safety assessments at 
different milestones will repeat until the system reaches the end of its lifecycle (e.g. 
decommissioned, disposal). The three generic steps within a safety assessment are as follows:  
Step 1 (S1): Perform Risk Analysis. A safety assessment consists of one or more risk 
analyses. The nature of risk analyses depends on the types of safety assessment techniques. 
An overview of risk analyses is captured in section 2.2.1. 
Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts. During a risk analysis, objects are generated 
from investigations and observations. These objects are collectively known as safety 
artefacts. Example of safety artefacts include list of hazards, risk mitigation plans, 
outstanding action items and residual risk report. 
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. The generated safety artefacts 
will be feedback to the system engineering process for further cause of actions if they 
affect the system lifecycle. For example, additional flight trial may have to be conducted 
after discovering more fight-critical hazards in the system of interest. More people and 
resources may need to be activated to conduct the flight trial as part of ongoing system 
engineering process that is beyond the scope and control of the stakeholders conducting 
the safety assessment.   
Example.  For example, in the RSAF, a safety assessment technique that is conducted as part 
of developing the safety assessment report is the zonal safety analysis. A process flow showing 
the zonal safety analysis is shown in Figure 48. According to the standard SAE ARP 4761 [7], 
the risk analysis in the zonal safety analysis broadly includes the following three steps: prepare 
design guideline, inspect installation and inspect for system/item interference. Through these 
steps, safety artefacts such as measurement results and propose corrective actions are 
generated. These artefacts would then be feedback to the system engineering process where 
necessary. For example, modification may need to be carried out due to certain interference 
between components. This would have to be considered in conjunction with other system 
engineering activities. The result from the zonal safety analysis will be attached as part of the 
safety case for the aircraft.  
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Figure 48. Process Flow for Zonal Safety Analysis 
4.3.1.2. Generic Process of Integrating T.A.G. Approach in Safety Assessment  
We have described the process of integrating the T.A.G. approach in risk analysis at the 
introduction of this chapter. In this section, we would provide a more detailed process flow to 
show this integration (see Figure 49). The highlighted portion represents the additional 
elements that have been added as part of the T.A.G. approach, as compared to the generic 
process of through-life safety assessment presented in Figure 47. 
Step 1 (S1): Perform Risk Analysis. The usual risk analysis per existing safety assessment 
technique. In addition, T.A.G. approach is integrated here by inserting the following sub steps: 
Step 1a (S1a): Identify Epistemic Uncertainty. This is Step 1 of the T.A.G. 
approach. Stakeholders can use the HOT-PIE taxonomy as a reference (see section 
4.2) to identify both known and unknown epistemic uncertainties. Stakeholders can 
also make use of the CMSS and CRMSA (see chapter 3) to help in finding 
uncertainties in the safety causal models, system models and the model types in the 
safety assessment.  
For example, there may be individuals during the safety assessment who are familiar 
with the system human resource model regarding the workforce. During safety 
assessment, such HR experts may be prompted by the ‘Human’ primary causal 
condition under the HOT-PIE taxonomy to bring up concerns about the expertise and 
experience of the workforce (i.e. uncertainty in the system model). This can help to 
identify plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships related to the workforce. Using 
the CRMSA, the safety analysts can describe this plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationship explicitly and manage it as part of the T.A.G. approach.  
Step 1b (S1b): Document Epistemic Uncertainty.  This is part of Step 2 of the 
T.A.G. approach. Any epistemic uncertainty that has been recognised, regardless if it 
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is assessed to be safety critical, should be tagged and stored in a T.A.G. database. This 
database is needed in the next step for prioritisation.  
Step 1c (S1c): Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses. The T.A.G. database will document 
causal relationships with epistemic uncertainties that may potentially be safety critical. 
We refer to them as plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. Stakeholders are not 
able to commit if such plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships are safety critical 
due to a lack of information at the point of conducting the risk analysis. They would 
also have to assess if the risk is at least tolerable for these uncertainties to be tracked 
further as explained in section 4.1.2.   Due to potential lack of resources, stakeholders 
may need to prioritise these uncertainties for further tracking. The factors to consider 
when prioritising the tracking of these uncertainties will be elaborated in section 4.3.2.  
Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts. Besides generating safety artefacts from safety 
analyses (e.g. list of hazards, risk mitigation plans, outstanding action items and residual 
risk report), a database of prioritised uncertainties from step 1c will also be generated. All 
this information should be integrated into the same existing reporting channel and 
transferred to the system engineering process in the next step.    
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. Besides the usual course of 
actions due to the risk analysis, the T.A.G. approach would also generate action plans to 
track and address epistemic uncertainties. The requirements from such action plans would 
be feedback to the system engineering process for further actions.  
Example.  For example, back to the running example of the RSAF safety assessment, a process 
flow that shows how T.A.G. approach could be integrated with the zonal safety analysis is 
shown in Figure 50. As shown in the figure, uncertainty can be recognised in each of the three 
steps of the zonal safety analysis. Hence, uncertainty tagging can occur in any of the three 
steps when uncertain causal relationships are discovered. After completing the third step (i.e. 
inspect for interference), the T.A.G. database shall be consolidated with other safety artefacts 
from the zonal analysis.  
We will revisit the process flows in later chapters where the T.A.G. approach is 
integrated with safety assessment techniques under the system (see chapter 5) and 
component (see chapter 6) viewpoints. 
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Figure 49. Process Flow to Integrate T.A.G. Approach in Safety Assessment 
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Figure 50. Process Flow to Integrate T.A.G. Approach in Zonal Safety Analysis 
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 Factors to Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Ideally, stakeholders would want to analyse all identified plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationships from the safety assessments. As mentioned, this is most likely not possible in 
practice due to limitation of resources such as time and manpower. Hence, stakeholders need 
a way to prioritise the list of causal relationships identified from the first step of the T.A.G. 
approach.  
To help stakeholders prioritise the analyses to be conducted on the plausible-but-uncertain 
causal relationships without overly complicating the existing process, we aim to develop a set 
of questions for stakeholders to consider during prioritisation based on some factors. For that, 
we have adopted the Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach [23] to create a set of guided 
questions and matrix for stakeholders to consider when prioritising the uncertainty analyses. 
The approach provides a structured way to develop factors (i.e. the metric) to help in our goal 
of prioritising the epistemic uncertainty identified from initiative one. While the approach is 
initially designed for software measurement, it can be easily adopted for our research. To 
summarise, the GQM approach comprises the following three steps: 
1. Goal.  Define the goal that specifies the purpose of the measurement 
2. Question. Refine the goal into questions to determine factors that break down the 
issues into components 
3. Metric.  Develop a measurement method as a metric to answer the questions. 
It is important to realise that such prioritisation inadvertently involves bias opinions among 
the stakeholders that are conducting the ranking. Hence, it is important to document as much 
as possible such opinions that influence the stakeholders’ decisions.  
Plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships that are of lower priority will be given less 
attention as compared to causal relationships that are of higher priority. A more proactive 
action plans may be expected for those relationships that are judged to be of higher priority. 
Such proactive action would involve coming out with “monitoring technique” and “monitoring 
activity” to track the uncertainty and its potential effect on the causal relationship. This is akin 
to developing a hazard tracking system for the high-priority uncertainty. 
For example, there could be uncertainty about operational profile that a system can function 
safely in. A predetermined “monitoring technique” to monitor this uncertainty can be the 
‘flight trial’ and the “monitoring activity” to monitor this uncertainty is the ‘opportunity to 
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conduct the trial beyond a certain flight boundary when operating overseas’. Both “monitoring 
technique” and “monitoring activity” will be tracked as a pair in the proactive action plan. 
We will proceed to describe the three steps in the GQM approach to develop the guided 
questions for prioritising uncertainty analyses. 
4.3.2.1. Goal of Prioritisation 
Our goal is to develop factors to help users compare and select the analyses to find out more 
information regarding the identified epistemic uncertainties. These analyses are based on the 
uncertainties that are identified in the first step of the T.A.G. approach.  
Example.  In the CHALLENGER example, after identifying the uncertainty in section 4.2.3, 
one analysis could be to investigate the uncertainty about the plausible design issue with the 
O-ring at different temperature. 
4.3.2.2. Factors for Prioritisation 
In our approach, we have recommended priority ranking of uncertainties as the preferred 
approach. However, we acknowledge that there could be other ways to rank uncertainties. One 
other approach of ranking uncertainties is to be explicit about how much an uncertainty may 
affect more than one causal relationships in the safety assessment. An uncertainty that affects 
multiple causal relationships can be exhibiting more dependencies and as such could be ranked 
as a higher priority to be managed.  
We base our prioritisation on the literature survey of the characteristics of epistemic 
uncertainty (see section 2.1.2.1). These characteristics are summarised in Table 23.  
Table 23. Literature Survey on the Characteristics of Uncertainties  
Author Observations (details in section 2.1.2) 
D. H. McQuiston, Johnston & 
Bonoma, Kirsch & Kutschker 
Novelty, complexity and importance affect participation and 
influence behaviour 
Peng et al, Novak & Eppinger 3 project complexity dimensions based on OIPT: project size, 
project novelty, task interdependence.  
Tatikonda & Rosenthal Project varies along two dimensions: technology novelty and 
project complexity 
Shenhar & Dvir Consider four project characteristics to identify and manage risk: 
“novelty, technology, complexity and pace,”  
Svejvig & Anderson Rethinking project management based on the following features: 
Learnability, multiplicity, temporality, complexity, uncertainty and 
sociability 
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Author Observations (details in section 2.1.2) 
Saunders et al Determinants of uncertainty based on: Environmental, individual, 
complexity, information, temporal and capability 
Galbraith, Teuteberg Organisation information processing model – the greater the task 
uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be 
processed to achieve a given level of performance 
From Table 23, we derive two key factors to consider when prioritising the plausible-but-
uncertain causal relationships to follow up: criticality and the expected effort (see Figure 51). 
By considering these factors, stakeholders would be able to make a better assessment on which 
uncertainties to analyse first. Generally, the more critical an uncertainty is to cause harm, the 
higher the priority to manage it first. As for the expected effort, it may be tempted to focus on 
uncertainty that requires the least effort. However, it can be dangerous if stakeholders decide 
to avoid uncertainties that require a lot of expected efforts.  
For example, an uncertainty that is critical but requires a lot of expected effort may imply that 
stakeholders need to cater for more resources to analyse the uncertainty, and not the discard it 
since it can potentially cause a lot of harm. Hence, how the expected effort can affect the 
prioritisation depends on the context surrounding the uncertainty.  
  
 
Figure 51. Factors to Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses 
Next, we will describe criticality and expected effort in detail. 
Factors to Measure Criticality.  In safety, the criticality of an uncertainty analysis is 
measured by its level of risk. In section 2.2.1, safety risk is defined as a product of the 
likelihood of harm occurring and how serious that harm could be. Similarly, the criticality of 
an uncertainty analysis can be determined by the probability of occurrence and severity of any 
hazard due to the plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship. Logically, an uncertainty 
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analysis that is of higher criticality should be given higher priority to clarify its epistemic 
uncertainty. 
Example.  For example, during system development, higher priority may be given to 
clarifying an uncertainty concerning the technical functions of a weapon system compared to 
the uncertainty in the number of engineers to conduct a flight trial. The technical functions 
have direct consequences on the hazard of the weapon to cause harm, whereas the manpower 
to conduct the flight trial would most likely affect the efficiency of the trial and not so much 
of a safety risk. 
Stakeholders need to be aware that uncertainty can also affect their assessment of criticality. 
In practice, the actual criticality of the uncertainty analysis depends on the real risk, which 
may differ from the estimated risk. This is because the real risk depends on known 
uncertainties, as well as unknown uncertainties (which we may not even be aware) that affect 
the probability and/or severity of a causal relationship. It is possible that the real risk could be 
higher than the estimated risk. Hence, the T.A.G. approach is important to find out more about 
known and unknown uncertainties such that the stakeholders can make a more informed 
assessment about the real risk.  
Factors to Measure Expected Effort.  The expected effort depends on the amount of 
additional knowledge needed to close the gap between the current state of uncertainty and the 
threshold of acceptable uncertainty. This is determined by the complexity, novelty and 
resource availability of the context associated with the uncertainty.  
• Complexity.  Complexity refers to the difficulty in understanding the uncertainties in 
a condition. The harder to appreciate the uncertainties in a condition (e.g. developing 
a system in a complicated safety-critical system), the more complex is the condition. 
Hence, if all else remains equal, the condition that is more complex tends to need more 
effort to clarify the uncertainties.  
From the literature survey, there seems to be multiple definitions of complexity in 
project management. In his assessment of uncertainty, McQuiston [37] refers to 
complexity as ‘how much information the organisation must gather to make an 
accurate evaluation of the system’. Shenhar [44] states that complexity is about 
finding out how complicated are the product, the process and the project involved. 
Tatikonda [43] defines project complexity as ‘the nature, quantity and magnitude of 
organisational subtask and subtask interactions posed by the project’.   
Peng [39] uses the Organisational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) to conclude 
that information processing needs are affected by complexity issues such as product 
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size and task interdependence. Product size refers to the number of parts in the product 
design and task interdependence looks at the influence of any given task on other tasks. 
Tatikonda, on the other hand, defines three attributes under project complexity, 
namely project difficulty (level of task performed), objective novelty (novelty of task 
objectives) and technology interdependence (interdependency of task units). While 
Tatikonda classifies novelty as a component under project complexity, there are other 
literature that elevate novelty as one of the main causal determinant besides 
complexity.  
We have constructed our guided questions (see Table 25) about complexity per the 
three uncertainty elements defined in the CMSS (see section 3.3.1): safety causal 
model, system model and model types. Under each uncertainty element, the extent of 
complexity is assessed by factors such as size, difficulties and interdependency.  
• Novelty. Novelty refers to the extent of prior knowledge about a condition. The lesser 
the prior knowledge or experience (e.g. developing a new system to operate in a new 
environment), the more novel is the condition. Since stakeholders cannot depend too 
much on prior knowledge, condition that is more novel tend to need more efforts to 
clarify the uncertainties. 
Novelty is defined by McQuiston as ‘the lack of experience of individuals in the 
organisation with similar situations.’. Shenhar considers novelty as ‘how intensely 
new are crucial aspects of the project’. Tatikonda refers to technology novelty as the 
‘newness to the development organisation of the technologies employed in the product 
and process development effort’.  Peng considers project novelty to involve novelty 
of product or process, lack of information about markets and customers and the 
ambiguity of project goals. Based on these definitions, we have selected the ‘newness’ 
of the target and the extent of prior experience to be the key factors to assess novelty.  
Like complexity, we have also constructed the guided questions (see Table 25) about 
‘newness’ based on the three uncertainty elements defined in the CMSS (see section 
3.3.1): safety causal model, system model and model types. Under each uncertainty 
element, the extent of novelty is assessed by factors such as system novelty, process 
novelty and objective novelty.  
We have also included a fourth category, experience, to emphasise the influence of 
prior experience. A group of stakeholders with prior experience of managing similar 
systems may be able to provide more information as compared to a group of less 
experienced stakeholders. However, having experience in other similar systems may 
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not always equate to being more knowledgeable about the current system of interest. 
Further analysis would still have to be conducted in the context of the current system.  
• Resource Availability.  Resource availability refers to the extent of resources 
available to understand a condition. It is more difficult to solicit information if there 
are no dedicated resources to help stakeholders to learn more about the uncertainties. 
We consider resource availability as having the capability (e.g. skills, infrastructure, 
manpower) and time to solicit information about the uncertainties.  
Having the capability is not enough if there is no time to do the learning. This has been 
stated by many researchers, such as Shenhar, Svejvig [45] and Saunders [46]. For 
example, in system safety lifecycle, stakeholders must meet numerous deadline. They 
may not have enough time to focus on all the uncertainties that have been discovered 
due to a lack of time. Hence, urgency is an important factor under resource availability. 
Example.  For example, in the RSAF safety assessment example from section 4.2, we have 
discovered a series of plausible uncertainties. There may be a need to prioritise which 
uncertainties to analyse first due to resource constraint in developing the safety assessment 
report. Besides considering the criticality, the safety analysts should also consider the expected 
efforts to analyse the uncertainty. The analysis for this example will continue in the next 
section of this chapter. 
4.3.2.3. Matrix to Calculate the Priority  
Based on the factors of criticality and expected efforts, we have created a list of guided 
questions for stakeholders to prioritise uncertainties for tracking (see Table 25). Stakeholders 
can use these questions to prioritise and choose which of the plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationships to focus on in the third step of the T.A.G. approach.  
To make a more objective decision, we introduce an overall priority score based on the two 
factors of criticality and expected effort. The following instructions would help stakeholders 
to calculate the priority score: 
1. Identify the uncertainty in the targeted causal relationship. 
2. Analyse the criticality of the target based on the guided questions. Score the criticality 
from 0 (low criticality) to 1 (high criticality). 
3. Analyse the complexity of the target based on the guided questions. Score the 
complexity from 0 (low complexity) to 1 (high complexity). 
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4. Analyse the novelty of the target based on the guided questions. Score the novelty 
from 0 (low novelty) to 1 (high novelty). 
5. Analyse the resource availability of the target based on the guided questions. Score 
the resource availability from 0 (high resource availability) to 1 (low resource 
availability).  
6. Calculate the overall expected effort by average out the sum of the three scores under 
complexity, novelty and resource availability (assuming the factors have equal 
weightage). 
7. Locate the quadrant on the prioritisation matrix (see Figure 52) that corresponds to the 
score for criticality and expected effort.  
 
Figure 52. Prioritisation Matrix for Uncertainty Analysis 
Example.  Using the examples in section 4.2, the expected efforts to analyse the uncertainty 
can be measured quantitatively by average out the scores (between 0 and 1) for each of the 
factors: complexity, novelty and resource availability for each uncertainty. Analysis of an 
uncertainty that is more complex, more novel and less learnable would be given a higher score. 
For instance, we have compared between three of the uncertainties that consider Human, 
Technology and Information causal condition in the HOT-PIE taxonomy (see Table 24). Note 
that, while these three examples belong to different case studies, we have artificially analysed 
them together as a form of comparison on the expected efforts. 
 
Table 24. Example of Expected Efforts Calculation to Analyse Uncertainties 
Example A B C 
HOT-PIE Primary 
Condition 
Human Technology Information 
Uncertainty  uncertainty about the 
expertise of the SMEs 
in carrying out the 
safety assessment 
(section 4.2.1) 
uncertainty about the 
design concern of the 
O-ring performance 
in low temperature 
(section 4.2.3) 
uncertainty about 
compliance with standards 
by subcontractors during 
modification of the aircraft 
(section 4.2.5) 
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Example A B C 
HOT-PIE Primary 
Condition 
Human Technology Information 
Complexity 0.3 0.6 0.8 
Novelty 0.3 0.7 0.4 
Resource 
Availability  
0.4 0.6 0.8 
Expected Effort 0.3 0.6 0.7 
Complexity. Comparing the three examples, the most complex analysis would be to find out 
the level of compliance among the subcontractors in example C. The efforts to find out the 
manufacturers of components and subcomponents, and subsequently deciding on which 
standards they need to comply with, can be complicated. Hence it is given a score of 0.8. 
Relatively, analysing the O-ring for example B would be less complex than example C. Hence 
it is given a complexity value of 0.6. Since it is quite straight forward to find out the experience 
level of the SMEs in example A, it is considered a relatively simpler task than the other two 
with a complexity score of 0.3. 
Novelty. In terms of novelty, the task of analysing previous data for design concern in the O-
ring might be something that the engineers have little experience in. Hence, example B is given 
the highest novelty score of 0.7. Relatively, communicating with contractors and subcontracts 
in example C, as well as SMEs in example A, are activities that stakeholders would most likely 
have done before. Hence, both example A and C have lower scores for novelty compared to 
example B.  
Resource availability. The hardest uncertainty to find out more information would be 
example C as it involves multiple third parties (contractors and subcontractors) outside the 
team that is conducting the safety analysis. Hence, it is given a resource availability score of 
0.8. Example B requires the team to retrieve past design and operational data that should be 
readily available. Finding if the SMEs have the necessary expertise in example A is also 
relatively easier compare to the other two examples. 
Expected effort. Averaging out the scores for complexity, novelty and resource availability, 
it is observed that analysing the expertise of the SMEs in example A requires the least effort 
at a score of 0.3. This is followed by analysing the O-ring design in example B which has a 
score of 0.6. The task of checking the compliance of contractors and subcontractors in example 
C is expected to require the most effort out of the three examples.  
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The prioritisation matrix for the three examples is plotted in Figure 53 using the calculated 
scores of criticality and expected efforts. Stakeholders can use it to prioritise the order 
in which the three uncertainties will be managed.   
 
Figure 53. Prioritisation Matrix Example 
Since prioritisation is subjective, stakeholders can be making decisions that are bias and based 
on certain mindsets. Hence, it is important for stakeholders to be explicit about the strategies 
that have been considered during prioritisation. Stakeholders should also be mindful that it can 
be a challenging task to prioritise the causal relationships as it is highly dependent on the 
information available.  
While we cannot guarantee that two safety analysts could produce consistent results, the 
guided questions in the T.A.G. approach are introduced to provide some level of consistency 
by having a structured way for the safety analysts to consider uncertainty. While it is feasible, 
applying an average of the overall priority score (based on the factors of criticality and 
expected effort) from each safety analyst may produce skewed and misleading results when it 
comes to prioritisation. An alternate approach could be to conduct qualitative discussion and 
sharing among the safety analysts that are using the T.A.G. approach to build consensus in 
selecting the more important uncertainties to focus on first. This will be an area we will focus 
on to improve the T.A.G. approach in the future. 
Example.  As an example, stakeholders may decide to prioritise the uncertainty analyses based 
first on the criticality of the uncertainties and secondly by the amount of efforts needed. This 
is summarised in the prioritisation matrix in Figure 54.  
With this strategy, stakeholders would decide to put high priorities to analyses in quadrants A 
and B, rather than C and D (see Figure 52). Take note that this is but one of the many ways 
that stakeholders can prioritise the uncertainty analyses. The final choice of where to focus on 
depends on the context facing the stakeholders during the analysis.  
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Figure 54. An Example of Prioritisation for Uncertainty Analysis 
To summarise, we have developed an approach to prioritise the plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationships based on a set of guided questions (see Table 25) and a prioritisation matrix chart 
(see Figure 52). Stakeholders can make use of this approach to prioritise the uncertainty 
analyses according to the quadrants in the prioritisation matrix.  
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Table 25. Guided Questions to Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Target Uncertainty to be analysed: < Describe the targeted uncertainty here > 
 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard 
interdependency, residual risk interdependency) 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is 
identified? (e.g. system structure / product size / product design, 
process / task interdependency, process design, technology 
interdependency, project management difficulties) 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? 
(e.g. patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and system 
models)  
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal 
model from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard 
list) 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system 
model from where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, 
technology, objective) 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, 
conventions) 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
Resource Availability: Assess the resource availability related to the target from the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other 
resources) 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? 
(e.g. project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
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 Initiative 3: A Structured Method to Track Action Plan 
and Address Goal  
   
Figure 55. T.A.G. Approach Third Step: Track and Address Goal 
To support step 3 of the T.A.G. approach, we implement a method to develop actionable goals 
that stakeholders can implement as part of the system engineering process (see Figure 55). The 
aim is to track plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship through-life till certain thresholds 
are met to prompt the stakeholders to address the uncertainty. The portion of the process where 
T.A.G. approach step 3 takes place is shown shaded in Figure 56. 
 
Figure 56. T.A.G. Approach Step 3: Track and Address Goal 
The third principle of managing epistemic uncertainties states that epistemic uncertainties in 
the underlying models of safety assessment should be tracked and addressed in a systematic 
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manner through-life (see section 3.2.3). The demand to track and address the uncertainty 
systematically is further elaborated here: 
• Demand of a Systematic Plan to Track the Uncertainty.  We have established in 
section 3.2.3.1 that system safety engineering demands a systematic and through-life 
management of knowledge. In order not to leave it to chance, tracking of epistemic 
uncertainties should be planned and this plan should follow a structured approach that 
spells out the activities to be conducted as part of the tracking. To do that, we have 
developed a guide for stakeholders to develop a systematic action plan (see section 
4.4.1). The factors to be considered under the action plan is covered in section 4.4.2.  
• Demand of a Systematic Plan to Address the Uncertainty. As mentioned in section 
3.2.3.2, epistemic uncertainties can change with time. Stakeholders need to be 
prepared when such changes occur. To help in being responsive to such changes, the 
plan to manage the epistemic uncertainties should include the actions needed when 
certain thresholds with regards to the uncertainties are met. For example, the plan 
could specify the right people and resources that should be available to address an 
uncertainty. The factors in the action plan to address the uncertainty is elaborated in 
section 4.4.2. Some of the possible outcomes when addressing epistemic uncertainty 
are described in section 4.4.3. 
 The GQTA Approach 
Like the prioritisation effort earlier, we also develop a set of questions for stakeholders to 
consider when constructing the action plan to manage epistemic uncertainties. However, 
instead of directly using the GQM approach, we have modified the approach to emphasis the 
two areas of tracking and addressing of uncertainties. To do that, we have dropped the ‘M’ 
(i.e. matric) in the GQM approach and added the ‘T’ and ‘A’ to represent ‘Track’ and 
‘Address’ respectively. This is known as the GQTA approach, which stands for Goal Question 
Track and Address approach. The following summarises the four steps under the GQTA 
approach: 
1. Goal – From the prioritisation based on criticality and expected effort, stakeholders 
would have selected a list of plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. The goal is 
to manage such uncertainty conditions throughout the system safety lifecycle 
proactively with an action plan.  
Example.  After deciding to analyse an uncertainty in section 4.3 (assuming it has been given 
high priority), the following goal is to develop the plan that comprises two parts: 1) to decide 
on the monitoring technique that tracks the plausible design flaws in the system after multiple 
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modifications, and 2) to decide on the monitoring activity that addresses the design flaws when 
certain thresholds are met.     
2. Question – Refine the goal into questions that break down the issues to prepare for 
tracking and addressing. Since system lifecycle and the epistemic uncertainties can 
evolve quickly with time, stakeholders may not have a lot of time to construct a 
comprehensive action plan to track and address the targeted epistemic uncertainties. 
We have proposed important areas to focus on when deriving the action plan and these 
are described in section 4.4.2. 
3. Track – Develop the tracking guide based on the questions from the previous step. 
We have suggested four focus areas to help the stakeholders develop the action plan. 
This is described in section 4.4.2.   
4. Address – Like tracking, the focus areas to address the uncertainty is also described 
in section 4.4.2. Besides having an action plan, it is important to consider the possible 
outcomes when called upon to address the uncertainties. This is discussed in section 
4.4.3. 
 Factors to Consider in Action Plan 
We have surveyed literature in section 2.1.2.2 on ways to track and address uncertainties and 
this is summarised in Table 26.  
Table 26. Literature Survey of Ways to Track and Address Uncertainties  
Author Approach (details in section 2.1.2) 
Eisenhardt & martin, 
Helfat, Zollo & Winter 
Dynamic capabilities theory – resources and capabilities must be 
constantly reallocated and reoptimized to adapt to changing environment  
Weick Decomposition of organizing – enactment, selection and retention.  
Teece Conceive the concept of dynamic capabilities as the ability to sense, seize 
and adapt to exploit competences and address changing environment 
Petit & Hobbs Conceptual framework to study management of uncertainty in project 
portfolios 
Saunders et al Present three approaches (structural, behavioural and relational) to 
contend with uncertainties in project life and describe ways that 
practitioners can identify, analyse and act on it 
Diana  Apply sense and respond in risk and security domain – risk signal that 
can be captured (sense) provide an opportunity to mitigate risk (respond). 
Sense and respond methods involve monitoring and observing, incessant 
rehearsing, understanding and interpreting data, deciding how to respond, 
and producing a response 
Gothelf and Seiden  Identify five most important principles underpinning the sense and 
respond approach 
From the literature surveyed, we observe that most of the models can be broadly grouped under 
two distinct phases: track and address. This supports our third principle of managing epistemic 
uncertainties – ‘epistemic uncertainties should be tracked and addressed in a systematic 
manner through-life’. Correspondingly, our action plan will be constructed based on these two 
phases. In addition, we have also based our action plan on the conceptual framework to study 
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project uncertainty by Petit [50] as it recommends a range of core activities for sensemaking. 
As a result, we have combined our principles to track and address with the conceptual 
framework by Petit to derive four focus areas. These focus areas are highlighted in Figure 57.  
 
Figure 57. Focus Areas in Uncertainty Management Action Plan 
An action plan should document the approach to 1) track sensors and 2) address responses that 
come from the sensing. For tracking, the stakeholders must decide on the type of monitoring 
technique to be constructed and the monitoring activity needed for the sensing task. To address 
the responses well, the stakeholders must set trigger points to make decision and readily adapt 
when there are any changes needed to keep the system safe. These four focus areas are 
elaborated in this section. 
4.4.2.1. Decide Monitoring Technique  
The first area focuses on deciding on the monitoring technique needed to track the epistemic 
uncertainties. In this case, we use the term ‘monitoring technique’ to describe any means to 
detect changes related to the epistemic uncertainty.  Examples of monitoring technique include 
machines (e.g. optical sensors) to detect certain physical property and people (e.g. operators 
or maintenance engineers) to observe certain phenomena. The key questions for considerations 
are: 
• What are the monitoring techniques needed to track the epistemic uncertainties? 
• How are the monitoring techniques able to track the epistemic uncertainties? 
Example.  In the CHALLENGER example, to track the plausible design concern of the O-
ring in low temperature, the monitoring technique could be the people and their tasks are to 
review the design and operation data. They would be given the responsibility of sensing if 
sufficient information is available to review the uncertainty over the design concern. 
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4.4.2.2. Develop Monitoring Activity 
The second area focuses on developing the monitoring activity to track the uncertainties using 
the monitoring technique. There can be many factors to consider here. The key questions to 
consider include: 
• What types of monitoring technique are to be taken? 
• When should these monitoring activities be collected from the techniques? 
• Who is responsible to do the tracking? 
• What are the structures and supporting resources to put in place for the tracking? 
• What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to do the tracking? 
Example.  In the CHALLENGER example, to track the plausible design concern in the O-
ring, the people tasked to consolidate the design and operation data would need to decide when 
sufficient material has been consolidated. They would also need to be experienced in soliciting 
the right documents that are needed for the analysis. They should report regularly to the safety 
committee that oversees the safety of the space shuttle. 
4.4.2.3. Set Trigger Points 
The third area focuses on the level of preparedness to make decision due to some trigger points. 
Such trigger points can be periodic (e.g. presenting result during monthly or quarterly safety 
review board), or due to any change of state or event that goes beyond a certain predetermined 
threshold (e.g. in the CHALLENGER example, a reason to address the design concern of the 
O-ring would be the discovery of plausible hazard when carrying out the monitoring activity). 
The key questions for considerations are: 
• What are the trigger points that require proactive response? 
• Who are responsible to decide on the respond actions? 
• What are the governance and supporting structure to put in place to make the decision? 
• What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to make the decision? 
4.4.2.4. Adapt to Change 
The fourth area focuses on the readiness to address the uncertainty and make changes to keep 
the system safe. The key questions for considerations are: 
• Who is responsible to review the changes that will be put in place? 
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• How prepared and responsive should the system be in addressing the uncertainty? 
• What are the structure and support resources to put in place to address the uncertainty? 
• What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to address the uncertainty? 
Example.  In the  CHALLENGER example, the safety committee overseeing the safety of the 
space shuttle should be responsible for making any recommendation or changes to address the 
uncertainty. In addition, the committee needs to weight the balance between the level of risk 
and the need to consolidate more information about the uncertainty. If the system needs to be 
modified upon the uncertainty analysis, the entire system engineer process would have to be 
reviewed to assess the impact on the system lifecycle.   
4.4.2.5. Planning Guide 
The planning guide to develop action plan is consolidated in Table 27. This guide can be used 
by stakeholders to develop the tracking plan to monitor the uncertainty conditions, as well as 
the follow up actions needed to address the uncertainties. We have also developed an expanded 
version of the guide in Annex B to provide more examples to consider for tracking and 
addressing epistemic uncertainties. This expanded version can be used for training purposes 
or as reference material during safety assessment where it is practical to do so.  
The proposal by Saunders [51] to consider structural, behavioural and relational approaches 
can be considered in the expended version. Structural issues refer to the structure and processes 
to manage uncertainty.  Behavioural issues refer to the attitude and mental state when 
managing uncertainty. Relational issues focus on the interpersonal communication to manage 
uncertainty. 
Table 27. Guide to Set Goals for Action Plan 
Target Uncertainty: < Describe the targeted 
uncertainty here > 
Guided Questions to set Goals for Action Plan 
1: Track 
Sensors 
1a: Decide Monitoring 
Techniques – What shall we 
track? 
Q1. What are the monitoring techniques needed to 
track the epistemic uncertainties? 
Q2. Why are the monitoring technique able to meet 
the goal of managing the uncertainty condition? 
 1b: Form Monitoring 
Activity – How do we track? 
Q3. What types of monitoring activity to be taken? 
Q4. When should these monitoring activity be 
collected from the techniques? 
Q5. Who are responsible to do the tracking? 
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Target Uncertainty: < Describe the targeted 
uncertainty here > 
Guided Questions to set Goals for Action Plan 
Q6. What are the structures and supporting resources 
to put in place for the tracking? 
Q7. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes 
needed to do the tracking? 
2: Address 
Responses 
2a: Set Trigger Points – 
When and how shall we 
decide to respond? 
Q8: What are the trigger points from the monitoring 
activity that require proactive response? 
Q9. Who are responsible to decide on the respond 
actions? 
Q10. What are the governance and supporting structure 
to put in place to make the decision?  
Q11. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes 
needed to make the decision? 
 2b: Adapt to Change – What 
are the possible responses? 
Q12. Who is responsible to review the changes that 
will be put in place? 
Q13. How prepared and responsive should the system 
be in addressing the uncertainty? 
Q14. What are the structure and support resources to 
put in place to address the uncertainty? 
Q15. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes 
needed to address the uncertainty? 
 Possible Outcomes When Addressing Uncertainty 
Besides having an action plan to explicitly document how to address the uncertainty, it would 
help stakeholders to better manage the uncertainties if they can appreciate and anticipate the 
possible outcomes when they address the uncertainty. Since these outcomes depend largely on 
how much the residual uncertainty has evolved, we would first present the common ways that 
an uncertainty may change with time in section 4.4.3.1. This would follow by a description of 
the possible outcomes when addressing epistemic uncertainty in section 4.4.3.2. 
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4.4.3.1. How does Residual Uncertainty change with Time? 
The uncertainty that remains after a safety assessment has been undertaken can be considered 
as residual uncertainty. Here are three cases in which such residual uncertainty may change 
with time: 
• Residual Uncertainty Reduces with Greater Clarity.  Some residual uncertainties 
may become lesser with time, e.g. as experiments produce test results, stakeholders 
clarify safety concerns with specialists, and new component developers lock down 
their interface specifications. Such relevant information can allow stakeholders to 
make better judgement about safety risk, albeit at a later phase of the system lifecycle. 
Having more information increases confidence but may not directly make a system 
safer. Whether the additional information makes the system safe or unsafe depends on 
the follow-on hazard analysis.  
• Residual Uncertainty Creates Other Related Uncertainty.  Some residual 
uncertainties may evolve when more information is available. For example, when 
mitigating argument or evidence is presented with regards to an uncertainty, a new 
residual uncertainty may be created. For example, there could be uncertainty about 
using a weapon system in a specific operating environment A. Operators may report 
their experiences of using the same weapon system in another environment B for the 
same purpose. This may reduce the uncertainty around the usage of the weapon 
system, but it may result in a new residual uncertainty about the similarity between 
environment A and B. This can trigger a follow-up effort to derive monitoring 
technique or activity to compare the differences between both operating environments.   
• Discovery of Previously Unknown Uncertainty.  As residual uncertainties are being 
tracked under the T.A.G. approach, stakeholders may unexpectedly discover other 
previously unknown uncertainties. This may trigger a response to address the newly 
discovered epistemic uncertainty. Since this uncertainty is new, the stakeholders 
would have to trigger the process to address the risk associated with the uncertainty.  
4.4.3.2. What are the Possible Outcomes when Addressing Uncertainty? 
When one of the above scenarios happens to the residual uncertainty, it may reach a certain 
predefined threshold tracked by the T.A.G. approach such that it triggers the stakeholders to 
address the uncertainty. The generic steps to address uncertainty when triggered is shown in 
Figure 58. It is similar to Figure 56 at the start of section 4.4, except that the starting point is 
at the trigger that activates the risk analysis to address the uncertainty. 
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When being triggered to address the uncertainty, stakeholders would conduct a risk analysis 
to assess the risk that is still facing the system, as well as the assessing the confidence in the 
analysis. At this moment, stakeholders would have to decide if the risk is confidently within 
the tolerable or acceptable region. If it is not, a decision would have to be made to either focus 
on managing the risk or clarifying the uncertainty. These two outcomes are explained further 
here.  
 
Figure 58. Possible Outcomes when Addressing the Uncertainty 
Outcome 1 – Focus on Risk by Implementing System Change.  If the level of system risk 
is assessed to be unacceptable, stakeholders would need to derive strategies to reduce the risk. 
Possible approaches include modifying the system design and changing the ways that the 
system is being operated. An example is to derive safety measure to reduce the risk (e.g. 
putting up speed bumps at an accident-prone junction to force motorist to reduce speed). 
Another example could be to use risk mitigation action to avoid the risk (e.g. putting up signs 
to warn motorists of an accident-prone junction). Stakeholders would have to conduct the 
safety analysis again to conclude if the new measure or mitigation does lower the risk to a 
tolerable or acceptable level. 
Outcome 2 – Focus on Uncertainty by Continuing with the T.A.G Approach.  The T.A.G. 
tracking on the epistemic uncertainty may need to continue either to increase confidence or 
reduce risk.  
• Outcome 2a – Increasing Confidence.  Regardless of the level of risk, there may still 
not be enough confidence in the assessment due to the presence of epistemic 
uncertainties. For example, during hazard analysis, risk assessment was conducted 
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based on the latest system design. The risk may be acceptable but there are outstanding 
epistemic uncertainties in the system design (e.g. lack of subsystem specifications 
from subcontractors) that need to be followed up to provide the necessary confident 
with the risk assessment.  
• Outcome 2b – Reducing Risk.  In this second case, clarifying certain epistemic 
uncertainties may be needed to make an unacceptable risk tolerable or acceptable.  
To end the uncertainty tracking, stakeholders must be satisfied that the epistemic uncertainties 
being tracked by the T.A.G. approach have either been eliminated or that the risk is assessed 
to be confidently acceptable despite the decision to stop tracking these known uncertainties. 
The T.A.G. approach would be applied in multiple cases studies across the next two chapters 
to demonstrate how it can complement established safety assessment techniques to manage 
epistemic uncertainties.  
 Initial Evaluation and Summary 
The overall evaluation of this research is discussed in detail under Chapter 7. In this section, 
we highlight and evaluate specifically the T.A.G. approach discussed in this chapter. 
In section 4.2, we have established the HOT-PIE taxonomy of causal mechanism that 
comprises six primary causal conditions of over three hundred abstract causal mechanisms. 
These causal mechanisms can be used to prompt stakeholders to either appreciate known 
uncertainties better or recognise unknown uncertainties that may not be obvious prior 
embarking on the T.A.G approach. Through the many examples in the section, we have shown 
that the taxonomy can help stakeholders to identify uncertainties that can lead to hazards not 
discovered in the original safety assessment. 
In section 4.3, we have established the prioritisation process to integrate the T.A.G. approach 
with existing safety assessment process. A generic process flow to tag uncertainty is 
developed, which can be customised with existing safety assessment technique. Two major 
factors to prioritise uncertainty analyses (i.e. criticality and expected efforts) are also 
established to help stakeholders to decide on which uncertainties to manage. We have shown, 
with the running examples from the RSAF safety assessment, CHALLENGER and NIMROD 
case studies, that the prioritisation process can be integrated with existing safety assessment 
technique such as the zonal analysis. We have also demonstrated how three epistemic 
uncertainties from the examples can be prioritised by considering the criticality and expected 
efforts to manage the uncertainties. 
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In section 4.4, we have established a structured method to construct an action plan to track and 
address epistemic uncertainties that are derived from the first two steps of the T.A.G. approach. 
The method advocates four important activities in the action plan: deciding on monitoring 
technique, forming the monitoring activity, setting trigger points and adapting to change. 
Again, using the running examples, we have demonstrated the formulation of the action plan 
to track and address the uncertainty about the plausible design flaw in previous aircraft 
modifications. This action plan shall provide the stakeholders the means to track and address 
the uncertainty even when it changes with time. 
In order to make the T.A.G. approach more feasible for industrial usage, we have consolidated 
the three steps, together with the key concepts, into a concise user guide. This is attached in 
Annex K. This guide is also used in the next two chapters when applying the T.A.G. approach 
on case studies that involves established safety assessment techniques. 
The T.A.G. approach requires the stakeholders to consider epistemic uncertainties in such 
depth that they would probably have not considered during normal risk analysis, as well as to 
track and address these uncertainties through life which they may not have done before. This 
inevitably would ‘cost’ the stakeholders to commit more resources such as time and manpower 
into the safety assessment. Like evaluating other safety assessment techniques, it is not easy 
to conduct a quantitative cost-benefit analysis on implementing the T.A.G. approach. Instead, 
a qualitative assessment using questionnaire is applied in this research to solicit feedback on 
the cost-benefit of implementing the T.A.G. approach. This will be further elaborated under 
the main evaluation in Chapter 7.    
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Chapter 5 – Application of T.A.G. Approach in Safety 
Assessments from System Viewpoints 
 Introduction  
With the understanding of the T.A.G. approach from chapter 4 and the relationships between 
system and system elements under CMSS (see Figure 28), we will next evaluate the feasibility 
of integrating the approach with existing safety assessment techniques. To cover a broad range 
of safety assessment techniques, our evaluation will focus on safety assessments conducted at 
both system and component viewpoints. In this chapter, we apply the T.A.G. approach on the 
Yongwen railway accident from a top-down perspective by assuming that we do not have 
hindsight about the facts in the accident. Hence, the uncertainties that will be identified using 
the T.A.G. approach may or may not be directly related to the actual cause of the railway 
accident. Facts about the actual accident are used for comparison after we have completed the 
exercise to identify the uncertainties using the HOT-PIE taxonomy; and are not considered as 
known information during the T.A.G. approach.   
System vs Component Viewpoints.  From IEEE 42010, recall that viewpoint, or model type, 
“establishes the conventions for constructing, interpreting and analysing the view (or model) 
to address concerns framed by that viewpoint”. Examples of viewpoint conventions include 
languages, notations, model kind, modelling methods and analysis techniques. Such model 
type determines the expressive power of the system model. The applications of T.A.G. 
approach at both viewpoints shall be evaluated in two separate chapters (see Table 28): 
Table 28. Summary of Chapters that Apply T.A.G. Approach 
Chapter Viewpoint Safety Assessment Technique Referenced Scenario  
5 System Systems-Theoretic Process 
Analysis 
Yongwen railway accident 
analysis by Song et al [24] 
6 Component Fault Tree Analysis and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis  
ARP 4761 aircraft design 
example [7] 
• Safety Assessments from System Viewpoints. In this chapter, chapter 5, we focus 
on safety assessments from system viewpoints. We integrate the T.A.G. approach with 
the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) hazard analysis technique. This is 
based on the STPA analysis on the Yongwen railway system by Song et al. The HOT-
PIE taxonomy is applied on the existing STPA risk analysis to assess the application 
of the T.A.G. approach to discover plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. 
• Safety Assessments under Component Viewpoints. In the next chapter, chapter 6, 
we focus on safety assessments from component viewpoints. We integrate the T.A.G. 
approach with the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
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(FMEA) techniques. This is based on the aircraft design example in ARP 4761. Unlike 
system viewpoint that consider broader system issues such as technology and 
processes, component viewpoints create models that are more targeted such as 
electrical circuit diagram or physical design specifications. The challenge is to be 
aware of the scope and limitations of each model, as well as appreciate the 
relationships between models that potentially can influence each other and become 
safety critical (e.g. when reviewing an electrical circuit diagram, the safety analyst 
may assume that the air-condition is well regulated and overheating of the electrical 
components is not of safety concern). We will elaborate more about safety 
assessments from component viewpoints in the next chapter.  
Accident Analysis vs Hazard Analysis.  In this chapter, we shall integrate the T.A.G. 
approach with the STPA safety assessment technique from the system viewpoint. As shown 
in Table 28, we have chosen to base our study on the Yongwen railway accident analysis by 
Song et al as they are able to demonstrate the important steps in STPA using a case study. In 
his research, Song conducts an inductive hazard analysis to develop safety requirements to 
manage hazards that are discovered using the STPA technique. As analysing the Yongwen 
railway accident can be retrospective based on hindsight and facts of the accident, Song’s 
hazard analysis has injected a sense of artificiality in order to demonstrate that the STPA 
technique can indeed discover hazards. These hazards could either be directly related to the 
actual accident or additional safety risk beyond the actual causes of the accident.  
Similarly, when we apply the T.A.G. approach on the Yongwen railway accident, we approach 
the analysis by assuming that we do not have hindsight about the facts of the accident. The 
facts from the accident can be used for comparison but should not be considered as known 
information during the safety assessment.   
Why do we choose STPA?  To evaluate safety assessment from the system perspective, we 
need a safety assessment technique that focuses on using models that are based mostly on 
system viewpoints. The STPA is one of such techniques. The STPA uses abstract safety causal 
models that highlight interactions between different systems, as well as unsafe system causal 
relationships in the form of control loops and constraints. This allows the elements in the STPA 
to be integrated with the CRMSA model (introduced in section 3.3.2). We will show in this 
chapter that the risk analyses conducted in the STPA can be easily represented using the 
CRMSA model and this helps to integrate the T.A.G. approach into the analysis.   
While the STPA examines hazards from the system viewpoints, the system issues that are 
being analysed are mostly bounded once the system control structure is finalised in the early 
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stages of the risk analysis. In addition, there isn’t systematic process in STPA to highlight 
structural linkages or causal relationships that are plausible but uncertain due to lack of 
information. This provides the opportunity to use the T.A.G. approach to complement STPA 
to identify more safety-critical system issues with the use of the HOT-PIE taxonomy, as well 
as track the epistemic uncertainties beyond the STPA process, throughout the system lifecycle 
till they are being addressed when information is available. 
Summary of the Yongwen Railway Accident.  On July 23, 2011, A high-speed train from 
Beijing to Fuzhou (train no: D301) collided into the back of another train from Hangzhou to 
Fuzhou (train no: D3115) along the Yongwen railway line at 20:30 China Standard Time 
(CST) near the suburbs of Wenzhou. The two trains collided at the track circuit 5829AG, 
causing 40 fatalities and 172 injuries. The sequence of events leading to the accident is 
described in Annex C. 
While the direct cause of the collision was due to the error in the track signalling system, it 
was accepted that there are other contributing factors to the accident that would have existed 
in the complicated railway system. The accident represents an appropriate example of a 
complicated social-technical system with numerous subsystems that are constantly interacting 
with each other, which can potentially be safety-critical. 
Moving forward, we will first describe the STPA on the railway system conducted by Song et 
al in section 5.2. With this understanding, we will next evaluate how epistemic uncertainties 
can be managed using the T.A.G. approach together with STPA in section 5.3. We will 
conclude the chapter by evaluating the contributions of the T.A.G. approach in managing 
uncertainties together with STPA in section 5.4.  
 Safety Assessment using STPA 
According to chapter 2.2.1, Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard analysis 
technique based on Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). To refresh, 
STAMP is an accident causality model that is based on the study of systems that are 
interdependent on each other. It is applied in safety assessment by considering factors such as 
software, human, technology and organisation. These are factors that directly or indirectly 
affect the safety of social-technical system. According to Leveson [66], the basic activity in 
STAMP is to find constraints in the system. In STAMP model, the cause of accident is 
considered as “the result of a lack of constraints imposed on the system design and on 
operations”.   
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STPA uses control loop to identify constraints that, when violated, can result in unsafe 
situations. Using the generic process of safety assessment from section 4.3, we construct a 
similar process flow for STPA (see Figure 59). The figure highlights the two unique steps in 
the STPA technique that focus on risk analysis (step 1a and step 1b). These steps are described 
in detail under the STPA primer [182]. 
 
Figure 59. Process Flow for STPA Safety Assessment 
Step 1a (S1a): Identify Safety Control Structure. This is the first risk analysis to be 
conducted in STPA. It focuses on constructing the hierarchical safety control structure 
(SCS) related to the hazard and the constraints necessary to control the hazard. 
Step 1b (S1b): Identify Unsafe Control Actions and Control Flaws.  This is the second 
risk analysis to be conducted in STPA. It focuses on identifying unsafe control actions 
(UCAs) and the root causes, known as control flaws (CFs), for the UCAs by looking for 
any failures and dysfunctional interactions. 
Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts and Requirements.  Generate and document the 
safety artefacts and requirements that will be integrated with the larger system engineering 
process.  
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. The generated safety artefacts 
will be feedback to the system engineering process for further cause of actions if they 
affect the system lifecycle.   
For the rest of this section, we will describe the SCS, UCAs and CFs that have been highlighted 
by Song et al during their STPA analysis on the Yongwen railway accident.  
 Yongwen Railway Safety Control Structure  
The SCS depends on how the system of interest is being modelled during the safety 
assessment. It is largely derived from the system models that are available during the STPA 
assessment. There are 3 steps in constructing the SCS: 
1. Identify main components 
2. Determine who controls who and what (control and feedback) 
3. Add details of constraints such as component responsibilities and process models 
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The railway SCS related to the accident according to Song et al is reproduced here in Figure 
60. Based on the SCS, safety constraints are identified during the safety assessment (see Table 
29Error! Reference source not found.). The subsequent analysis focuses on determining the 
UCAs and CFs that can lead to hazards that are known as ‘inadequate control processes to 
maintain the safety constraints’. 
Table 29. Safety Constraints for Railways System Components 
Railway system components Safety constraints 
Train control centre • Acquire correct and fresh data about train position, speed 
and occupation 
• Control passing signals in block sections and send moving 
authorities to ATP correctly based on acquired data 
ATP on board • Control operation of train according to signals provided by 
ground system 
• Prevent train from entering the block section occupied by 
another train 
Train dispatcher • Sending control commands to railway stations and drivers 
• Monitoring the operation of trains and the occupation of 
tracks 
Drivers • Operate trains safely according to operation procedures and 
control commands issued by train dispatcher 
• Report operation information and problems to dispatcher 
and railway stations 
Ministry of railway • Make regulations and standards on safe operation of trains 
• Provide oversights on the execution of regulations and 
standards 
• Implement technical review and certification of equipment 
Shanghai railway bureau • Enforce safety regulations and working standards in its 
railways 
• Provide adequate education and training to its staff 
• Oversee railway operation and report incidents and 
accidents to ministry 
As it is not possible to analysis all the railway system components for the rest of our evaluation, 
we will narrow the focus on the interactions between train control centre (TCC) equipment 
and the ATP on the train (i.e. the first two components in Error! Reference source not 
found.). We will use these two components to evaluate the process of integrating the T.A.G. 
approach into STPA. 
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Figure 60. Basic Railway Safety Control Structure in the Yongwen Accident 
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 Unsafe Control Actions between TCC and ATP 
In the STPA analysis, the UCAs are identified by looking for causal conditions that can violate 
the safety constraints. A summary of the UCAs identified by Song et al for both the train 
control centre and on-board ATP are shown in Table 30. 
Table 30. Unsafe Control Actions for the TCC and ATP 
Train control centre On-board ATP 
1) Train CC didn’t get information that 5829AG 
section was occupied by D3115 
2) Passing signal in the 5829AG section was wrong 
3) Send moving authorities to the ATP on D301 
while the section was occupied by D3115 
1) ATP on D3115 stopped train near 
faulted 5829AG track section 
2) ATP on D301 didn’t take any action 
to prevent train from entering block 
section occupied by D3115 
Example.  For example, the UCA “passing signal in the 5829AG section was wrong” can 
cause the TCC safety constraint “acquire correct and fresh data about train position, speed 
and occupation” to be violated, while the UCA “ATP on D301 didn’t take any action to prevent 
train from entering block section occupied by D3115” can cause the ATP safety constraint 
“prevent train from entering the block section occupied by another train” to be violated. 
 Control Flaws leading to the Unsafe Control Actions 
After identifying the UCAs, the CFs are identified by looking for causal conditions that can 
cause the UCAs. A summary of the CFs identified by Song et al for both the train control 
centre and on-board ATP are shown in Table 31. 
Table 31. Control Flaws for the TCC and ATP 
Train control centre On-board ATP 
False track occupation information was provided to 
the computer due to component failure 
Design of equipment could not ensure correctness and 
freshness of data in face of a thunder strike and 
component failure 
Code sent to ATP on D3115 by 5829 track 
circuit was abnormal 
Process model of the ATP on D301 was 
inconsistent with actual process 
Example.  For example, the UF “false track occupation information was provided to the 
computer due to component failure” can cause the TCC UCA “passing signal in the 5829AG 
section was wrong”, while the UF “code sent to ATP on D3115 by 5829 track circuit was 
abnormal” can cause the ATP UCA “ATP on D3115 stopped train near faulted 5829AG track 
section”. 
 Integrate T.A.G. approach into STPA 
To evaluate the application of the T.A.G. approach, we will continue to focus on the causal 
relationships between train control centre and ATP on the train from the previous section. We 
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will first describe the process flow of tagging uncertainties as part of the STPA (section 5.3.1). 
Next, we follow the process flow to complement STPA with the three steps in T.A.G. approach 
described in chapter 4:  
• Step 1.  Identify uncertainties using HOT-PIE taxonomy. This is conducted for both 
the SCS (section 5.3.2) and the UCAs and CFs (section 5.3.3). 
• Step 2.  Prioritise the uncertainty analyses based on the factors introduced in the T.A.G 
approach (section 5.3.4), and 
• Step 3.  Generate track and address action plans using the guided questions introduced 
in the T.A.G. approach (section 5.3.5). 
 Process of Tagging Uncertainties in STPA 
Using the generic process of tagging uncertainties in safety assessment from section 4.3, we 
construct a similar process flow to tag epistemic uncertainties in STPA (see Figure 61). To 
emphasise what has been mentioned earlier in section 3.3, the T.A.G. approach is not a 
separate standalone method to conduct safety assessment but rather it introduces additional 
steps to complement the existing safety assessment techniques. This is again evidenced in  
Figure 61, which shows how the T.A.G. approach is integrated with the existing process flow 
for STPA. For the rest of this section, we will describe in detail how epistemic uncertainties 
during STPA analysis for the Yongwen railway system can be identified, documented, tracked 
and addressed by using the T.A.G. approach.  
 Step 1a: Identify and Tag Uncertainties from SCS 
According to Figure 61, the first step of the T.A.G. approach is to tag uncertainties that are 
discovered while identifying the SCS. This is conducted with the help of the HOT-PIE 
taxonomy (a copy of the taxonomy can be found in the T.A.G. approach User Guide in Annex 
K). In this section, we evaluate the use of the taxonomy to identify epistemic uncertainties 
related to the SCS. Uncertainty Observation 1 is about new linkage among nodes with existing 
causal relationship (see section 5.3.2.1) and Uncertainty Observation 2 is about linkage 
between nodes that do not have prior relationships with each other (see section 5.3.2.2). The 
differences between the two have been discussed in section 4.2.7. 
5.3.2.1. Uncertainty Observation 1: Fatigue among Workers  
From the SCS in Figure 60, it is observed that there is a causal relationship whereby “workers 
maintain the TCC equipment”. This is an existing causal relationship between the worker and 
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the TCC equipment. We use the CRMSA model to represent this causal relationship at the 
system domain in Figure 62. Here, we can search for uncertainty in linkages between nodes. 
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Figure 61. Process Flow to Tag Epistemic Uncertainties in STPA Safety Assessment 
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Figure 62. Uncertainty about Fatigue among Workers 
We refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Human primary condition for the workers and the 
Technology primary condition for the TCC equipment, we found two relevant plausible-but-
uncertain causal mechanisms:  
• Fatigue (under secondary casual condition H2: Mental State), and  
• Performance slip (under secondary casual condition H3: Action).   
Example.  We choose Fatigue as a plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism. Hence, a 
plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship could be related to the fatigue level of the workers 
when maintaining the TCC equipment. Pertinent questions to consider include:  
1. Are the workers getting sufficient rest prior to any maintenance or repair job on the 
railway system? 
2. Is there an established system to monitor the fatigue level of the workers during 
maintenance? 
3. Are there criteria in place to stop work when working condition is undesirable such 
as due to bad weather or prolong working hours? 
5.3.2.2. Uncertainty Observation 2: Infrastructure Support by Shanghai Railway 
Bureau  
From the SCS in Figure 60, we have observed that there is no prior system linkage between 
the Shanghai railway bureau and the TCC equipment. However, with the HOT-PIE taxonomy, 
we discover new causal relationship between both system components (see Figure 63). Here, 
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we search for uncertainty in the linkage between nodes with no prior identified causal 
relationships. 
 
Figure 63. Uncertainty about Infrastructure Support by Shanghai Railway Bureau 
We refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Organisation primary condition for the Shanghai railway 
bureau and the Technology primary condition for the TCC equipment, we found a relevant 
plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism:  
• Interdependent infrastructure (under secondary casual condition O3: Resource).  
Example.  We choose Interdependent Infrastructure as a plausible-but-uncertain causal 
mechanism between Shanghai railway Bureau and the TCC equipment. Pertinent questions to 
consider include:  
1. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Shanghai railway bureau in ensuring 
reliable communication from the TCC equipment? 
2. Is the technical infrastructure support provided by the Shanghai railway bureau to 
the Wenzhou south station sufficient and timely? 
3. How often is the TCC equipment maintained and serviced according to the policies 
and standards laid down by the Shanghai railway bureau? 
 Step 1b: Identify and Tag Uncertainties from UCAs and CFs 
According to Figure 61, the second step is to tag uncertainties that are discovered while 
identifying the UCAs and CFs. While the process for tagging uncertainties may look like Step 
1, the focus has shifted from system models (i.e. looking at SCSs) to safety causal models (i.e. 
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looking at UCAs and CFs). This shows that the T.A.G. approach is flexible enough to discover 
plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships in both system and safety domains.  
This is conducted with the help of the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide attached in Annex 
K. In this section, we evaluate the use of the taxonomy to identify epistemic uncertainties 
related to the UCAs and CFs between the TCC and ATP on the train. Uncertainty Observation 
3 is about new linkage among nodes with existing causal relationship (see section 5.3.3.1) and 
Uncertainty Observation 4 is about linkage between nodes that do not have prior relationships 
with each other (see section 5.3.3.2). 
5.3.3.1. Uncertainty Observation 3: Software Algorithm during Signal Abnormality  
In section 5.2.3, we have highlighted a causal relationship whereby the CF “false track 
occupation information was provided to the computer due to component failure” can cause the 
TCC UCA “passing signal in the 5829 section was wrong”. We use the HOT-PIE taxonomy 
to determine that the causal mechanism for this causal relationship can be classified as a form 
of electrical property (under secondary casual condition T2: Property). We represent this 
relationship using the CRMSA in Figure 64. Here, we can search for uncertainty in linkage 
between existing nodes. 
 
Figure 64. Uncertainty about Software Algorithm during Signal Abnormality 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Considering the CF is a Technology primary condition and the UCA is an 
Information primary condition, we identify a relevant plausible-but-uncertain causal 
mechanism using the taxonomy:  
• Software issue (under secondary casual condition T1: Machine).  
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Example.  We choose Software issue as a plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism. Pertinent 
questions to consider include:  
1. How much knowledge do the operators and engineers have about the software 
functions in the train operation? 
2. Can the software in the train operation provide a fail-safe algorithm to mitigate any 
risk due to hardware failure?  
3. Can the software in the train operation handle abnormality such as wrong passing 
signal? If so, how? 
5.3.3.2. Uncertainty Observation 4: Human Intervention during Signal Abnormality 
In section 5.2.2, we have highlighted the UCAs between the TCC and the ATP on train. 
However, there is no direct causal relationship established between any UCAs. That does not 
mean that there are no uncertainties between the UCAs that can be safety-critical. Using the 
HOT-PIE taxonomy and represent it using the CRMSA model, we aim to discover new causal 
relationships between the UCAs (see Figure 65). Here, we can search for uncertainty in linkage 
between new nodes. 
In this illustration, we consider the TCC UCA “Send moving authorities to the ATP on D301 
while the section was occupied by D3115” can potentially cause the ATP UCA “ATP on D301 
didn’t take any action to prevent train from entering block section occupied by D3115”. 
 
Figure 65. Uncertainty about Human Intervention during Signal Abnormality 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Consider both UCAs as Process primary causal conditions, we found two 
relevant plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism:  
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• Oversight (under secondary casual condition P1: Nature), and 
• Extent of autonomy (under secondary casual condition P1: Nature). 
Example.  We choose Oversight as a plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism. Pertinent 
questions to consider include:  
1. How much human oversight is there during the train operation, especially to handle 
abnormality?  
2. To what extent can humans intervene in the autonomous train operation? 
3. How established is the command and control structure among the staff running the 
train operation? 
5.3.3.3. Summary  
To summarise, we have identified four epistemic uncertainties with the help of the HOT-PIE 
taxonomy (see Table 32). While observations 1, 2 and 4 may not be directly related to the 
actual cause of the railway accident, observation 3 (uncertainty about the software algorithm 
during signal abnormality) may plausibly lead to the discovery of the error in the track 
signalling system that causes the accident. Hence, the HOT-PIE taxonomy can potentially help 
safety analysts to recognise safety hazards to a system. 
Table 32. Summary of Epistemic Uncertainties Identified using HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
Observation 1 2 3 4 
Uncertainty Fatigue among 
workers 
Infrastructure 
support by 
Shanghai 
Railway Bureau 
Software 
algorithm during 
signal 
abnormality 
Human 
intervention 
during signal 
abnormality 
HOT-PIE 
primary causal 
condition 
(cause)  
Human Organisation Technology Process 
HOT-PIE 
primary causal 
condition 
(effect) 
Technology Technology Information Process 
HOT-PIE 
causal 
mechanism 
H2: Mental State 
(Fatigue) 
O3: Resource 
(Infrastructure) 
T1: Machine 
(Software) 
P1: Nature 
(Oversight) 
To move on, we assume that the estimated risk due to these four observations are at least 
tolerable such that the stakeholders can embark on managing the epistemic uncertainties. The 
next step is to prioritise the uncertainty analyses needed to manage these uncertainties. 
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 Step 2: Document and Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Following the process flow from Figure 61, the next step is to prioritise the uncertainty 
analyses for the four epistemic uncertainties found in the previous sections. This is conducted 
with the help of the guided questions under the T.A.G. approach User Guide (see Annex K). 
In this section, we will evaluate the criticality and expected effort to manage Uncertainty 
Observation 1, while the assessment for the remaining 3 Uncertainty Observations are attached 
in Annex D.  
5.3.4.1. Uncertainty Observation 1: Fatigue among Workers  
The responses to the guided questions in the User Guide are shown in Table 33. It is to note 
that the responses to the guided questions are fictional.  
Table 33. Responses to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 1 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
May not be often as it happens only when maintenance need 
to be conducted. Need information on maintenance 
frequency to make better judgement 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Fatigue can lead to performance slip and directly cause harm 
to the engineers and the rail system. 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where 
the target is identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, 
hazard interdependency, residual risk interdependency) 
No safety causal model involved. 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target 
is identified? (e.g. system structure / product size / product 
design, process / task interdependency, process design, 
technology interdependency, project management 
difficulties) 
Simple system model of workers maintaining TCC 
equipment 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is 
identified? (e.g. reach and depth of patterns, templates and 
conventions used by the safety and system models)  
It follows conventional model of workers maintaining 
equipment when there is equipment failure. Possible 
complexity lies in the type of maintenance work being 
conducted. 
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Factors Questions 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the 
safety causal model from where the target is identified? (e.g. 
causal factors, hazard list) 
No safety causal model involved 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the 
system model from where the target is identified? (e.g. 
system legacy, process, technology, objective) 
Maintenance history and worker conditions during 
maintenance should be available from experience. 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the 
model type from where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, 
templates, conventions) 
Maintenance and repair tasks should be following standard 
orders and manuals. 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
Not sure if workers are familiar with all the repairs that are 
expected from them.  
Resource Availability: Assess the resource availability related to the target from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge 
needed? (e.g. manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, 
environment, other resources) 
Yes, easy task to collect information. No specialised skill set 
required. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge 
needed? (e.g. project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Yes, there should be sufficient time to find out the 
information. 
From the responses, we assess the criticality, complexity, novelty, and resource availability of 
managing the epistemic uncertainty regarding the level of fatigue among the workers. We 
make use of the instructions in section 4.3.2.3 to calculate the priority scores (reproduced 
below for reference). 
1. Identify the uncertainty in the targeted causal relationship. 
2. Analyse the criticality of the target based on the guided questions. Score the 
criticality from 0 (low criticality) to 1 (high criticality). 
3. Analyse the complexity of the target based on the guided questions. Score the 
complexity from 0 (low complexity) to 1 (high complexity). 
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4. Analyse the novelty of the target based on the guided questions. Score the 
novelty from 0 (low novelty) to 1 (high novelty). 
5. Analyse the resource availability of the target based on the guided questions. 
Score the resource availability from 0 (high resource availability) to 1 (low 
resource availability).  
6. Calculate the overall expected effort by average out the sum of the three scores 
under complexity, novelty and resource availability (assuming the factors 
have equal weightage). 
7. Locate the quadrant on the prioritisation matrix that corresponds to the score 
for criticality and expected effort.  
The criticality is given a score of 0.7 which implies that the uncertainty is of high risk (see 
Table 34). The expected effort is calculated from the average score of complexity (0.2), 
novelty (0.3) and resource availability (0.2). The average expected effort is calculated as 0.2, 
which implies that the task to analyse the uncertainty may not take a lot of effort. Based on the 
scores for criticality and expected effort, we plotted the Uncertainty Observation on the 
prioritisation matrix chart (see Figure 66). 
Table 34. Scores based on Prioritisation Factors 
Factors Score 
Criticality  0.7 
Complexity 0.2 
Novelty 0.3 
Resource 
Availability 
0.2 
Expected effort 0.2 
 
Figure 66. Uncertainty Observation 1 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
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We indicate on the top left quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.7 criticality 
and 0.2 expected effort.  
5.3.4.2. Summary 
The same prioritisation process was conducted on Uncertainty Observations 2 to 4 (see Annex 
D). The following Table 35 summarises the calculation of priority for all the observations.  
Table 35. Summary of Prioritisation for the Uncertainty Observations 
Observation 1 2 3 4 
Uncertainty Fatigue among 
workers 
Infrastructure 
support by 
Shanghai 
Railway Bureau 
Software 
algorithm during 
signal 
abnormality 
Human 
intervention 
during signal 
abnormality 
Criticality  0.7 0.4 0.9 0.8 
Complexity 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 
Novelty 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 
Resource 
Availability 
0.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Expected 
effort 
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 
Using the scores for criticality and expected efforts, the 4 uncertainty observations are plotted 
on the prioritisation matrix chart as shown in Figure 67.  
 
Figure 67. Uncertainty Observation 1 to 4 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
Example.  For example, while this may not be the only strategy, stakeholders may choose to 
focus first on analyses that are of high criticality and follow by those that required lower 
efforts. If this is the strategy adopt, the priority of action would be as follows:  
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Focus on Top Left Quadrant First. Since the expected effort is low and the uncertainty is 
critical, stakeholders should consider managing the Uncertainty Observation 1 about the 
working condition of the signal engineers first. 
Pay More Attention to Top Right Quadrant: While the uncertainties are critical, the 
expected efforts are considerable. Hence, the stakeholders are advised to allocate more 
resources to manage the uncertainties from Uncertainty Observation 3 (software issue) and 4 
(human intervention issue). By having an overview of the resources needed to manage these 
critical uncertainties, stakeholders can make a more informed and confident decision about the 
efforts needed to track and address these uncertainties concurrently. 
Low Hanging Fruits in the Bottom Quadrants: While the expected effort is low, the 
uncertainty is assessed to not be as critical as the others. Hence, the stakeholders are advised 
to focus on Uncertainty Observation 2 (infrastructure support) only if there are resources 
readily available to manage the uncertainty. If there are any shared resources with other 
uncertainties, priority should go to uncertainties that are in quadrants with higher criticality. 
  Step 3: Generate Track and Address Action Plan 
After prioritising the plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship, the next step is to generate 
the action plan to track and address the uncertainties throughout the system lifecycle. This is 
usually conducted towards the end of each safety assessment, where uncertainties causal 
relationships and other safety artefacts such as residual risk and safety requirements are 
consolidated. These uncertainties will be tracked throughout the system engineering lifecycle 
till either the next safety assessment or some pre-defined points that are triggered for the 
stakeholders to address them. 
In this section, we will generate the action plan to track and address Uncertainty Observation 
3 regarding software algorithm during signal abnormality. This observation is chosen as it is 
relatively critical compared to the other observations and the high expected effort would most 
likely require a structured plan to track and address the uncertainty.   
5.3.5.1. Uncertainty Observation 3: Software Algorithm during Signal Abnormality  
The action plan is formulated by responding to the series of questions in the T.A.G. approach 
user guide (see Annex K). The details of the responses are attached in Table 36.  
Table 36. Guide to Develop Action Plan for Uncertainty 3 
Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about software algorithm during signal abnormality 
1: Track Sensors 
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Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about software algorithm during signal abnormality 
1a: Decide 
Monitoring 
Technique – 
What shall we 
track? 
Q1. What are the monitoring techniques needed to track the epistemic 
uncertainties? 
• Software algorithm, software operation onboard the train and train station 
• Involves proper allocation and management of resources to understand the 
role of software in controlling signal abnormality during train operation. 
• Separate manpower (software engineers) are needed to conduct the 
investigation. 
Q2. Why are the monitoring techniques able to meet the goal of managing the 
uncertainty condition? 
• Knowing the software algorithm will provide clarity on the software 
functions for train operation. This will help in the investigation into the 
possibilities of having any failed-safe software modules to mitigate the risk 
due to signal abnormalities. 
1b: Form 
Monitoring 
Activity – 
How do we 
track? 
 Q3. What types of monitoring activity are to be taken? 
• Investigate the safety impact of software modules on physical train 
operations, especially look for any software that mitigate the risk of false 
signals 
Q4. When should these monitoring activity be collected from the techniques? 
• Can be a paper study by reviewing the software manuals and 
documentation. 
• Unsure if observation of software performance is needed during operation. 
This will require more resources and expertise. 
Q5. Who are responsible to do the tracking? 
• Software engineers need to be assigned to capture and analyse the software 
information  
Q6. What are the structures and supporting resources to put in place for the 
tracking? 
• A structured management oversight appointed by the Shanghai railway 
bureau needs to be in place to ensure data is feedback to the safety team for 
analysis.  
• Regular update to be presented at the monthly safety forum. 
• Regular data collection is needed to capture the investigation on software 
modules. 
Q7. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to do the tracking? 
• Require software engineers that are competent in analysing software 
modules in train operations. 
2: Address Responses 
2a: Set 
Trigger Points 
– When and 
how shall we 
decide to 
respond? 
Q8: What are the trigger points from the monitoring activity that require 
proactive response? 
• Discovery of software modules that affect the safety of railway operation. 
• Discovery of software modules that potentially mitigate risk by providing 
failed-safe algorithm or highlight signal abnormality. 
Q9. Who are responsible to decide on the respond actions? 
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Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about software algorithm during signal abnormality 
• Shanghai railway bureau safety management committee. 
Q10. What are the governance and supporting structure to put in place to make 
the decision?  
• Results and observations to be presented in the monthly safety forum. 
• If trigger points are met, software engineers should escalate result directly 
to the safety committee through a safety incident report. 
Q11. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to make the decision? 
• Knowledge about software operations and software functions. 
• Knowledge about latest development in the railway system and operation. 
• Having the authority or access to higher management that has the authority 
to review train operations. 
2b: Adapt to 
Change – 
What are the 
possible 
responses? 
Q12. Who is responsible to review the changes that will be put in place? 
• Project safety engineers, together with software engineers and operators.  
Q13. How prepared and responsive should the system be in addressing the 
uncertainty? 
• If no data is observed in the next 2 months, safety committed needs to decide 
on a different action plan if the uncertainty is still considered to plausibly be 
safety-critical. 
• Depends on the findings regarding the software modules, project safety 
committee needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue to higher 
management.  
Q14. What are the structure and support resources to put in place to address the 
uncertainty? 
• Process to escalate safety concerns will follow the existing safety report 
channels.  
• Incident report to be submitted when trigger points are met. 
• Potentially a review of the software-hardware interface components may be 
needed depending on the investigation. 
Q15. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to address the 
uncertainty? 
• Knowledge about software operations and functions. 
Using the guide, we have developed the following track and address action plan. 
Track Portion of the Action Plan. Tracking the uncertainty involves investigating software 
modules and algorithm onboard the train and train station. This is because knowing the 
software algorithm will provide clarity on the software functions for train operation. This will 
help in the investigation of having any fail-safe software modules to mitigate the risk due to 
signal abnormalities. 
A detailed resource allocation and management plan needs to be developed after a better 
understanding of the software in controlling signal abnormality during train operation. To do 
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that, dedicated software engineers are needed to conduct the investigation. The software 
engineers should be competent in analysing software modules in train operations. 
The software engineers are responsible to investigate the safety impact of software modules 
on physical train operations, especially focus on any inherence software that can mitigate the 
risk of false signals. This can be a paper study by reviewing the software manuals and 
documentation or if needed, a more in-depth observation of software performance is needed 
during operation. Note that the second option will incur more resources and expertise. 
A structured management oversight appointed by the Shanghai railway bureau needs to be in 
place to ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis. Regular data collection is 
expected to capture the investigation on software modules and regular updates are to be 
presented at the monthly safety forum. 
Address Portion of the Action Plan. The uncertainty will trigger a response when there is a 
discovery of software modules that either affect the safety of railway operation or potentially 
mitigate risk by providing failed-safe algorithm or highlight signal abnormality. 
The Shanghai railway bureau safety management committee shall be responsible to decide on 
the respond actions. Results and observations shall be presented in the monthly safety forum. 
The process to escalate safety concerns will follow the existing safety report channels. When 
trigger points are met, dedicated software engineers shall escalate result directly to the safety 
committee through a safety incident report. 
A review committee that includes project safety engineers, together with software engineers 
and operators, shall be responsible to review any changes that will be put in place to address 
the uncertainty. The review committee should have knowledge about software operations and 
software functions, as well as the latest development in the railway system and operation. It 
should also have the authority or access to higher management that has the authority to review 
train operations.  
If no data is observed in the next 2 months, the review committee needs to decide on a different 
action plan if the uncertainty is still considered to plausibly be safety-critical. Depends on the 
findings regarding the software modules, the committee needs to decide on the urgency to 
escalate the issue to higher management. There may potentially be a review of the software-
hardware interface components depending on the investigation. 
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Figure 68. Possible Scenarios when Addressing Uncertainty in Software Algorithm 
Possible Actions when Trigger to Address Uncertainty.  When being triggered to address 
the uncertainty (see Figure 68), stakeholders would conduct a risk analysis to assess the risk 
that is still facing the system, as well as the assessing the confidence in the analysis. At this 
moment, stakeholders would have to decide if the assessed risk due to the software algorithm 
uncertainty is confidently within the tolerable or acceptable region. If it is not, a decision would 
have to be made if one or both of the following needs to be conducted: 
• Focus on Risk through System Change.  If the assessed risk has become 
unacceptable, stakeholders would need to derive strategies to reduce the risk. Possible 
approaches include modifying the software or changing the ways that the system is 
being operated to mitigate the software limitation. An example could be to implement 
software that prompt and alert the railway watchers when there is signal abnormality. 
This is assuming that the stakeholders have accessed to the software code. 
Stakeholders would have to conduct the safety analysis again to conclude if the new 
measure or mitigation does lower the risk to a tolerable or acceptable level. 
• Focus on Knowledge through Uncertainty Clarification.  The T.A.G. tracking on 
the epistemic uncertainty may need to continue under certain scenarios. The following 
are two possible scenarios to solicit more information to clarify the epistemic 
uncertainties.  
o Scenario 1 – Increasing Confidence.  Even when the assessed risk is 
tolerable, there may still not be enough confidence in the assessment due to 
the residual uncertainties. For example, the investigation team may have 
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obtained the preliminary software document that indicate the presence of the 
software modules to manage signal abnormality. However, since it is 
preliminary, the team decides to continue and track the uncertainty till the 
final software document is available to validate that the safety functions have 
indeed been implemented. 
o Scenario 2 – Reducing Risk.  In the second scenario, clarifying certain 
epistemic uncertainties may directly help to reduce assessed risk. For 
example, after investigating the software modules, it has been discovered that 
software written separately by two subcontractors may have contradicted each 
other. As a result, more investigation needs to be conducted by soliciting 
information from these two subcontractors. Hence, there is a need to continue 
and track the uncertainty due to software algorithm as new information is 
needed to lower the system risk into the tolerable region. 
To end the uncertainty tracking, stakeholders must be satisfied that the uncertainty due to 
software algorithm being tracked by the T.A.G. approach has either been eliminated or that 
the risk is assessed to be confidently acceptable despite the decision to stop tracking the 
uncertainty in the software algorithm. 
Uncertainty tracking will stop when there is sufficient clarity related to the uncertainty such 
that the safety analysts can use the knowledge to influence safety assessment. For example, 
the uncertainty may no longer pose a safety concern and hence drop from the tracking. In 
another example, the uncertainty, after clarification, may have invalidated an assumption made 
during a previous safety assessment. In such case, the safety analysts would need to review 
the impact of the invalidated assumption on the safety assessment, while continuing to track 
the uncertainty. 
 Initial Evaluation and Summary 
In this chapter, we have highlighted the contribution of the research specifically from applying 
the T.A.G. approach with STPA on the Yongwen railway accident case study. Using the 
T.A.G. approach, we could discover four plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships that can 
potentially be safety-critical and one of them can plausibly lead to the discovery of the error 
in the track signalling system that causes the accident. Two of the causal relationships are 
linkage among nodes with existing causal relationship while the other two are linkages 
between nodes that do not have prior relationships with each other. Using the prioritisation 
factors of criticality and expected effort, the uncertainties were prioritised according to the 
analyses that are needed to clarify the unknowns. Action plans were also developed based on 
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the guided questions in the T.A.G. approach user guide, which allow users to track and address 
the uncertainties through-life. 
While the four plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships may be identifiable using the 
existing STPA technique, this would not be conducted in a systematic way like the T.A.G. 
approach. The ways that the SCS, UCAs and CFs are currently presented may not allow easy 
discovery of plausible causal relationships. Furthermore, as STPA requires users to form close 
control loops when identifying hazards, it may not be easy to identify and document epistemic 
uncertainties that may not contribute to close control loops. In comparison, the T.A.G. 
approach provides an easier approach to capture epistemic uncertainties, as long as one can 
define the causal relationship associated with the uncertainty, based on certain causal 
mechanism.  
Safety analysts may be concerned that extensive resources are needed to apply the T.A.G. 
approach on existing safety assessment techniques. While the concern is valid, such 
uncertainties, if not managed well, can potentially lead to safety-critical consequences. 
Furthermore, we have not discovered any feasible and systematic methods to manage such 
uncertainties in safety assessment during our literature survey. It is not clear if there is any 
alternate approach that uses less resources and efforts than the T.A.G. approach and provide 
an acceptable level of confidence in managing the uncertainties. As part of the overall 
evaluation, we would revisit the resource concern in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 – Application of T.A.G. Approach in Safety 
Assessments from Component Viewpoints 
 Introduction  
While the previous chapter focuses on conducting safety assessments from a system 
viewpoint, we focus on conducting safety assessments from the component viewpoint in this 
chapter (see Table 37).  
Table 37. Summary of Chapters that Apply T.A.G. Approach 
Chapter Viewpoint Safety Assessment Technique Referenced Scenario  
5 System Systems-Theoretic Process 
Analysis 
Yongwen railway accident 
analysis by Song et al [24] 
6 Component Fault Tree Analysis and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis  
ARP 4761 aircraft design 
example [7] 
For safety assessment with models from the component viewpoints, besides discovering 
epistemic uncertainty, the T.A.G. approach can help stakeholder to be more aware of the 
following characteristics of component models: 
• Limitation of Component Model. When analysing components, we can expect the 
safety assessment techniques to be more focus and narrow in their expressive power. 
For example, a fault tree could be constructed for a component by focusing solely on 
the electrical properties of the component. It does not normally consider other factors 
such as human error or environmental conditions. By considering the different causal 
conditions in the HOT-PIE taxonomy, it helps the stakeholders to appreciate the focus 
and limitation of the models (including the safety assessment techniques) that are 
being used when analysing a component.  
• Association Relationship between Component Models.  Since a component model 
may be limited by its expressive power, it is often dependent or influenced by other 
component models (refer to the discussion of association relation between models in 
section 3.3.1.2). For example, a fault-tree that considers electrical circuit diagram for 
components may depend on other models that assume certain way of operating and 
maintaining the components. Separately, there could be a human factor analysis that 
has considered the situations in which the operators or engineers may not follow the 
specific procedure due to issues like distraction or fatigue.  
While both the fault tree and the human factor analysis are independent analyses, the 
findings from the human factor analysis can have safety implications on the 
assumptions and assessment using the fault tree. This association between the fault 
  
190 
tree and the human factor analysis may not commonly surfaced and tracked in safety 
assessment, especially if the safety analysts conducting the assessment are electrical 
engineers focusing on analysing the electrical circuit diagram. The HOT-PIE 
taxonomy can be a tool to discover such associations between different component 
models, such that the stakeholders can derive action plan to track and response 
accordingly when an observation from one model affects the safety assessment in 
another model.  
ARP 4761: Aircraft Design Example.  We have chosen to base our study on the ARP 4761 
standard, which is an industrial standard for conducting safety assessment to certify civil 
aircraft. The examples in the standard provide suitable references at the component viewpoint 
level. The standard describes the three common phases of safety assessment across the system 
lifecycle: Function Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
(PSSA) and System Safety Assessment (SSA). Details of these three phases are described in 
section 2.2.1.2.  
The standard also includes a worked example of a typical safety assessment for a fictitious 
aircraft design. As described in Appendix L of ARP 4761 standard, the fictitious aircraft design 
example focuses on analysing functions that can potentially leads to the loss of the aircraft. 
The functions were complicated enough to apply the different safety assessment techniques 
and concise enough to show the process flow when using the techniques. The analysis focuses 
upon a specific system and eventually to specific components within the system.  
The safety assessment was applied throughout the three phases of FHA, PSSA and SSA with 
different safety assessment techniques (see Figure 69).  
• Function Hazard Assessment (FHA).  First, the FHA was applied on models looking 
from system viewpoints by considering system functions related to the loss of aircraft. 
Since we have discussed system viewpoints in chapter 5, we will not present the FHA 
in this chapter.  
• Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA).  Next, the PSSA was applied on 
the Wheel Brake System (WBS) component using the FTA technique. We will 
describe the FTA during PSSA in section 6.2. After which, we will evaluate how the 
T.A.G. approach can be integrated with this component viewpoint FTA in section 6.3. 
• System Safety Assessment (SSA).  Finally, the SSA was applied on the same WBS 
component using the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) technique. We will 
describe the FMEA during SSA in section 6.4. After which, we will evaluate how the 
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T.A.G. approach can be integrated with this component viewpoint FMEA in section 
6.5.  
 
Figure 69. Safety Assessment Techniques Applied on FHA, PSSA and SSA  
(extracted from ARP 4761) 
 Safety Assessment using FTA  
In this section, we focus on the FTA technique applied on the WBS component during 
preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA). According to ARP 4761, the PSSA is a “top 
down approach to determine how failures can lead to the functional hazards identified by the 
FHA”. The PSSA is normally conducted throughout the preliminary design phase of the 
system lifecycle. The outputs from PSSA are feedforward as inputs to the SSA during system 
development.  
In this example, the FTA technique is applied during PSSA to identify failures at the WBS 
that might cause the aircraft failure conditions identified during FHA. Using the generic 
process of safety assessment from section 4.3, we construct a similar process flow for FTA 
(see Figure 70). The figure highlights three unique steps in the FTA technique that focus on 
risk analysis (step 1a to 1c). In the later part of the chapter, we will show how the T.A.G. 
approach can be integrated with the FTA process. 
  
192 
 
Figure 70. Process Flow for FTA Safety Assessment 
Step 1a (S1a): State Undesired Top-Level Event.  In this example, the undesired top-
level event identified in the WBS FTA is the “unannunciated loss of all wheel braking”.   
Step 1b (S1b): Develop Tiers of Fault Tree until Root Causes.  The focus is to extend 
the fault event to the next lower level which are “minimum, immediate, necessary, and 
sufficient” to cause the top-level event. The fault tree shall be developed downward until 
the root causes are established or until it is considered unnecessary to develop further. 
For the example, the WBS FTA is shown in Figure 71 (a detailed description of the WBS 
is attached in Annex F). The description of the fault tree is extracted from ARP 4761 and 
reproduced here for reference:    
“This tree includes recognition of the fact that loss of all braking is considered 
hazardous and a design decision was made to cover all possible loss regardless of 
annunciation. This is reflected by the addition of the “Loss of Annunciation 
Capability” event which is ANDed with the “Loss of All Wheel Braking” event … 
The probability of “Loss of Annunciation Capability” is set to 1.0. … (The figure) 
also shows the downward development of the “Normal Brake” system design by 
budgeting failure rates to the identified contributors to “Normal Brake System Does 
Not Operate” (Loss of Hydraulic Supply, Loss of Hydraulic Components, and Loss 
of BSCU Ability to Command Braking). The Loss of BSCU Ability to Control 
Braking event is further broken down into the two major elements of BSCU Failure 
and Loss of Power to BSCU …” 
  
193 
Unannunciated
Loss of All Wheel
Braking
LSSALLWBP3
 Loss of All
Wheel Braking
 Loss of
Annunciation
Capability
LOSSALLWB NOANCREDIT
Normal Brake
System Does Not
Operate
Alternate Brake
System Does Not
Operate
Emergency Brake
System Does Not
Operate
LOSSNORMP3 LSSALTERP3 LSSEMERGP3
Loss of Green
Hydraulic Supply
Loss of Normal Brake
System Hydraulic
Components
Loss of BSCU Ability
to Command Braking
LSSGRHYDP3 LSSNRMBRP3 LSSOF2BSCU
Loss of Aircraft
Electrical Power to
Both BSCU Systems
BSCU Fault Causes
Loss of Braking
Commands
LBSCUPWRP3BOTHBSCUSF
BSCU 1 Failure
Causes Loss of
Braking Commands
BSCU 2 Failure
Causes Loss of
Braking Commands
BSCU1FAILS BSCU2FAILS
5.00E-07
Requirement is per
5 hour flight
5.00E-07
Requirement is per
5 hour flight
PROB: 1.00E+00 (0)
No Credit Taken
PROB: 5.00E-03 (0)
Budgeted Prob.
PROB: 1.00E+00 (0)
No Credit Taken
PROB: 3.30E-05 (0)
Budgeted Prob.
PROB: 3.30E-05 (0)
Budgeted Prob.
3.30E-05 (0)
Redundant BSCUs Required
to Meet Budgeted Probability
3.30E-05
PROB: 1.00E-07 (0)
Historical Data
PROB: 5.75E-03 (1)
RATE: 1.15E-03 /H
EXPO: 5 H
Budgeted F.R.
PROB: 5.75E-03 (1)
RATE: 1.15E-03 /H
EXPO: 5 H
Budgeted F.R.  
Figure 71. WBS FTA: Unannunciated Loss of All Wheel Braking (extracted from ARP 4761) 
 
Step 1c (S1c): Evaluate Fault Tree Quantitatively or Qualitatively.  In the ARP 4761 
example, the failure budget (measured by probability of failure) for the WBS components 
are calculated using the fault tree and feedback to the developer for design considerations. 
Calculation of the failure budget will not be discussed further as it is beyond the scope of 
our research on managing epistemic uncertainty.    
Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts.  Generate and document the safety artefacts and 
requirements that will be integrated with the larger system engineering process.  
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. The generated safety artefacts 
will be feedback to the system engineering process for further cause of actions if they 
affect the system lifecycle.   
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 Integrate T.A.G. approach into FTA  
PSSA is usually carried out during preliminary design phase of the system lifecycle. At this 
phase, there could still be many unknowns in the preliminary design where we can expect 
epistemic uncertainties. The T.A.G. approach can help stakeholders identify and document 
such uncertainties early and continue to track and address them later in the system lifecycle.  
To evaluate the application of the T.A.G. approach, we use the WBS FTA constructed during 
the PSSA (see section 6.2). We will first describe the process flow of tagging uncertainties as 
part of the FTA (section 6.3.1). Next, we follow the process flow to complement FTA with 
the three steps in T.A.G. approach described in chapter 4:  
• Step 1.  Identify uncertainties using HOT-PIE taxonomy. This risk analysis is 
conducted while the WBS FTA is being generated (section 6.3.2). 
• Step 2.  Prioritise the uncertainty analyses based on the factors introduced in the T.A.G 
approach (section 6.3.3), 
• Step 3.  Generate track and address action plans using the guided questions introduced 
in the T.A.G. approach (section 6.3.4). 
 Process of Tagging Uncertainties in FTA 
 
Figure 72. Process Flow to Tag Epistemic Uncertainties in FTA Safety Assessment 
Using the generic process of tagging uncertainties in safety assessment from section 4.3, we 
construct a similar process flow to tag epistemic uncertainties in FTA (see Figure 72). Once 
again, the process flow shows that the T.A.G. approach is not a separate standalone method to 
conduct safety assessment but rather it introduces additional steps to complement the existing 
FTA.  
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For the rest of this section, we will describe in details how epistemic uncertainties in the WBS 
FTA can be identified, documented, tracked and addressed by using the T.A.G. approach.  
 Step 1: Identify and Tag Uncertainties from Fault Tree 
According to Figure 72, the first step of the T.A.G. approach is to tag uncertainties that are 
discovered while constructing the fault tree. Before uncertainties can be tagged, stakeholders 
need to identify the undesired top-level event (step 1a), as well as develop the fault tree (step 
1b). The tagging is conducted with the help of the HOT-PIE taxonomy (a copy of the taxonomy 
can be found in the T.A.G. approach User Guide in Annex K). In this section, we evaluate the 
use of the taxonomy to identify epistemic uncertainties associated with the fault tree. 
Uncertainty Observation 1 is observed from the first layer of the fault tree (see section 6.3.2.1) 
and Uncertainty Observation 2 is observed from the second layer of the fault tree (see section 
6.3.2.2). 
6.3.2.1. Uncertainty Observation 1: Slow Reaction Due Limited Vision 
From the fault tree in Figure 71, we focus on the first layer of the fault tree with the failure 
event– “normal brake system does not operate”. We use the CRMSA model to describe the 
causal relationships related to the sub-branches of this failure event in Figure 73. 
 
Figure 73. Uncertainty about Reaction Time due Limited Vision 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Human primary condition, we found a relevant plausible-
but-uncertain causal mechanism:  
• Visual limitation (under secondary casual condition H2: Mental state) 
Example.  A plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship could be related to the limited vision 
on the pilot that may result in slower reaction when operating the normal brake system (see 
the highlighted causal relationship in Figure 73). Pertinent questions to consider include:  
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1. Can the vision of the pilot from the cockpit be obstructed such that they fail to notice 
dangers outside the cockpit and affect the operation of the normal brake system? 
2. If so, what kind of conditions can lead to such bad vision from the cockpit? 
3. How much reaction time does the pilot have, to operate the normal brake system? 
6.3.2.2. Uncertainty Observation 2: Logic Error in Command Messages   
From the fault tree in Figure 71, we move to the second layer of the fault tree with the failure 
event – “loss of BSCU ability to command braking”. The Brake System Control Unit (BSCU) 
is the computer that monitors signals from various WBS components to provide correct brake 
functions for normal operation. We use the CRMSA model to describe the causal relationships 
related to the sub-branches of this failure event in Figure 74. 
 
Figure 74. Uncertainty about the Logic in the BSCU Command Messages 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Information primary condition, we found a relevant 
plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanism:  
• Rationalities regarding logic error (under secondary casual condition I2: Knowledge).  
Example.  A plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship could be related to some logic error 
in the message that is communicated between the BSCU and other WBS components (see the 
highlighted causal relationship in Figure 74). Pertinent questions to consider include:  
1. Besides the power supply, are there other inputs or unintended messages that can 
be received by the BSCU from other components and result in loss of brake functions? 
2. Has the design team assessed all of the interconnect specification related to 
messages received and transmitted by the BSCU? 
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6.3.2.3. Summary  
To summarise, we have identified two epistemic uncertainties with the help of the HOT-PIE 
taxonomy (see Table 38). We have assumed that the estimated risk due to these two 
observations are at least tolerable such that the stakeholders can embark on managing the 
epistemic uncertainties. The next step is to prioritise the uncertainty analyses needed to 
manage these uncertainties.  
Table 38. Summary of Epistemic Uncertainties Identified in WBS FTA 
Observation 1 2 
Uncertainty Slow reaction due limited 
vision 
Logic error in command 
messages  
HOT-PIE primary causal 
condition (cause)  
Human Information 
HOT-PIE primary causal 
condition (effect) 
Technology Technology 
HOT-PIE causal mechanism 
H2: Mental state (Visual 
limitation) 
I2: Knowledge (Rationalities) 
 Step 2: Document and Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Following the process flow from Figure 72, the next step is to prioritise the uncertainty 
analyses for the two epistemic uncertainties found in the previous section. This is conducted 
with the help of the guided questions from the T.A.G. approach user guide (see Annex K). The 
assessment for the Uncertainty Observation is attached in Annex E.  
The following Table 39 summarises the calculation of priority for the 2 observations.  
Table 39. Summary of Prioritisation for the Uncertainty Observations from WBS FTA 
Observation Uncertainty 
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1 Slow reaction due limited vision 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 
2 Logic error in command messages 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Using the scores for criticality and expected efforts, the 2 uncertainty observations are plotted 
on the prioritisation matrix chart as shown in Figure 75. Stakeholders can make use of the 
chart to decide which uncertainties to focus on and allocate the proportionate resources to 
manage them. 
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Figure 75. Uncertainty Observation 1 and 2 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
 Step 3: Generate Track and Address Action Plan 
After prioritising the plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships, the next step is to generate 
the action plan to track and address the uncertainties after completion of the PSSA. These 
uncertainties will be tracked throughout the system engineering lifecycle till some pre-defined 
points are triggered for the stakeholders to address them.   
The action plan is formulated by answering a series of questions from the T.A.G. approach 
user guide from Annex K. In this section, we will generate the action plan to track and address 
Uncertainty Observation 2 regarding logic error in command messages. This observation is 
chosen as it requires more expected effort as compared to Uncertainty Observation 1. Hence, 
a structured plan to track and address the uncertainty would be important.   
6.3.4.1. Uncertainty Observation 2: Logic Error in Command Messages   
The details of developing the action plan for Uncertainty Observation 2 are described in Annex 
G. Using the guide, we have developed the following track and address action plan: 
Track Portion of the Action Plan. Tracking the uncertainty involves investigating the 
interfaces between the BSCU and other WBS components, such as the Interface Control 
Document (ICD). This is because having the ICD will allow the engineers to investigate the 
command messages that are passed between the BSCU and the other WBS components. This 
is needed to sieve out any potential unintended logic error in the command messages that are 
communicated between the components during operations. 
To do that, dedicated communication engineers are needed to conduct the investigation. The 
communication engineers should be competent in analysing electronic signals in WBS 
operation. 
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The communication engineers are responsible for investigating the communication messages 
that are transmitted between the BSCU and the other WBS components and checking if there 
are any scenarios where correct messages are transmitted based on the technical specifications 
but the messages lead to unintended WBS operation. This can be a paper study by reviewing 
the ICD and interface documentation. It is unsure if actual test on the physical system is 
necessary to validate the design performance. This will incur more resources and expertise.  
In this example, a structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to be 
in place to ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis. Regular update is expected 
at the weekly safety meeting. 
Address Portion of the Action Plan. The uncertainty will trigger a response when there is a 
discovery of command message that either has logic error or affects the safety of the WBS 
operation. 
The management safety committee shall be responsible for deciding upon the respond actions. 
When trigger points are met, the communication engineers shall escalate result directly to the 
management via incident report. 
A review committee that includes project manager and communication engineers shall be 
responsible to review any changes that will be put in place to address the uncertainty. The 
review committee should have knowledge about communication engineering and WBS 
operation. It should also have accessed to higher management that has the authority to review 
WBS operation.  
If no data is observed within a month, the project manager needs to decide on a different action 
plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. Depends on the findings regarding the 
software modules, the project manager needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue to 
higher management. There may potentially be a review of the software-hardware interface 
components depending on the investigation. 
Possible Actions when Trigger to Address Uncertainty.  Taking reference from section 
4.4.3, if the assessed risk due to uncertainty about the logic error in command message is still 
not confidently within the tolerable or acceptable region, a decision would have to be made if 
one or both of the following needs to be conducted: 
• Focus on Risk through System Change.  If the level of system risk has become 
unacceptable, stakeholders would need to derive strategies to reduce the risk. One 
approach could be to modify the software in either the BSCU or the WBS component 
to eliminate the logic error in the message. This is assuming that the stakeholders have 
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accessed to the software code. Stakeholders would have to conduct the safety analysis 
again to conclude if the new measure or mitigation does lower the risk to a tolerable 
or acceptable level. 
• Focus on Knowledge through Uncertainty Clarification.  The T.A.G. tracking on 
the epistemic uncertainty may need to continue under certain scenarios. The following 
are two possible scenarios to solicit more information to clarify the epistemic 
uncertainties.  
o Scenario 1 – Increasing Confidence.  Even when the assessed risk is 
tolerable, there may still not be enough confidence in the assessment due to 
the residual uncertainties. For example, the investigation team may have 
obtained the preliminary software document that indicate the logic behind the 
messages sent between the BSCU and the control valves. However, since it is 
preliminary, the team decides to continue and track the uncertainty till the 
final software document is available to validate that the implemented software 
code has no logic error. 
o Scenario 2 – Reducing Risk.  In the second scenario, clarifying certain 
epistemic uncertainties may directly help to reduce assessed risk. For 
example, it is discovered that the software documentation for the green pump 
is incomplete. As a result, more investigation needs to be conducted to solicit 
the information from the relevant contractor. Hence, there is a need to 
continue and track the uncertainty as more information is needed to lower the 
system risk into the tolerable region. 
To end the uncertainty tracking, stakeholders must be satisfied that the uncertainty due to logic 
error in the command message being tracked by the T.A.G. approach has either been 
eliminated or that the risk is assessed to be confidently acceptable despite the decision to stop 
tracking the uncertainty. 
 Safety Assessment using FMEA 
In this section, we focus on the FMEA conducted on the WBS component during system safety 
assessment (SSA). According to ARP 4761, the SSA is a “a systematic, comprehensive 
evaluation of the implemented system to show that relevant safety requirements are met”. The 
SSA is conducted to verify that the system that has been developed conforms to the safety 
requirements generated from the FHA and PSSA. It is usually conducted in the development 
phase of the system lifecycle, after the conceptual and design phases.  
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In this example, a piece-part WBS FMES is constructed during SSA to identify failure modes 
at the WBS and the effects they have on the aircraft braking function. The WBS FMES 
represents a higher level FMEA that is derived from the component FMEAs within the WBS. 
Using the generic process of safety assessment from section 4.3, we construct a similar process 
flow for FMEA (see Figure 76). The figure highlights three unique steps in the FMEA 
technique that focus on risk analysis (step 1a to 1c). In the later part of the chapter, we will 
show how the T.A.G. approach can be integrated with the FMEA process. 
 
Figure 76. Process Flow for FMEA Safety Assessment 
Step 1a (S1a): Identify List of Components Covered.  The WBS system description is 
attached in Annex F. We have reproduced a diagram of the WBS components here for 
reference (see Figure 77). The WBS comprises the BSCU computer that is connected to 
two independent hydraulic pumps via control valves. These pumps are in turn connected 
to the pedals and the aircraft wheels. 
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Figure 77. Wheel Break System (WBS) Components Breakdown (extracted from ARP 4761) 
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Step 1b (S1b): Determine Failure Modes of Each Component Type.   
Step 1c (S1c): Determine Failure Effects and/or Failure Causes for each Failure 
Mode.   
In the ARP 4761 example, the product of step 1b and 1c is the WBS FMES table, such as 
the one shown in Figure 78.  The WBS FMES for aircraft breaking failure effect contains 
failure modes related to the components within the WBS. It is identified from the FMEAs 
conducted on individual components within the WBS. The potential failure causes are also 
extracted from individual component FMEAs.  
 
Figure 78. Wheel Brake System FMES of Braking Failure Effect at SSA 
Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts.  Generate and document the safety artefacts and 
requirements that will be integrated with the larger system engineering process.  
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. The generated safety artefacts 
will be feedback to the system engineering process for further cause of actions if they 
affect the system lifecycle.   
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 Integrate T.A.G. approach into FMEA 
SSA is usually carried out during development phase of the system lifecycle. At this phase, 
system design may have been implemented and stakeholders would be involved in verifying 
the product against the design and safety requirements. There could still be epistemic 
uncertainties at this phase and the efforts to implement major changes may be massive if it 
involves system redesign. The T.A.G. approach remains relevant for stakeholders to identify 
and document such uncertainties and continue to track and address them later in the system 
lifecycle.  
To evaluate the application of the T.A.G. approach, we use the WBS FMES constructed during 
the SSA in section 6.4. We will first describe the process flow of tagging uncertainties as part 
of the FMEA (section 6.5.1). Next, we will follow the process flow to complement FMEA 
with the three steps in T.A.G. approach described in chapter 4:  
• Step 1.  Identify uncertainties using HOT-PIE taxonomy. This risk analysis is 
conducted while the WBS FMES is being generated (section 6.5.2). 
• Step 2.  Prioritise the uncertainty analyses based on the factors introduced in the T.A.G 
approach (section 6.5.3), 
• Step 3.  Generate track and address action plans using the guided questions introduced 
in the T.A.G. approach (section 6.5.4). 
 Process of Tagging Uncertainties in FMEA 
Using the generic process of tagging uncertainties in safety assessment from section 4.3, we 
construct a similar process flow to tag epistemic uncertainties in FMEA (see Figure 79). Once 
again, the T.A.G. approach is not a separate standalone method to conduct safety assessment 
but rather it introduces additional steps to complement the existing FMEA.  
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Figure 79. Process Flow to Tag Epistemic Uncertainties in FMEA Safety Assessment 
For the rest of this section, we will describe in details how epistemic uncertainties in the WBS 
FMES can be identified, documented, tracked and addressed by using the T.A.G. approach.  
 Step 1: Identify and Tag Uncertainties from FMEA 
According to Figure 79, the first step of the T.A.G. approach is to tag uncertainties that are 
discovered while constructing the FMEA. Before uncertainties can be tagged, stakeholders 
need to identify the relevant components (step 1a), as well as determine the failure modes, 
effects and causes that constitute the FMEA (step 1b and 1c). The tagging is conducted with 
the help of the HOT-PIE taxonomy. In this section, we evaluate the use of the taxonomy to 
identify epistemic uncertainties from the WBS FMES. Uncertainty Observation 3 is about new 
linkage among components with existing causal relationship (see section 6.5.2.1) and 
Uncertainty Observation 4 is about linkage between components that do not have prior 
relationships with each other (see section 6.5.2.2). The differences between the two have been 
elaborated in section 4.2.7. 
6.5.2.1. Uncertainty Observation 3: Mechanical Faults at Control Valves  
From the FMES in Figure 78, we will first focus on the failure mode – “loss of single BSCU 
command channel”. We use the CRMSA model to describe the causal relationships related to 
this failure mode between the BSCU and the hydraulic pumps in Figure 80. The original 
electrical failure cause due to BSCU is also shown in the figure for reference. In this example, 
a new causal mechanism between the BSCU and the pumps is discovered using the HOT-PIE 
taxonomy. 
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Figure 80. Uncertainty about Mechanical Faults at Control Valves 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Technology primary condition, we found some relevant 
plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanisms:  
• Interface (under secondary casual condition T1: Machine), and  
• Mechanical (under secondary casual condition T2: Property) 
Example.  A plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship could be related to mechanical fault 
at the control valves between the BSCU and the hydraulic pumps (see the highlighted causal 
relationship in Figure 80). While the original focus in the FMES is on electrical failures 
between the BSCU and pumps, mechanical faults at the valve interfaces between the BSCU 
and the pumps may also result in the loss of BSCU command channel. For example, referring 
to Figure 77, a mechanical ‘sticky’ joint at the shutoff selector valve of the green pump may 
result in the loss of BSCU command signal to the pump. Pertinent questions to consider 
include: 
1. Is there analysis conducted on the reliability of the mechanical valves? 
2. How likely is it to lose the BSCU command signal when the mechanical joints are 
‘sticky’? 
3. How does the mechanical consideration affect the composite failure rate calculated 
in the WBS FMES? 
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6.5.2.2. Uncertainty Observation 4: Task Overload During Emergency  
From the FMES in Figure 78, we will next focus on the failure mode – “inadvertent brake 
command”. We use the CRMSA model to describe the causal relationships related to this 
failure mode in Figure 81. The original two electrical failure causes due to brake pedals and 
BSCU are shown on the left. In this example, a plausible causal mechanism between the BSCU 
and a new component – pilot, is discovered using the HOT-PIE taxonomy. 
 
Figure 81. Uncertainty about Task Overload during Emergency 
Next, we refer to the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the user guide to recognise plausible causal 
relationships. Searching through the Process primary condition, we found some relevant 
plausible-but-uncertain causal mechanisms:  
• Procedure (under secondary casual condition P1: Nature), and 
• Overload (under secondary casual condition P1: Nature).  
Example.  A plausible-but-uncertain causal relationship could be related to unintended 
operation of the brake system when the pilots are overloaded with multiple tasks during 
emergency (see the highlighted causal relationship in Figure 81). The concern is regarding 
possible distractions by the pilot during the deceleration process due to issues such as 
procedural and task overload during an emergency. With a better appreciation of the cockpit 
operation during system development, it could be timely to put more efforts in reviewing the 
human-machine interface during emergency.  
1. Are there studies being conducted on the probability of the pilots being overloaded 
with multiple tasks during emergency? 
2. How likely is it for the pilots to inadvertently activate the brake command when 
overloaded with multiple tasks? 
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3. How does the human-machine interface consideration affect the composite failure 
rate calculated in the WBS FMES? 
6.5.2.3. Summary  
To summarise, we have identified two epistemic uncertainties with the help of the HOT-PIE 
taxonomy (see Table 40). We have assumed that the estimated risk due to these two 
observations are at least tolerable such that the stakeholders can embark on managing the 
epistemic uncertainties. The next step is to prioritise the uncertainty analyses needed to 
manage these uncertainties.  
Table 40. Summary of Epistemic Uncertainties Identified in WBS FMES 
Observation 3 4 
Uncertainty Mechanical faults at control valves  Task overload during 
emergency 
HOT-PIE primary causal 
condition (cause) 
Technology Process 
HOT-PIE primary causal 
condition (effect) 
Technology Technology 
HOT-PIE causal mechanism 
T2: Property (Mechanical), T1: 
Machine (interface) 
P1: Nature (Procedure, 
overload) 
 Step 2: Document and Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Following the process flow from Figure 79, the next step is to prioritise the uncertainty 
analyses for the two epistemic uncertainties found in the previous section. This is conducted 
with the help of the guided questions from the T.A.G. approach user guide (see Annex K). The 
assessment for uncertainty observations is attached in Annex H.  
From the responses to the guided questions, we assess the criticality, complexity, novelty, and 
resource availability of managing the uncertainty observations. The expected effort is 
calculated from the average score of complexity, novelty and resource availability. The 
following Table 41 summarises the calculation of priority for the 2 observations.  
Table 41. Summary of Prioritisation for the Uncertainty Observations from WBS FMES 
Observation Uncertainty 
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3 Mechanical faults at control valves 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 
4 Task overload during emergency 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 0..5 
Using the scores for criticality and expected efforts, the 2 uncertainty observations are plotted 
on the prioritisation matrix chart as shown in Figure 82. Stakeholders can make use of the 
chart to decide which uncertainties to focus on and allocate the proportionate resources to 
manage them. 
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Figure 82. Uncertainty Observation 3 and 4 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
 Step 3: Generate Track and Address Action Plan 
After prioritising the plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships, the next step is to generate 
the uncertainty management action plan to track and address the uncertainties after completion 
of the SSA. These uncertainties will be tracked throughout the system engineering lifecycle 
till some pre-defined points are triggered for the stakeholders to address them.   
The action plan is formulated by answering a series of questions from the T.A.G. approach 
user guide from Annex K. In this section, we will generate the action plan to track and address 
Uncertainty Observation 3 regarding mechanical fault at control valves. Using the same 
argument as previous sections, this observation is chosen as it requires more expected effort 
as compared to Uncertainty Observation 4. Hence, a structured plan to track and address this 
uncertainty is important.   
6.5.4.1. Uncertainty Observation 3: Mechanical Faults at Control Valves   
The details of developing the action plan for Uncertainty Observation 3 are described in Annex 
I. Using the guide, we have developed the following track and address action plan: 
Track Portion of the Action Plan. Tracking the uncertainty involves investigating the 
physical interfaces and joints at the control valves that receive the electrical signal from the 
BSCU. This is because these physical interfaces represent the location where electrical signals 
are transmitted between the BSCU and the control valves to control the valve operation. 
Mechanical faults such as dry or sticky joints may result in signal corruption.   
To do that, dedicated mechanical engineers are needed to conduct the investigation. The 
mechanical engineers should be competent in analysing physical and mechanical properties of 
WBS operation  
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The mechanical engineers are responsible for investigating the mechanical contacts where the 
BSCU signals reach the control valves and checking on the reliability and failure rate of these 
mechanical contacts. This can be a paper study by reviewing the specification of the 
mechanical contacts. It is unsure if lab test or additional contractor test result/specification is 
needed to verify the design performance of the mechanical contacts. This will incur more 
resources and expertise.  
A structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to be in place to 
ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis. Regular update is expected at the 
weekly safety meeting. 
Address Portion of the Action Plan. The uncertainty will trigger a response when there is a 
discovery of mechanical conditions that can potentially compromise the electrical signal 
between the BSCU and the control valves and lead to signal corruption. Discovery of specific 
control valves that may be subjected to the above mechanical condition will also trigger a 
response from the investigation team.   
The management safety committee shall be responsible for deciding upon the respond actions. 
When trigger points are met, the mechanical engineers shall escalate result directly to the 
management via incident report. A review committee that includes project manager and 
mechanical engineers shall be responsible to review any changes that will be put in place to 
address the uncertainty. The review committee should have knowledge about mechanical 
engineering and WBS operation. It should also have accessed to higher management that has 
the authority to review WBS operation.  
If no data is observed within a month, the project manager needs to decide on a different action 
plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. Depends on the findings regarding the 
mechanical contacts, the project manager needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue 
to higher management. There may potentially be a review of the mechanical properties of the 
control valve depending on the investigation.  
Possible Actions when Trigger to Address Uncertainty.  Taking reference from section 
4.4.3, if the risk due to uncertainty about the mechanical faults at control valves is still not 
confidently within the tolerable or acceptable region, a decision would have to be made if one 
or both of the following needs to be conducted: 
• Focus on Risk through System Change.  If the assessed risk has become 
unacceptable, stakeholders need to derive strategies to reduce the risk. One approach 
could be to modify the existing mechanical valve with either a more reliable valve or 
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a different joint with better mechanical contact between the BSCU and the control 
valve. Stakeholders would have to conduct the safety analysis again to conclude if the 
new measure or mitigation does lower the risk to a tolerable or acceptable level. 
• Focus on Knowledge through Uncertainty Clarification.  The T.A.G. tracking on 
the epistemic uncertainty may need to continue under certain scenarios. The following 
are two possible scenarios to solicit more information to clarify the epistemic 
uncertainties.  
o Scenario 1 – Increasing Confidence.  Even when the assessed risk is 
tolerable, there may still not be enough confidence in the assessment due to 
the residual uncertainties. For example, the investigation team may have 
received assurance from the contractors providing the control valve that the 
reliability of the mechanical contact is within tolerance. However, the 
contractors are not able to provide the supporting test result in time since it 
has been generated by another agency. The investigation team may request 
for more time to solicit the test result so as to verify the reliability of the 
mechanical contact. 
o Scenario 2 – Reducing Risk.  In the second scenario, clarifying certain 
epistemic uncertainties may directly help to reduce assessed risk. For 
example, after investigating the mechanical contact at the control valve, it has 
been discovered that dry joint may be an issue due to environmental condition 
(e.g. hot and humid weather). As a result, more investigation needs to be 
conducted to solicit information about the environmental conditions 
surrounding the airport. Hence, there is a need to continue and track the 
uncertainty as more information is needed to lower the system risk into the 
tolerable region. 
To end the uncertainty tracking, stakeholders must be satisfied that the uncertainty due to 
mechanical faults at control valves being tracked by the T.A.G. approach has either been 
eliminated or that the risk is assessed to be confidently acceptable despite the decision to stop 
tracking the uncertainty. 
 Initial Evaluation and Summary  
Like chapter 5, we have highlighted in this chapter the contributions specifically from applying 
the T.A.G. approach in the FTA during PSSA and FMEA during SSA. Using the T.A.G. 
approach, we have managed to discover four plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships 
across different phases of the safety assessment process and over a spectrum of primary causal 
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conditions. Based on criticality and expected efforts to manage the uncertainties, the 
uncertainty observations are compared and prioritised using the prioritisation matrix chart. 
Stakeholders can then make use of the chart to decide how much to focus on each uncertainty 
so as to allocate the proportionate level of resources to manage them. Note that the four 
uncertainties may not be plotted on the same prioritisation matrix at the same time since they 
are discovered at different phases of the safety assessment process. After selecting the 
uncertainty to be tracked, an action plan to manage the uncertainty has been developed using 
the guided questions in the user guide. 
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Chapter 7 - Evaluation 
 Introduction  
For this thesis, the proposition was defined in section 1.3 as: 
Epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessments for safety-
critical systems can be feasibly and systematically identified, documented and 
tracked through-life in order to enable intervention to address potential risk. 
In this chapter, we have systematically evaluated the above proposition as a claim supported 
by evidence using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [133]. The GSN is a notation to 
represent arguments used specially in the safety domain. We have made use of four common 
elements under the notation (see Table 42). 
Table 42. GSN Elements used in the Evaluation 
 
Goal or claim (e.g. the 
system is safe to operate in 
the stipulated conditions) 
 
Solution or evidence 
referenced to support the 
goal (e.g. analysis and test 
results) 
 
Strategy or argument to 
support a goal (e.g. 
argument by showing that 
all identified hazards have 
been mitigated) 
 
Reference to a contextual 
information or statement 
(e.g. policy where a 
strategy takes reference 
from)  
 Structured Argument 
Using the GSN, a structured argument has been developed to describe how the above thesis 
preposition can be shown to be true based on evidence observed in this evaluation (see Figure 
83). 
 Goal 1 (G1): Thesis Proposition 
As shown in Figure 83, the top-level claim (G1) is the thesis proposition as stated in the 
introduction of this chapter. This claim is based on the principles that epistemic uncertainties 
should be identified (as explained in section 3.2.1), documented (as explained in section 3.2.2), 
tracked and addressed (as explained in section 3.2.3). These three principles (context C1, C2 
and C3) serve to argue for the thesis proposition to manage epistemic uncertainties feasibly 
and systematically through-out the system lifecycle.  
 
G: Sn: 
S: C: 
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Figure 83. Structured Argument to Evaluate Thesis Contributions using the GSN 
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Our evaluations shall focus on two types of activity: verification and validation. We refer to 
the definitions in ISO 9001:2015 [183] to explain the differences between the two activities. 
ISO 9001 is chosen as it is an international standard used by organisations to demonstrate that 
a product or service has met specific requirements. We would next explain the details of both 
activities in support of G1. 
 Strategy 1 (S1): Verification  
According to the standard, verification activities are conducted to “ensure that the design & 
development output meets the input requirements (functional requirements & specifications)”. 
In other words, verification is about asking the question “are we building the thing right?” Our 
primarily focuses are on the concepts that have been defined and the T.A.G. approach that has 
been developed to help safety analysts to manage epistemic uncertainties. Based on the top-
level goal G1, we have derived three 2nd level goals to verify the T.A.G. approach: 
1. G2: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to identify epistemic uncertainties 
2. G3: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to document epistemic uncertainties 
3. G4: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to track and address epistemic 
uncertainties  
We use two types of evidence to evaluate strategy 1: 
1. Sn1-3: Evaluation against Initial Requirements. For this argument, we use the 
requirements of the three initiatives under the T.A.G. approach to evaluate if the 2nd 
level goals have been achieved. Each of the 2nd level goals (G2, G3 and G4) has a 
corresponding evidence statement (Sn1, Sn2 and Sn3 respectively). We have 
reproduced the three requirements in Table 43. This will be discussed in section 7.2. 
Table 43. 2nd level Goals under Verification 
Sn. Initial Requirements (extracted from section 4.1) 
1 Taxonomy of causal mechanisms for stakeholders to recognise epistemic uncertainties not 
covered in original assessment 
2 Process and factors to prioritise epistemic uncertainties analysis so as to document the findings 
in existing safety assessment technique 
3 Method to develop actionable goals to track epistemic uncertainties through-life and address 
when some thresholds are met 
2. Sn4: Peer Review from Conferences and Workshops. Besides the theoretical 
assessment, we have also solicited feedback through peer reviews from internal and 
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external sharing of the T.A.G. approach as a mean to verify the 2nd level goals (Sn4). 
This will be discussed in section 7.3. 
 Strategy 2 (S2): Validation  
According to ISO 9001:2015, validation activities are conducted to “ensure that the resulting 
products and services meet the requirements for the specified application or intended use 
(customer needs)”. In other words, validation is about asking the question “are we building the 
right thing?” For validation, our focus is about soliciting feedback on the actual application to 
introduce the T.A.G. approach from this research into real-life usage. Based on the top-level 
goal G1, we have derived two 2nd level goals to validate the T.A.G. approach: 
4. G5: The T.A.G. approach can be feasibly applied in industry. In other words, this goal 
considers the viability of applying the T.A.G. approach in the context of existing 
industrial practice. 
5. G6: The T.A.G. approach can be systematically applied in industry. In other words, 
this goal considers if the T.A.G. approach is implemented according to a certain fixed 
plan (based on certain principles or concepts) that is repeatable in the industry. 
We use two types of evidence to evaluate the above 2nd level goals: 
1. Sn5: Peer Review from Semi-Structured Interviews. We have solicited feedback 
through semi-structured interviews with safety analysts in the Singapore defence to 
validate both of the 2nd level goals. Semi-structured interview comprises a pre-
determined set of open-ended questions that guides the discussion and yet maintains 
the flexibility for the discussion with the participants to branch out into other areas 
related to the management of epistemic uncertainties. Through an open-ended 
interview, the participants have been able to share their perspectives on the feasibility 
and systematic application of the T.A.G. approach. This will be discussed in section 
7.4. 
2. Sn6: Preliminary Industrial Application. Besides the semi-structured interview, we 
have also solicited feedback on the initial adaptation of the T.A.G. approach in the 
Singapore Air Force. This has provided more insights if the T.A.G. approach can be 
feasibly and systematically applied in the Singapore defence industry. This will be 
discussed in section 7.5. 
The four types of evaluating approach against the thesis proposition in this chapter is 
summarised in Table 44. 
  
217 
Table 44. Types of Evaluating Approach 
Section Evaluating Approach Verification Validation 
7.2 Evaluation against Initial Requirements x  
7.3 Peer-review: Conferences / Seminars  x  
7.4 Peer-review: Semi-structured interview  x 
7.5 Preliminary Industrial Adaptation  x 
 Evaluation against Initial Requirements 
In this section, we shall verify if the theoretical concepts and structured approach that have 
been developed in this research are able to support the three 2nd level goals. These three goals 
are:  
1. G2: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to identify epistemic uncertainties This 
would be discussed in section 7.2.1. 
2. G3: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to document epistemic uncertainties. This 
would be discussed in section 7.2.2. 
3. G4: Adoption of the T.A.G. approach helps to track and address epistemic 
uncertainties. This would be discussed in section 7.2.3. 
 Verify Contributions to Identify Epistemic Uncertainty 
The HOT-PIE taxonomy has been developed under the first initiative of the T.A.G. approach 
to better identify epistemic uncertainty. As elaborated in section 4.2, this is possible because 
of the following reasons: 
1. HOT-PIE taxonomy helps to search more effectively. The taxonomy of causal 
mechanisms that we have created harness prior knowledge about credible causal 
mechanisms, especially those that may reveal certain type of unsafe situations related 
to the system of interest. It specifies a reasonable coverage of diverse issues to help 
stakeholders recognise a wide range of safety-critical concerns and causal 
relationships. To create a credible taxonomy, literature review of subjects that are 
related to safety was conducted (see Annex A for the range of literature surveyed). 
These causal mechanisms covered a wide range of topics such as system safety, human 
factor ergonomic, project uncertainty, taxonomy of safety-related subjects and 
situational awareness. The use of the taxonomy encourages stakeholders to shift the 
boundary of knowledge from not knowing to knowing about epistemic uncertainty, 
through surfacing and modelling of previously unknown uncertainty. 
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2. HOT-PIE taxonomy helps to search more efficiently.  Without a systematic way of 
searching, the process may end up being laborious and inefficient. Our taxonomy 
helps the stakeholders to narrow their search by grouping the causal mechanisms into 
primary and secondary causal conditions for more efficient searching. This is 
explained with greater details in section 4.2. The list of causal mechanisms is classified 
into six primary causal conditions: Human, Organisation, Technology, Process, 
Information and Environment.  
The approach of using the HOT-PIE taxonomy has been demonstrated using two case studies 
focusing on system viewpoints in chapter 5 and component viewpoints in chapter 6 
respectively.  
In chapter 5, we have highlighted the use of the HOT-PIE taxonomy with the STPA safety 
assessment techniques under the Yongwen railway accident case study. With the help of the 
taxonomy, we could recognise four plausible-but-uncertainty causal relationships that were 
not discovered by the original safety assessment. The newly identified uncertainties are listed 
in Table 32. Two of these are known uncertainties that form new linkage among nodes with 
existing causal relationship and two are unknown uncertainties that form new linkages 
between nodes that do not have prior relationships with each other (see section 5.4.2 and 
section 5.4.3). Observation 3 on the uncertainty associated with software algorithm can even 
plausibly lead to the discovery of the error in the track signalling system that causes the 
accident. In chapter 6, we have highlighted the use of the HOT-PIE taxonomy with the FTA 
and FMEA safety assessment techniques under the ARP 4761 aircraft design case study. With 
the help of the taxonomy, we could recognise four plausible-but-uncertainty causal 
relationships that were not discovered by the original safety assessment. The newly identified 
uncertainties are listed in Table 38 and Table 40. Three of these are known uncertainties that 
form new linkage among nodes with existing causal relationship and one is an unknown 
uncertainty that form new linkages between nodes that do not have prior relationships with 
each other (see section 6.4.2 and section 6.6.2). 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the HOT-PIE taxonomy in the T.A.G. approach can 
recognise known and unknown uncertainties not covered in the original safety assessment. 
This verifies that the first initiative under T.A.G. approach can help to identify epistemic 
uncertainties. 
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 Verify Contributions to Document Epistemic Uncertainty 
Process and factors to prioritise epistemic uncertainties have been developed under the second 
initiative of the T.A.G. approach to better document epistemic uncertainty. As elaborated in 
section 4.3, this is possible because of the following two reasons: 
1. Generic process helps integrate T.A.G. approach into any safety assessment 
techniques. Section 3.2.2.1. mentioned that there is no established approach of 
documenting uncertainties in current safety assessment techniques. With the generic 
process flow developed in section 4.3.1, we can counter this challenge by 
complementing any safety assessment techniques with the T.A.G. approach so as to 
document the uncertainties and the corresponding uncertainty analysis.   
2. Prioritisation Factors helps to improve traceability when prioritising uncertainty 
analyses.  With limited resources, stakeholders may discard the less certain causal 
relationships during safety assessment (see section 3.2.2.2) and not document the 
reasons they choose or discard causal relationships for analysis during safety 
assessment (see section 3.2.2.3). To be explicit about such selections, we have defined 
two major factors: Criticality and Expected Effort, that represent what stakeholders 
can consider when prioritising which uncertainty analyses they would manage first. 
These factors have been defined in section 4.3.2. 
Like the previous section, the approach of using the process and prioritisation factors has been 
demonstrated using two case studies focusing on system viewpoints in chapter 5 and 
component viewpoints in chapter 6 respectively.  
In chapter 5, we use the process and prioritisation factors to document and prioritise the 
uncertainties analyses under the Yongwen railway accident case study. Using the generic 
process of tagging uncertainties from section 4.3, we have constructed a similar process flow 
to tag epistemic uncertainties in STPA in section 5.3. This process flow is shown in Figure 61. 
We develop this process flow to show that the T.A.G. approach is not a separate standalone 
method to conduct safety assessment but rather it introduces additional steps to complement 
the existing STPA techniques.  
With the help of the prioritisation factors, we could prioritise the 4 plausible-but-uncertainty 
causal relationships that were not discovered from the original safety assessment. This is 
conducted with the help of the guided questions from the T.A.G. approach User Guide (see 
Annex K).  
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In chapter 6, we use the process and prioritisation factors to document and prioritise the 
uncertainties analyses under the ARP 4761 aircraft design case study. Using the generic 
process of tagging uncertainties from section 4.3, we have constructed similar process flows 
to tag epistemic uncertainties in FTA (see section 6.3) and FMEA (see section 6.5). These 
process flows are shown in Figure 70 and Figure 76. Again, it shows that the T.A.G. approach 
can be integrated into existing safety assessment techniques.  
With the help of the prioritisation factors, we could prioritise the 4 plausible-but-uncertainty 
causal relationships that were not discovered from the original safety assessment. Again, this 
is conducted with the help of the guided questions from the T.A.G. approach User Guide (see 
Annex K).  
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the process and factors to prioritise epistemic 
uncertainties analyses in the T.A.G. approach can be integrated in existing safety assessment 
techniques. This verifies that the second initiative under T.A.G. approach can help to 
document epistemic uncertainties. 
 Verify Contributions to Track and Address Epistemic 
Uncertainty 
The guided questions have been developed under the third initiative of the T.A.G. approach to 
track and address epistemic uncertainty. As elaborated in section 4.4, this is possible because 
of the following two reasons: 
1. Guided questions help to develop actionable goals to track uncertainty.  To do 
that, we have developed guided questions based on specific factors in section 4.4.2. to 
help track the uncertainty. This is based on the GQTA approach as explained in section 
4.4.1. This ensures that tracking of epistemic uncertainties is not random, and it 
follows a structured approach that spell out the activities to be conducted as part of 
the tracking.  
2. Guided questions help to develop actionable goals to address uncertainty. We 
have also developed guided questions based on specific factors to address the 
uncertainty in section 4.4.2. These would help safety analysts to response to changes 
in the epistemic uncertainties when certain thresholds with regards to the uncertainties 
are triggered.  
Like the previous section, the approach of using the guided questions has been demonstrated 
using two case studies focusing on system viewpoints in chapter 5 and component viewpoints 
in chapter 6 respectively.  
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In chapter 5, we use the guided questions to develop action plan so as to track and address the 
epistemic uncertainties under the Yongwen railway accident case study. The action plan is 
formulated by responding to a series of questions using the T.A.G. approach user guide (see 
Annex K). An example of the responses to the guided question is attached in Table 36 of 
chapter 5. The subsequent track and address action plan derived from the responses is 
elaborated in section 5.3.5.  
In chapter 6, we use the guided questions to develop action plan so as to track and address the 
epistemic uncertainties under the ARP 4761 aircraft design case study. Like the Yongwen 
railway accident case study, the action plan is formulated by responding to the same set of 
questions in the T.A.G. approach user guide. An example of the responses to the guided 
question is attached in Annex G. The track and address action plans derived from the responses 
are elaborated in section 6.4.4. and 6.6.4  
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that the guided questions in the T.A.G. approach can 
develop actionable goals. This verifies that the third initiative under T.A.G. approach can help 
to track and address epistemic uncertainties through-life. 
 Peer Review – Sharing at Conferences and Workshops 
The research from this thesis was presented to scholars, researchers and engineers both from 
academia and industry. In the University of York, the research was presented internally at the 
High Integrity Systems Engineering (HISE) Group workshops where valuable comments and 
suggestions were solicited to refine the T.A.G. approach. The HISE Group is involved with 
research and teaching in systems and software engineering, especially in safety and security-
critical applications.  
Externally, we have published papers and presented at peer-reviewed international 
conferences, namely: 
• Causal Reasoning for Embedded and Safety-critical Systems Technologies – 
CREST 2017 (29 Apr 2017, Sweden). We presented the research at the 2nd 
International Workshop on Causal Reasoning for Embedded and Safety-critical 
Systems Technologies (CREST 2017) at Uppsala, Sweden on 29 April 2017. This is 
part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software (ETAPS) 
for international academic and industrial researchers working on topics relating to 
software science in safety-critical systems. Since the focus was on causal reasoning, 
the concept of representing hazards as causal relationships generated interesting 
discussions, especially on the graphic representations of cause-and-effect 
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relationships. The CRMSA was discussed and refined based on the comments from 
the workshop regarding the ways to better represent causal reasoning in safety.  
• 35th International System Safety Conference (21-25 Aug 2017, New Mexico). This 
conference is among the premiere international conferences on system safety with the 
theme “Pushing the Boundaries of System Safety”. The conference had attracted 
participants from both academia and industry focusing on challenges in safety 
assessment for systems of system. The T.A.G. approach was presented during the 
conference and the participants provided valuable suggestions to help concretise the 
approach. For example, the idea of providing a quantitative scoring to the prioritisation 
factor was generated during a discussion at the conference. There were differing views 
among the participants if higher priority should be given to critical uncertainty that 
requires more efforts or less critical uncertainty that requires less efforts. At the end 
of the discussion, the participants agreed that this can be context dependent.  
• 12th International Conference on System Safety and Cyber Security (30 Oct- 1 
Nov 2017, London). The conference was organised by the Institution of Engineering 
and Technology (IET) as a unique conference in the UK where both safety and 
security engineers can network and share insights between them. Our research was 
presented during the conference. One of the interesting discussions was on the 
possibility of applying the T.A.G. approach in the security domain to identify active 
agents that intend to do harm to the system. While the participants see value in porting 
the T.A.G. approach into the security domain, the taxonomy would have to be 
customised from the security perspective. 
• System Safety Society (Singapore Chapter) (19 Jan 2018, Singapore). A 
presentation of our research was conducted at the Singapore chapter of the 
International System Safety Society to share with local academics and industry system 
safety practitioners. While the participants acknowledge the usefulness of the T.A.G. 
approach, the complexity of the approach generated much concern, especially if the 
approach is implemented at a larger scale or with greater heterogeneity across an 
organisation. This is also a common observation in the semi-structured interview (see 
section 7.4) that we have conducted with system safety analysts working in the 
Singapore defence industry. 
• Singapore Aerospace Technology and Engineering Conference – SATEC 2018 (7 
Feb 2018, Singapore). Singapore Aerospace Technology and Engineering Conference 
(SATEC) is a biannual aviation conference that is held in conjunction with the 
Singapore Air show. It is where researchers, aviation operators and engineers present 
and discuss key developments and advancements in aerospace technology and 
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engineering. The key focus for this year’s conference is on the innovative use of 
technology and engineering to meet new and evolving challenges in the aerospace   
industry. Like the IET conference in London, there were suggestions to port the 
T.A.G. approach into cyber security. Again, the participants acknowledge that the 
approach of managing uncertainties can possibly be applied to cyber security but the 
list of causal conditions in the HOT-PIE taxonomy needs to be reviewed. While the 
six primary categories in the taxonomy are relevant for cyber security, the lower level 
causal conditions would need to be reviewed as it was developed based on literature 
surveyed. A review of the literature concerning cyber security is needed to make the 
taxonomy more encompassing.  
 Peer Review – Semi-Structured Interview 
This section describes the result of the interview with industrial participants to validate the 
T.A.G. approach so as to complement the verification activities conducted in the previous 
sections. We first describe the methodology that shapes the interview in section 7.4.1, before 
we present the interview analysis in section 7.4.2. 
 Interview Methodology  
As part of the interview methodology, we present the objectives, structure, approach of 
collecting and analysing the data and the profile of the participants in this section. This 
methodology guides us in soliciting trustworthy data that is systematically collected and ensure 
that it comes from participants who are subject matter experts in our area of research. 
7.4.1.1. Objectives 
The interview supports the validation activities with the following objectives: 
• Solicit feedback if the T.A.G approach can be feasibly applied in industry 
• Solicit feedback if the T.A.G approach can be systematically applied in industry 
7.4.1.2. Structure of Questionnaire 
The interview is guided by a questionnaire (see Annex J) with five sections that comprises 
both quantitative and qualitative questions. The methodology of preparing the questionnaire 
is based on two key questions: deciding what to ask and designing how to ask.  
In terms of deciding what to ask, we have structured the questionnaire into five sections: 
participants’ details, uncertainty in safety assessment, HOT-PIE taxonomy, prioritisation 
factors and guided action plans. The participants’ details are to help us in finding possible 
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correlation between the eventual feedback to the profile of the participants. The uncertainty in 
safety assessment portion is to solicit feedback on the current situation regarding managing 
uncertainty during safety assessment. The remaining three sections are aligned to the three 
steps under the T.A.G. approach: identify, document, track and address. As for designing how 
to ask, we have taken recommendations from Oppenheim [184] to design our questionnaire to 
be exploratory and in depth. The intent for each section is as follows: 
Section 1: Participants’ Details. This section records the profile of the participant in terms 
of the job responsibility and the level of experience in safety assessment. 
Section 2: Uncertainty in Safety Assessment.  This section investigates the impact of 
epistemic uncertainty on existing safety assessment and how well it is being managed. This 
would provide the demand to manage epistemic uncertainty better in safety assessment. 
Section 3: HOT-PIE Taxonomy.  This section solicits feedback on step 1 of the T.A.G. 
approach to recognise known and unknown uncertainties not covered in the original safety 
assessment. The three quantitative questions are scoped to focus on the possibility, usefulness 
and feasibility of integrating the HOT-PIE taxonomy with existing safety assessment 
techniques. The participants are also provided with a message box to provide qualitative 
feedback on the HOT-PIE taxonomy. 
Section 4: Prioritisation Factors. This section solicits feedback on step 2 of the T.A.G. 
approach that helps to document and prioritise uncertainty analyses in existing safety 
assessment. The three quantitative questions are scoped to focus on the importance, usefulness 
and feasibility of incorporating the prioritisation with existing safety assessment techniques. 
The participants are also provided with a message box to provide qualitative feedback on the 
prioritisation factors. 
Section 5: Action Plan.  This section solicits feedback on step 3 of the T.A.G. approach that 
provides guided questions to develop goals to track and address epistemic uncertainty in 
existing safety assessment. The two quantitative questions are scoped to focus on the 
usefulness and feasibility of implementing the guided questions with existing safety 
assessment techniques. The participants are also provided with a message box to provide 
qualitative feedback on the guided questions. 
7.4.1.3. Profile of Participants  
The semi-structured interview targets individuals who are experience in safety analysis under 
the domain of aviation and defence systems management. It is hope that, by having the 
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experiences in utilising safety assessment techniques and having been through the hazard 
analysis process, the participants would be able to provide insightful comments and 
suggestions to improve the T.A.G. approach.  
Since the participants can only be selected from a niche pool of individuals, we set our target 
to engage at least 5 participants. In the Singapore air force, the complicated safety-critical 
system that we are concerned with is known as system-of-systems. Participants that have 
experiences in safety assessment with system-of-systems would either be military personnel 
from the air force or civilian engineers from the defence agency supporting the acquisition and 
operationalisation of the system. In total, seven participants were interviewed using the semi-
structured interview approach. Their profiles are summarised in Table 45. All of them have at 
least 5 to 10 years of experience in safety.  
        Table 45. Summary of Participants 
No. Job Requirement related to Safety Experience in Safety (Years) Industry 
1 SoS Safety Governance 10-15 Air Force 
2 System Safety Engineer 10-15 Defence Agency 
3 Senior Engineer (System Safety) 5-10 Defence Agency 
4 System Safety (Airborne Systems) 5-10 Defence Agency 
5 System Safety Engineering Lead >15 Defence Agency 
6 Safety Assessment for SoS >15 Air Force 
7 Networked Safety and Engineering 10-15 Air Force 
 
7.4.1.4. Data Collection Approach 
This section discusses the approach to collecting data from the interview so as to meet the 
objectives stated in section 7.4.1.1. 
Inclination towards Qualitative Data.  According to Punch [185], quantitative data is about 
numbers (or measurements) and qualitative data is about data not in the form of numbers 
(usually in the form of words). Qualitative research is targeted to gain insights into a problem 
and look for underlying trends from the opinions of a selected group of participants. 
Quantitative research tends to generalise numerical data using some statistical calculation 
collected from a large sample.  
Since the interview involves seven participants, we do not have sufficient sampling size to 
make conclusive deduction from the quantitative data. In order to appreciate if the T.A.G. 
approach can be feasibly and systematically complementing existing safety assessment 
techniques, it is important to solicit the opinions from the participants based on their 
experiences. Hence, a qualitative approach is more appropriate in this case where we will be 
highlighting considerations, observations and challenges from the participants. While there are 
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quantitative data collected, the interview has mostly been focusing on soliciting qualitative 
data. 
Semi-Structured Interview to collect Qualitative Data.  The one-to-one interview is a type 
of semi-structured interview as it comprises a pre-determined set of open-ended questions that 
prompt the discussion and yet maintains the flexibility for the discussion with the participants 
to branch out into areas related to the management of epistemic uncertainties. The participants 
had been provided with a case study and asked a set of predefined questions related to the case 
study. The case study is based on a research by Song et al [24] from Beihang University, 
Beijing. It consists of two parts. In part 1, we provide the background to the Yongwen railway 
accident and the STPA hazard analysis technique. The hazard analysis has been conducted on 
the Yongwen railway system by Song. In part 2, we introduce the T.A.G. approach and apply 
it on the STPA hazard analysis from part 1 to help manage epistemic uncertainties.  
Refinement of Questions in the Semi-Structured Interview. The questions in the evaluation 
form is design based on internal discussions among the researchers and in accordance with the 
recommendations for questionnaire design described by Oppenheim [184]. The questions can 
be divided into four main areas. The first area focuses on the impacts of uncertainty on safety 
assessment; while the remaining three areas are dedicated to each of the three initiatives under 
the T.A.G. approach. The number of questions is optimised such that there are not too many 
to make the interview too laborious and yet about to sieve out critical opinions from the 
participants. 
User Guide as a Reference.  To complement the interview, a concise user guide that explains 
the concepts and methods under the T.A.G. approach is produced and attached in Annex K. 
The user guide can be used during the interview as a quick reference to retrieve information 
such as the HOT-PIE taxonomy and guided questions to develop the action plan. Moving 
forward, the user guide would be refined to serve as a document for safety analysts to refer to 
when they apply the T.A.G. approach during safety assessments.   
Length of Interview. Being a qualitative approach, the semi-structured interview is expected 
to take a longer time compared to a quantitative approach. Summarising the interview has also 
been harder, compared to a quantitative one. In our semi-structured interview, we have 
specially used a thematic analysis approach to summarise the findings. This is discussed in 
detail under section 7.4.1.5. While we have scheduled an hour for each interview, most of the 
interviews lasted between 1.5hr to 2hrs. The participants were passionate to share on the topics 
of safety assessment and candidly provide their opinions in managing hazards and 
uncertainties during safety assessment. Since the semi-structured interview is open-ended, 
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some discussions tend to take some time depending on the flow of the conversations. As some 
of the discussions are sensitive due to the nature of the projects that the participants were 
involved in, voice recorder was not used. Instead, notes and insights relevant to the research 
were hand written. This inadvertently increase the length of the interview as compared to using 
a recorder.   
7.4.1.5. Data Analysis Approach 
This section discusses the way that the data collected from the interview is being analysed. As 
mentioned in section 7.4.1.4, we conduct semi-structured interview to solicit considerations, 
observations and challenges highlighted by the participants. From these pointers, we group the 
common ones together to produce themes. Such a thematic analysis approach helps to sieve 
out important issues that get surfaced from multiple interviewees. According to Braun and 
Clarke [186], a thematic analysis typically comprises the following steps (see Table 46). 
Table 46. Thematic Analysis Approach 
No. Step Descriptions (directly extracted from Braun and Clarke) 
1 Familiarisation with 
Data 
This step requires the researcher to actively transcribe the data during 
the interactions. The researcher needs to understand the content of the 
interaction and be familiarised with all aspects of the data.  
2 Generating Initial 
Codes 
Once familiar with the data, the researcher must then start identifying 
preliminary codes, which are the features of the data that appear 
interesting and meaningful. These codes are more numerous and 
specific than themes but provide an indication of the context of the 
conversation. 
3 Searching for Themes The third step in the process is the start of the interpretive analysis of 
the collated codes. Relevant data extracts are sorted (combined or split) 
according to overarching themes.  
4 Reviewing Themes A deeper review of identified themes follows where the researcher 
needs to question whether to combine, refine, separate, or discard 
initial themes. Data within themes should cohere together 
meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions 
between themes. A thematic ‘map’ can be generated from this step. 
5 Defining and Naming 
Themes 
This step involves ‘refining and defining’ the themes and potential 
subthemes within the data. Ongoing analysis is required to further 
enhance the identified themes. The researcher needs to provide theme 
names and clear working definitions that capture the essence of each 
theme in a concise and punchy manner. At this point, a unified story of 
the data needs to emerge from the themes. 
6 Producing the Report Finally, the researcher needs to transform the analysis into an 
interpretable piece of writing with examples that relate to the themes, 
research question, and literature. 
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From the semi-structured interview, a thematic map was developed based on the above steps 
under the thematic analysis approach. The insights from the thematic mapping is reported as 
part of the qualitative analysis in section 7.4.2.  
 Interview Analysis 
As explained in section 7.4.1.4 the interview focuses primarily on the qualitative data using 
the thematic analysis approach. In addition, we have also collected quantitative data that 
showcases average responses among the participants. Since these behavioural responses are 
subjective, we acknowledge that the quantitative result is not an exact science but more of a 
reference to the spread of responses among the participants. These quantitative observations 
are collated in section 7.4.2.1. Using the thematic analysis approach in section 7.4.1.5, the 
qualitative observations are presented in section 0. 
7.4.2.1. Quantitative Observations 
In this section, we present the quantitative data extracted from the semi-structured interview. 
The questions are spread across the questionnaire (see Annex J) provided to each of the 
participants. It is based on a 5-points Likert scale [187] to measure the participants’ responses 
to a variety of statements according to the four focus areas defined in section 7.4.1.2. While 
the Likert scale is easy to construct and simple to complete for the participants, it does have 
its limitations. According to Bertram [188] and Subedi [189], participants of the Likert scale 
may be influenced by bias such as “avoiding extreme responses at both end of the scale 
(central tendency bias), agreeing with statements as presented in order “please” the 
experimenter (acquiescence bias), and portraying themselves in a more socially favourable 
light rather than being honest (social desirability bias)”. While we acknowledge that the 
quantitative data is subjective, it serves as a reference of the participant inclinations.  
Focus Area 1: Uncertainty in Safety Assessment 
 
Most of the participants disagree that the 
information needed for safety assessment is 
readily available during the analysis. Hence, lack 
of information is common in safety assessment.  
Since uncertainty is about lack of knowledge, the 
question should have been more precise by 
focusing on “knowledge”, rather than 
“information”. While information may not be 
equivalent to knowledge, a lack of information 
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can potentially lead to a lack of knowledge. 
Hence, while it is not conclusive, the responses 
could imply that lack of knowledge (epistemic 
uncertainty) can potentially exist in safety 
assessment due to a lack of information. 
 
With a mean of 3.7, the participants agree that 
epistemic uncertainty does affect their trust in the 
safety assessment results. However, there are 
fluctuating views among the participants as 
shown. Some commented that since they have 
‘done their best with what they know’, they are 
confident in trusting their assessment, even 
though there can be unknowns which they are not 
aware of. 
 
With a mean of 2.4, the participants generally 
disagree that epistemic uncertainties in safety 
assessment are well managed. Most of them 
agree that more can be done to better manage 
such uncertainties during safety assessment. 
Some participants may feel more confident in 
managing epistemic uncertainties as the projects 
that they are involved in may not be too 
complicated or involved multiple systems. 
 
Focus Area 2: HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
 
Most of the participants strongly agree that the 
HOT-PIE taxonomy can be augmented into 
existing way of conducting safety assessment if 
there is no resource constraint. 
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Most of the participants strongly agree that the 
HOT-PIE taxonomy can help to identify 
epistemic uncertainties which they may overlook 
if not prompted. 
 
With a mean of 3, the participants have mixed 
opinions if the amount of efforts required to 
incorporate the taxonomy is practical for existing 
safety assessment. There are differing views 
among the participants on the practicality of 
augmenting HOT-PIE taxonomy as shown. 
 
Focus Areas 3: Proritisation Factors 
 
Most of the participants strongly agree that it is 
important to prioritise the further investigations 
needed on the epistemic uncertainties after 
identifying them. 
 
With a mean of 4.1, the participants agree that the 
prioritisation factors are useful to focus on 
epistemic uncertainties that are more important. 
One participant opined that the factors would 
only be helpful after a review by domain experts, 
which would depend on the context surrounding 
the system.  
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With a mean of 4.1, the participants generally 
agree that the amount of efforts required to 
incorporate the prioritisation factors is practical 
for existing safety assessment. Most of the 
participants feel that the prioritisation can be 
easily introduced into the current process when 
considering which epistemic uncertainties to 
analyse first. 
Focus Area 4: Guided Questions for Action Plan 
 
Most of the participants strongly agree that the 
guided questions can help them to formulate the 
action plan to track and address epistemic 
uncertainties through-life. 
 
Most of the participants strongly agree that it is 
feasible to use the guided questions to formulate 
action plan as part of existing safety assessment. 
In addition to the focus areas, we have also reviewed the feedback according to the experience 
and industry of the participants (i.e. taking reference from Table 45.).  
   
Figure 84. Trending Based on Experience 
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Experience.  We have rearranged the 7 participants such that those with the least experience 
are on the left (5-10 years) and those with most experience are on the right (>15 years). Two 
of the questions show interesting observations: Q5 and Q9 (see Figure 84). Q5 chart indicates 
that more experience safety analysts seem to have less trust in the safety assessment due to the 
presence of epistemic uncertainty. Q9 chart indicates that more experience safety analysts are 
more pessimistic about incorporating the taxonomy into existing safety processes. One 
possible postulation is that the senior analysts may have seen many new initiatives in the past 
failing. Hence, they tend to be more sceptical about new approaches, even though they agree 
that epistemic uncertainty can affect confidence in safety assessment.  
 
 
Figure 85. Trending Based on Industry 
Industry.  Next, we rearrange the participants by industry, with the 4 participants from 
Defence Agency on the left and 3 participants from the Air Force on the right. There is no 
obvious trending in most charts except Q9 (see Figure 85). Beside the more experience 
participants, it seems that the Air Force participants have less confidence in implementing the 
HOT-PIE taxonomy as compared to the Defence Agency. This is possibly due to the concern 
of balancing operational support in the air force, while still committing time and resources to 
carry out the uncertainty tagging using the HOT-PIE taxonomy.   
7.4.2.2. Qualitative Observations 
In this section, we present the observations based on the thematic analysis conducted after the 
semi-structured interview. To provide a holistic analysis, the observations have also 
considered the assessment from the quantitative data presented in the previous section. A total 
of over 30 themes and sub-themes have been identified. The thematic map constructed from 
the interview is shown in Figure 86. At the highest level, three top-level themes are defined to 
reflect the key focuses: present context, proposal and moving forward.  Under these top-level 
themes, seven level-2 sub-themes are defined: epistemic uncertainty, trust, taxonomy, 
prioritisation, action plan, pilot implementation and targeted observations. 
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Top-level Theme 1: Present Context 
In this theme, we consider the current landscape of managing epistemic uncertainty in safety 
assessment and how this can affect the trust in the assessment.   
Epistemic Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in Safety Assessment.  There is a consensus among the participants that 
information needed for safety assessment is never complete and epistemic uncertainties are 
always present during their analysis. While participants are confident with the current safety 
assessment results, they feedback that this confidence is based on the belief that they have 
done their best, within their means and knowledge, to identify hazards based on existing 
techniques. However, the participants acknowledged that unknown uncertainty can still create 
that blind spot and make them unable to identify hazard. Such uncertainties do affect the trust 
in the safety assessment results and the participants are looking forward to managing these 
uncertainties better. 
Lack of Problem Definition in Current Safety Assessment.  The issue of epistemic uncertainty 
is especially pronounced in the current system level hazard analysis known as scenario-based 
hazard analysis. There is often a lack of credible scenarios to describe the ways constituent 
systems are interacting and operating with each other. This is because in early design phase, 
different systems have different level of maturity (some may not even be developed yet, while 
some are legacy systems); how different systems operate together as a complicated safety-
critical system may not even be well understood yet. This can be an iterative process that takes 
time. Usually, the safety analysts can define the key mishap potentials based on past 
experiences from operating either the constituent systems independently or through references 
to other known mishaps. However, the key challenges are the causes of such mishaps, which 
are often not easily identified from the limited experiences in the scenarios that the systems 
will operate together.  
Complementing Current Limitations.  The sensing among the participants is that the T.A.G. 
approach is suitable for top-down hazard analysis, e.g. to complement STPA, brainstorming, 
system-level FTA; which is more flexible but rely heavily on experiences. It will help to 
prompt users to consider different scenarios so as to tackle the lack of problem definition in 
the safety assessment. As for more structured safety assessment techniques, e.g. FMEA, as 
such technique is less experience dependent, the T.A.G. approach may not be too applicable 
since the boundary of issues to be considered is more restricted. 
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Figure 86. Thematic Map from Semi-Structured Interview 
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Trust 
The trust in the safety assessment relies largely on the experiences of the safety analysts 
involved. From the interview, there are two types of experts that determine the trustworthiness 
of the safety assessment results. First, are the technique experts, who are the ones with 
experiences in using the safety assessment techniques to analyse and identify hazards. These 
are usually project managers and system safety engineers that can advise on how to use the 
safety assessment techniques. Second, are the domain experts, who are the ones with 
experiences in developing, managing and operating the system of interest. These are usually 
the operational manager, system engineers and system operators that can contextualise the 
safety assessment techniques and identify what are the causal conditions that can be 
potentially be hazardous. 
Such experts are increasingly difficult to find in complicated systems as (1) we need people 
that not only know constituent system, but also at the integrated or system-of-systems level, 
(2) not easy to get all experts to be present during a safety assessment, some may send 
members of differing experiences. Hence, the HOT-PIE taxonomy is useful to complement 
the existing way of doing safety assessment when identifying hazards. Although we need to 
caution that, ultimately, we still need experts to decide what are hazardous, what are 
considered plausible with uncertainty and what are considered not plausible right from the 
start. While the responsibility to decide still lies with the experts, having a HOT-PIE taxonomy 
as a prompter to explicitly document the influence of uncertainties during safety assessment is 
important to help experts make a more informed safety decision. 
Top-level Theme 2: Proposal 
In this theme, we consider the feasibility of implementing the three initiatives under the T.A.G. 
approach. These are primarily the taxonomy, the prioritisation effort and the action plan. 
Taxonomy 
The participants felt that the HOT-PIE taxonomy is useful as it can provide a comprehensive 
view of potential causal mechanisms that may be hazardous. The diverse focus under the 
taxonomy can help to flag out issues that are not immediately apparent from existing way of 
conducting hazard analysis. This can help to break away from the current way of thinking 
about causes that can lead to the established mishaps. 
While the taxonomy is systematically developed from a range of literature (see Annex A) and 
incorporated as a process to identify epistemic uncertainties, however, the key concern is the 
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challenge of expanding and implementing the entire HOT-PIE taxonomy into current safety 
assessment process. As the taxonomy serves as a prompter (and not a compulsory checklist to 
follow), the participants questioned if it is necessary to refer to all the causal mechanisms listed 
in the taxonomy. This would determine when to stop searching through the list. Most 
participants are concerned that safety analysts do not have the time to consider the entire list 
of plausible causal mechanisms under the HOT-PIE taxonomy. Some of the participants also 
felt that not all causal mechanisms in the taxonomy are relevant for different domains and the 
list needs to be contextualised. For example, an organisation may have assumed that its people 
are already qualified and well trained for the tasks to operate the system of interest and so the 
safety concern about expertise or competency may not be considered under the taxonomy. 
While filtering the taxonomy in advance may be needed due to practical reason, it will limit 
the extent of the HOT-PIE taxonomy to prompt users about plausible safety-critical causal 
relationships.  
Prioritisation 
Some of the participants fed back that in the current stringent safety culture, there seem to be 
the expectations that any safety concerns identified must be analysed, and subsequently 
eliminated or mitigated whenever they are being discovered. Hence, there may not be the need 
to prioritise the analyses since all uncertainties must be managed immediately. However, this 
argument may not be entirely valid because: 
1) In view of the pressure that ‘all identified safety concerns must be eliminated or 
mitigated’, safety analysts may subconsciously discard plausible causal relationships 
during the safety assessment as they may not have either sufficient evidence to 
determine the level of risk or the clarity to analyse the causal relationships due to 
epistemic uncertainties. As a result, safety decision may have been made without 
being aware of these plausible causal relationships that can be safety-critical. 
2) In the context of large-scale social-technical systems with limited resources, as more 
and more systems begin to interoperate and integrate with each other, understanding 
the interactions among systems will become more and more complicated. Without a 
corresponding increase in resources such as manpower and time, the epistemic 
uncertainties that safety analysts have to deal with may eventually outweigh the 
resources available to analyse all such uncertainties. Such evolving landscape can 
eventually place a practical demand such that it is necessary to prioritise the efforts 
needed to analyse the epistemic uncertainties associated with the safety concerns.  
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The added dimension of considering expected effort is well received by most of the 
participants as they agreed that explicitly considering the efforts based on different factors can 
help to provide a systematic analysis that adds credibility for the prioritisation. As for the factor 
on criticality, there are concerns that it may be difficult or even less credible to assess the 
severity and probability of a safety concern that has epistemic uncertainty. This is especially 
so if the effect of a safety concern is unknown or non-deterministic during the time of 
assessment because of epistemic uncertainty. 
Action Plan 
The participants considered the guided questions to derive the track and address action plan 
useful. They feel that the questions can serve as a structured reference during the process of 
developing the action plan. However, they raised a similar concern of the need of expertise to 
formulate quality action plan, just like the need of expertise to make sense and contextualise 
the HOT-PIE taxonomy. 
As a form of continuous improvement, the participants suggested that the questions can be 
improved by generalising the queries that are commonly asked by committee members in 
safety forums, as well as insights from safety assessments conducted for past projects.  
Top-level Theme 3: Moving Forward 
Pilot Implementation 
Some of the participants feel that, where there are benefits, project managers may not be 
receptive to devote the time and efforts to conduct T.A.G. approach. This is especially so for 
those in the front-end design and planning, as they may not be able to appreciate how the final 
system may operate with other systems. The participants foresee a reluctance to embark fully 
on the T.A.G. approach when its benefits are not clearly demonstrated. Hence a pilot 
implementation may be a suitable approach moving forward. It will help to showcase a 
concrete example of an actual project that uses the T.A.G. approach. However, the participants 
acknowledge the challenge of such pilot implementation as there will be concerns such as: 
• The risk of delaying the project schedule 
• The security impact of sharing information about the project 
• The factors to consider and areas to observe during the trial so as not to be too intrusive 
to the ongoing project 
• The duration of the pilot implementation to obtain credible result  
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Targeted Observations 
Using the three steps of the T.A.G. approach, many of the participants find that it can provide 
valuable insights into causal conditions to complement existing safety assessment techniques 
during hazard analysis. The T.A.G. provides a different perspective that can help to make 
safety assessment more credible, especially by advocating the use of HOT-PIE taxonomy to 
check for blind spots when identifying hazards.  
One major blind spot that was brought up regularly is the safety concerns related to human. 
Currently, there is still this assumption in safety assessment that human will do what is 
intended. Especially for engineers, there may be this perception that they can’t control human 
errors that occur when human deviates from expected operation procedure. However, the 
participants see value of using the T.A.G approach to discover uncertainties that may 
eventually influence the redesign of a system so as to mitigate human related concerns and 
hazards. 
The participants feedback that the T.A.G. approach has the potential to make the safety 
assessment more comprehensive as it: 
• Provides a systematic approach based on established theories and concepts 
• Provides a structured process that is repeatable and traceable  
• Synergises with existing safety techniques by integrating into existing process  
 
 Preliminary Industrial Adaptation 
Besides conducting the semi-structured interview, discussions between the Singapore Air 
Force and the defence agency have also been initiated to explore the possibility of adapting 
the T.A.G. approach into the current way of conducting safety assessment. Through 
preliminary discussions with the relevant stakeholders that are responsible for the system 
safety methodology and safety governance in the air force, we have identified possible areas 
that the existing T.A.G. approach can be adapted to the existing safety assessment for 
complicated safety-critical systems, which is known as networked system-of-systems 
(NwSoS) in the Singapore context. As these are long-term ongoing efforts, we can expect more 
fine-tuning as we receive more feedback from the users. In this section, we will describe four 
key adaptations of the T.A.G. approach that have already been initiated (see Table 47). The 
adaptations aim to make the T.A.G. approach more feasible and systematic when integrated 
with existing safety assessment techniques.  
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Table 47. Summary of Adaptation of the T.A.G. Approach 
   Enhancement to 
Section Baseline Adaptation Feasibility Systematic  
1 Applying in any Hazard 
Analysis 
Applying specifically in 
Scenario-Based Hazard Analysis 
Yes - 
2 HOT-PIE taxonomy Context-specific HOT-PIE 
taxonomy  
Yes Yes 
3 Original prioritisation factors Review prioritisation factors to 
better represent domain 
Yes - 
4 Free text to develop action 
plan 
Action-item table to track action 
plan 
Yes Yes 
 Applying T.A.G. approach in Multi-Perspective Hazard 
Analysis 
Multi-Perspective Hazard Analysis (MPHA) is the current approach to analyse complicated 
NwSoS in the Singapore Air Force. MPHA consists of four types of hazard analysis, with each 
type catering for a specific context. The details of the MPHA are described in the paper by 
Chan et al that was presented at the 2015 International System Safety Conference. The 
following table summarises the differences between the four types of hazard analysis (see 
Table 48). 
 Table 48. Multi-Perspectives Hazard Analysis  
No. Types of HA Purpose (Extracted from Chan et al) 
1 Top Level 
Mishap Scenarios 
(TLMS) 
The TLMS technique was developed to analyse NwSoS in its entirety for 
top level mishaps and their potential causes. The TLMS findings also 
serve as a hazard prompt list for subsequent techniques. A holistic top-
level perspective is adopted to study the overarching concept of the 
NwSoS operations and capabilities, which spans across multiple 
constituent systems. 
2 Scenario Based 
Hazard Analysis 
(SBHA) 
The scenario perspective examines the safety concerns related to SoS 
operations and interoperability between the constituent systems. Subject 
matter experts and operators need to draw upon their experience and 
expert knowledge to raise pertinent safety concerns associated with 
specific operational scenarios. These scenarios typically involve multiple 
constituent systems, and therefore may require various experts to 
communicate their knowledge of the constituent systems.  
3 Message 
Based Hazard 
Analysis 
(MBHA) 
In the NwSoS, the main interaction is through electronic messages 
communicated between the constituent systems. The MBHA was 
developed to analyse the message interface between the constituent 
systems and how message faults can impact the recipient constituent 
systems, and subsequently the SoS. 
4 Constituent 
System Hazard 
Analysis (CSHA) 
Constituent systems come inherently with hazards and some of these 
hazards may be triggered by the interoperability nature of the SoS. The 
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No. Types of HA Purpose (Extracted from Chan et al) 
 CSHA was developed to analyse each constituent system for potential 
emergent hazards and causal factors when interacting with the SoS. 
After deliberations with the technique experts, it is assessed that the most relevant hazard 
analysis to integrate the T.A.G. approach is the SBHA. This is because SBHA depends largely 
on the experiences of the safety analysts during the safety assessment and the quality of the 
assessment depends on the information available. This is where the T.A.G. approach can 
provide the safety analysts with the tool to manage the epistemic uncertainties that can affect 
the SBHA.  
By choosing the SBHA as the target of implementation, it makes the implementation of the 
T.A.G. approach more feasible and acceptable by the stakeholders. Moving forward, the 
T.A.G. approach would be incorporated into one of the constituent systems (i.e. subsystems 
within the NwSoS) safety assessment and monitored for a few milestones across the project 
lifecycle for at least 6 months to a year. 
 Context-Specific HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
Raising the same concern from the semi-structure interview, both the technique and domain 
experts are concerned that the full list of HOT-PIE taxonomy is not practical for 
implementation. A session was conducted with the relevant stakeholders to trim the taxonomy 
to an initial list of context-specific HOT-PIE causal mechanisms (see Table 49). The list shall 
be used during a SBHA for a planned engineering testing for one portion of the NwSoS. The 
context-specific HOT-PIE taxonomy will be reviewed after three months so that the team will 
not be fixated only by the causal mechanisms that have been selected in the first session. 
 Table 49. Context-Specific HOT-PIE under Scenario Based HA for Engineering Testing 
Primary Secondary Factor Probing questions 
Human  Communication and 
Coordination 
How was the test made known to and communicated to 
the users? 
How are the agencies responsible to carry out the 
mitigation measures being informed? 
 Expertise Are the personnel carrying out the testing identified and 
tagged individually? 
 Ownership Does the test director know his/her term of references? 
Organisation Structure What is the composition of the testing team? 
Is the schedule for the testing realistic? 
 Goals and Expectations Is the intent of the testing made known explicitly? 
 Audit and Control Is there any independent party involved in the testing? 
What are the control mechanisms to ensure proper 
documentation of the testing? 
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Primary Secondary Factor Probing questions 
Technology Engineering Feedback How are technical faults affecting the testing feedback 
timely?  
Process Systematic How are outstanding issues being tracked and resolved? 
How are changes in the testing plan and procedures 
being managed? 
 Level of Autonomy How is the conduct of the testing being administered? 
Who can make changes to the test plan? 
 Risk Management How are users being kept aware of the risk during 
testing? 
 Configuration Control How are hardware and software versions being 
monitored during the duration of the testing? 
Information Documentation How are the test results documented? 
 Standards and Policy What are the policies and orders governing the testing? 
How are incidents supposed to be reported? 
 Evidence Management How is evidence being documented and transferred for 
future usage under the lifecycle? 
Environment Regulatory Control  Is there any configuration control manager? 
How would any deviation during testing be managed? 
 Security How is the testing protected from virus? 
 Operating Condition Are there any pre-requisite conditions before 
conducting the testing? 
By developing a context-specific HOT-PIE taxonomy, it makes the T.A.G. more feasible for 
the stakeholders to apply during hazard analysis. This process of coming out with probing 
questions based on the HOT-PIE categories introduces a systematic way of identifying 
epistemic uncertainties during the safety assessment. The plan is to solicit feedback on the 
usefulness of the context-specific HOT-PIE taxonomy after the first three months and to 
decide if further refinement is needed.    
The evidence that we can make use of the HOT-PIE taxonomy and optimise it by choosing a 
subset that is practically reasonable for the stakeholders, reinforces our goal to develop an 
approach that is feasible and systematic. It is feasible since the taxonomy is optimised for 
practical usage. It is systematic since we can trace the final context-specific list to the original, 
more extensive HOT-PIE taxonomy that has been developed from references in Annex A.  
 Review of Prioritisation Factors  
The third adaption is with regards to the prioritisation factors. After a discussion with the 
domain experts for the NwSoS, the following changes have been made to the prioritisation 
factors to better represent the local context. The changes are highlighted in Figure 87. 
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1. Instead of using the word ‘Criticality’, a more common term in the local context is 
‘Mishap Potential’. The concern is that ‘criticality’ has a different definition in 
software analysis as it denotes different levels of software criticality. In order not to 
be confused, ‘Mishap Potential’ is considered a more precise term to mean the 
probability and severity of a mishap as part of evaluating the risk due to the 
uncertainty.  
2. ‘Feasibility’ replaces ‘resource availability’ as it was felt that ‘feasibility is a word 
that is more commonly used in industry. According to the domain experts, the word 
‘feasibility’ can better represent the assessment of how much resources that are 
available to clarify the uncertainty, as compared to resource availability. 
 
Figure 87. Refined Prioritisation Factors for NwSoS 
By changing these two terms, it is believed that stakeholders will be more receptive of using 
the factors to prioritise the uncertainty analyses after identifying the uncertainties during the 
safety assessment. The prioritisation factors can be used after identifying the uncertainties in 
the ongoing safety assessments of the constituent system acquisition lifecycle.  
However, while it is important to customise the factors for the local context, we need to be 
mindful that ‘criticality’ and ‘resource availability’ have different meanings compared to 
‘mishap potential’ and ‘feasibility’. We have explicitly documented the conscious decision to 
adopt the later, while keeping in mind the original two words as reference. This is important 
as the words ‘mishap potential’ and ‘feasibility’ may not be suitable in other contexts. 
A post implementation review will be initiated after one year of using the prioritisation factors. 
 Action-Item Table for Track Action Plan 
The original intent is to make use of the guided questions to set goals in the form of track and 
address reports. Such textual report, while comprehensive, may not be easily traceable or 
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tracked throughout the system lifecycle. During the discussion with domain and technique 
experts, it was suggested that key issues under the track and address action plan can be 
monitored in the form of a table. This can mirror the way that action items are being tracked 
in current way of doing business in the air force. By using a familiar format, it makes the 
T.A.G. approach easier to be accepted by the safety analysts. Having specific categories under 
the tracking table that follows the format of the guided questions (see Table 50 for an example) 
would also make the process more systematic.  
Table 50. Example of Track and Address Table 
 
Like the prioritisation factors, a post implementation review on the action-item table will be 
conducted after a year of usage.   
 Conclusions 
This chapter aims to evaluate the thesis proposition by (1) verifying if the T.A.G. approach 
does indeed help to identify, document, track and address epistemic uncertainties, as well as 
(2) validating if the T.A.G. approach can be feasibly and systematically applied in industry.  
Verification.  Through the evaluations against the initial requirement (section 7.2) and sharing 
at conferences / workshops (section 7.3), we have demonstrated it is possible to use the T.A.G. 
approach to identify, document, track and address epistemic uncertainties. However, we have 
also observed limitations of the T.A.G. approach during the verification, especially the 
following: 
• The HOTPIE taxonomy is useful to help safety analysts to identify causal condition 
that have yet been considered. However, its usefulness is limited by what has been 
included in the taxonomy. While we have tried to be as diverse as possible, we can 
never be so comprehensive that the taxonomy covers all domains. We must be 
prepared to acknowledge this limitation and continue to keep updating the list on a 
regular basis. Moving forward, we will continue to conduct periodic review on the list 
of causal conditions identified in the HOTPIE taxonomy. 
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• While making the HOTPIE taxonomy comprehensive, the list may grow to a level that 
is not practical to use. Theoretically, we suggest that domain experts may look through 
the original list and discard those that may not be relevant. This may not be a simple 
process as we have assumed the domain experts are provided with some guidelines or 
experiences to carry out this filtering process. Moving forward, we are exploring if the 
full set of taxonomy can be categorised into the groups: compulsory and optional. The 
compulsory group should be included in all T.A.G. approach, while the optional ones 
may be discarded depending on the domain of interest.  
• We have suggested factors to consider when prioritising the uncertainties to focus on 
and introduced a scoring that is based on individual subjective assessment. Like other 
safety assessment techniques, the limitation comes with this subjective assessment, 
which depends on who are the safety analysts present during the assessment and the 
experience level of these safety analysts. There is a danger that the assessment may 
not be consistent or reproducible since it is subjected to whoever is present. This 
limitation also applies to the guided questions that are introduced to help in tracking 
and addressing the epistemic uncertainties. The usefulness of these questions depends 
to a great extent on the knowledge of the safety analysts using the guide. Moving 
forward, we will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the prioritisation factors and 
well as the approach of quantifying the various factors in a more consistent manner. 
• We have provided examples in chapter 5 and 6 to show that it is possible to use the 
T.A.G. approach to complement existing safety assessment techniques. We have 
intentionally chosen STPA, FTA and FMEA techniques as these are the common 
techniques in safety assessment. However, we acknowledge that there are other 
techniques where further customisation may be needed before our T.A.G. approach 
can be integrated to manage epistemic uncertainties. Moving forward, we are looking 
at developing similar processes for other techniques such as Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP) and Common Cause Analysis. 
Validation. While we verify that it is possible to use the T.A.G. approach to complement 
existing safety assessment technique, it is more difficult to validate the approach in the 
industry. Through the semi-structured interview (section 7.4) and preliminary industrial 
application (section 7.5), we have solicited feedback to indirectly show that it is feasible to 
implement the T.A.G. approach. However, there are limitations in our validation approach and 
the key challenges are as follows: 
• During our validation, we have chosen to focus on the domain of military aviation and 
defence systems management for the RSAF since it is the key domain of interest for 
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this research. However, being such a niche domain, the participants for the interview 
would have to be targeted. Since the number of participants is small, any quantitative 
feedback would not be statistically significant, and it is used more as a reference rather 
than a conclusive observation. Moving forward, we intend to continue the validation 
beyond the RSAF, to explore either to solicit feedback from our Army and Navy 
counterparts; or to even share the approach with other air forces in the world. 
• Ideally, to validate the T.A.G. approach, it should be integrated into all the safety 
assessments throughout the system lifecycle from early design concept phase till the 
deployment of the system. Unfortunately, this would take years and even decades for 
some complicated systems; which is not practical as part of our research to observe 
for such an extensive period. Specifically, the pilot implementation for the industry, 
as proposed in section 7.5, would require multiple reviews throughout the years to 
assess their effectiveness in better managing epistemic uncertainties. Realistically, we 
can only solicit anecdotal observations and feedback as much as possible, either 
through a one-time application of the approach in the pilot implementation or request 
the participants to imagine themselves using the T.A.G. approach for their safety 
assessments. Moving forward, we have already derived a systematic way to assess the 
usefulness of the pilot implementation whenever it is being used by safety analysts. 
Such data will be consolidated into the existing database of feedback that we have 
created for further trending and analysis. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions  
 Summary of Thesis Contributions 
This thesis has developed and demonstrated an approach to managing epistemic uncertainties 
that are associated with the underlying models of safety assessment for safety-critical systems. 
This approach is based on three inter-dependent initiatives that aim to identify, document, 
track and address known and unknown uncertainties. Specifically, the research has contributed 
the following:  
• Defined a taxonomy to classify causal mechanisms so as to identify epistemic 
uncertainties and demonstrated an approach that uses the taxonomy to identify 
uncertainties not covered in the original safety assessment (see section 8.1.1) 
• Defined a process to document and prioritise epistemic uncertainties and demonstrated 
an approach that is based on this process to analyse and prioritise uncertainties that 
have been identified in existing safety assessments (see section 8.1.2) 
• Defined guided questions to develop action plans and demonstrated an approach to 
develop actionable goals to track epistemic uncertainties throughout the system 
lifecycle and address them when some thresholds are met (see section 8.1.3) 
 Contributions to Identifying Epistemic Uncertainties 
In chapter 3, we have highlighted that while epistemic uncertainties are inherent in the 
underlying models used in safety assessment, there is no commonly practised approach to 
identifying them. This is reinforced in the literature survey on uncertainty management in 
chapter 2. Our survey shows that uncertainty in safety management is widely acknowledged 
and yet there is no systematic and common industrial practice to identify such uncertainties in 
safety. 
To set the foundation of identifying epistemic uncertainties, we have developed the 
Conceptual Model of System Safety to emphasise that uncertainties can reside in both the safety 
and system models, as well as the Causal Relationships Model of Safety Assessment to help 
locate the uncertainties that reside in the cause-and-effect relationship during hazard 
identification. Through a review of literature related to safety, we have established the HOT-
PIE taxonomy of causal mechanism that comprises six primary causal conditions and fifteen 
secondary causal conditions. The taxonomy serves as a guide to help the user to recognise 
epistemic uncertainties not covered in the original assessment. Since the HOT-PIE taxonomy 
is based on literature research, safety analysts can harness the collective wisdom from other 
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experts, rather than be limited by the experience and expertise of individuals in a safety 
assessment. 
To show the application of HOT-PIE taxonomy, we have used it on safety causal models with 
both system and component viewpoints. In chapter 5, we applied the HOT-PIE taxonomy on 
the Yongwen railway accident on models from system viewpoints to discover four plausible-
but-uncertain causal relationships. In chapter 6, we demonstrate the usefulness of HOT-PIE 
taxonomy on the ARP 4761 example by identifying four plausible-but-uncertain causal 
relationships across different phases of the safety assessment process and over a spectrum of 
primary causal conditions. These uncertainties are linkages among nodes that may or may not 
have prior relationships with each other.  
 Contributions to Document Epistemic Uncertainties 
In chapter 3, we have highlighted that structured documentation of epistemic uncertainties 
reduces bias during safety assessment and reduces the chance of ignoring such uncertainties. 
And yet, in the literature survey, while we came across literature that attempted to define 
uncertainties beyond just safety, such as the Cynefin model, there is no research that focus on 
integrating uncertainty management into existing safety techniques to be applied in the 
industry. 
We have introduced the T.A.G. approach in chapter 4 and deliberately integrated the approach 
into existing safety assessment techniques to show that it is practical to apply the approach in 
the industry. We further demonstrate that the T.A.G. approach can be integrated into the STPA 
technique to analyse the Yongwen railway accident and the FMEA and FTA techniques used 
to analyse the ARP 4761 example. By complementing these three existing safety assessment 
techniques, we have been able to systematically document the epistemic uncertainties 
identified in previous section. Subsequently, we prioritise these uncertainties for analysis 
based on criticality and expected effort, the two factors we defined in chapter 4. Participants 
of the semi-structured interview have fed back that the factors are indeed more useful and 
systematic to help in prioritising the uncertainties, compared to doing the prioritisation in an 
unstructured manner. 
 Contributions to Track and Address Epistemic Uncertainties 
System safety engineering demands a systematic and through-life management of knowledge 
and this is especially applicable to uncertainty management since uncertainty can evolve with 
time. In our review of existing safety management processes and safety standards, there are 
established processes to track hazards across the system life-cycles. However, in most safety 
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assessments, hazards are derived using known causal relationships that can be traced from root 
causes to failure effects.  
Our proposal to manage hazards through-life is novel as we track both the hazards and the 
influence of epistemic uncertainties on the hazards through-life. This approach allows a timely 
response when information related to the epistemic uncertainties becomes available. To 
advocate a continuous through-life management of uncertainty, we have developed guided 
questions based on four factors for safety analysts to consider when they develop their action 
plans to monitor uncertainties: deciding on monitoring technique, forming the monitoring 
activity, setting trigger points and adapting to change. To demonstrate its feasibility, we have 
constructed the action plans in chapter 5 and 6 for the Yongwen railway accident and the ARP 
4761 example respectively to manage epistemic uncertainties through-life. During the semi-
structured interview, participants have fed back that the guided questions help them in 
formulating the action plan to track and address epistemic uncertainties through-life. 
 Overall Conclusions  
In conclusion, we have established an approach that pushes the knowledge frontier during 
safety assessment for safety-critical systems in two specific ways. Firstly, we have created a 
HOT-PIE taxonomy that provides the opportunity for safety analysts to transform unknown 
uncertainties into known uncertainties. The risk of such known uncertainties can then be 
assessed as part of ongoing safety assessment. Secondly, we have introduced the T.A.G. 
approach to track and address known uncertainties systematically to reduce the chance of 
known uncertainties that may be safety-critical from being ignored, as a system is being 
developed throughout its lifecycle.  
While we have shown that it is possible to complement existing safety assessment technique 
using our T.A.G. approach, there are scalability and validity concerns with applying the 
approach. Feedback from peer reviews and interviews raise the issue of scaling the list of 
causal factors in the HOTPIE taxonomy and the list of uncertainties being tracked. Both lists 
may grow to a level that may not be practical to manage realistically as we scale up the usage 
of the approach in large scale system. In terms of validity, our approach can only be evaluated 
comprehensively if it is incorporated into safety assessments right from system conceptual 
design till deployment. Realistically, this is not possible within the duration of our research 
due to industrial limitations and the protracted system acquisition lifecycle that may span many 
years. 
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 Future Work 
From the development, application and feedback on the research, the following areas have 
been identified for future work: 
• Complementing quantitative techniques 
• Complement with IT and Data Analytic Tools 
• Integrating with other Safety Assurance Initiatives 
• Integrating with other Safety Assessment Initiatives  
• Refining through Pilot Implementation  
• Applying beyond Safety  
The following sub-sections provide brief descriptions of these areas. 
 Complementing Quantitative Techniques 
In chapter 2, we have discussed the importance of appreciating the context from which a 
quantitative uncertainty analysis take reference. For example, the “model of the world” in 
Mensing’s approach [57] and the “background knowledge” defined by Aven in his quantitative 
assessment of uncertainty [61]. As this context changes, the validity of the quantitative 
assessment may be affected. 
The T.A.G. approach can be used to complement such quantitative techniques by explicitly 
identifying epistemic uncertainties in these contexts using the HOT-PIE taxonomy as a 
prompter. Subsequently, any epistemic uncertainties associated with these contexts can be 
tracked through-life and reviewed wherever it is suspected that the validity of the quantitative 
assessment may be affected.  
When prioritising the uncertainties to focus on, as highlighted in section 4.3.2.3, applying an 
average of the overall priority score (based on the factors of criticality and expected effort) 
from each safety analyst may produce skew and misleading results. One way to improve the 
T.A.G. approach could be to conduct qualitative discussion and sharing among the safety 
analysts to build consensus in selecting the more important uncertainties to focus on first. 
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 Complementing with Database 
To make the T.A.G. approach more pervasive, future research can consider developing a 
scalable database to allow epistemic uncertainties to be easily documented, stored and tracked 
during a safety assessment. The database should reference the HOT-PIE taxonomy to prompt 
users of potential epistemic uncertainties. Once documented, the epistemic uncertainties can 
be tracked and mobile application can be implemented to notify the user when some triggering 
points are met to address the uncertainties.  
Another possible area of focus is to ride on the tools that are developed for data analytic to 
help in decision making. Data analytics uses software tools to analyse data so as to derive 
conclusions about the information in the data. There is a push for data analytics in the recent 
years as software tools are becoming more accessible and pervasive. If the T.A.G. approach 
can collect sufficient data about the epistemic uncertainties associated with the safety 
assessments across many safety-critical systems, this can potentially be a rich source of 
information for data analytics.  
 Integrating with other Safety Assurance Initiatives 
We have mentioned in chapter 2 that the ways to manage safety assurance include either 
arguing that an uncertainty is not safety critical or developing an approach to reduce the 
uncertainty to a level that is acceptable. T.A.G. approach can be used when epistemic 
uncertainties that affect safety assurance need to be tracked through-life after a safety 
assessment. This is important as the uncertainties evolve, the level of safety assurance may 
change depending on how much unknown regarding the safety assessment has become 
available. For example, in the “assured safety argument” proposed by Kelly and Hawkin [72], 
the assurance case can reference the epistemic uncertainties discovered by a T.A.G. approach 
as part of its arguments and evidence.     
 Integrating with other Safety Assessment Initiatives  
The advantage of the T.A.G. approach is that it provides a generic process flow (see section 
4.3) that can be easily adopted on other safety assessment initiatives. Specifically, in the 
defence industry, there are many opportunities to use the T.A.G. approach to complement with 
other ongoing initiatives to enhance safety assessment for complicated systems. For example, 
the relevant authorities can consider integrating the T.A.G. approach in the following ongoing 
enhancement to safety assessment:  
• ASEMS Proportionality Assessment (UK MoD). The intent of the study in the UK 
MoD is to ensure that the extent of managing and assuring the safety of a system is 
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proportionate to the risks involved. Using the same argument, the extent of tracking 
an epistemic uncertainty should be proportionate to the assessed risks. Moving 
forward, a study can be conducted to synergise the efforts between uncertainties 
prioritisation under the T.A.G. approach and proportionality assessment introduced in 
ASEMS.  
• Change Impact Analysis (Singapore Air Force). Another area where the T.A.G. 
approach can be applied is on the Change Impact Analysis (CIA) that is developed to 
complement existing Multi-Perspective Hazard Analysis (see section 7.5). The CIA is 
used to systematically characterise changes in complicated safety-critical systems so 
as to assess the extent that a change may proliferate to other subsystems. This would 
determine to what extent the four types of hazard analysis need to be conducted due 
to the change. The T.A.G. approach can be used to monitor epistemic uncertainties 
that concern the CIA, as such uncertainties can affect the extent of conducting the four 
types of hazard analysis.   
 Refining through Pilot Implementation  
As mentioned in section 7.4, a pilot implementation of the T.A.G. approach may be preferred 
to demonstrate its benefit without causing too much disruption to the established way of 
conducting safety assessment. With the observations from chapter 7, the pilot implementation 
can be more targeted and further reviews can focus on concerns that have already been 
surfaced in chapter 7 (such as evaluating the context-specific HOT-PIE taxonomy and refining 
the prioritisation factors). Besides selecting the scope of the pilot study, proper communication 
with the stakeholders on the intent and content of the T.A.G. approach is necessary before 
applying the T.A.G. approach. Periodic progress reviews are also important so as to introduce 
timely refinement.  
 Applying beyond Safety   
One possible area to apply the T.A.G. approach beyond safety is for security assessment. This 
has also been surfaced before during the sharing of T.A.G. approach in conferences and 
workshops. Although security assessment is also a type of risk analysis, the potential causes 
of security concerns can be different from safety. Hence, the HOT-PIE taxonomy needs to be 
reviewed to encompass security concerns. For example, further research is needed to integrate 
key security considerations (e.g. vulnerability, denial of service, social engineering) into the 
six primary causal conditions of the HOT-PIE taxonomy. 
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 CODA 
As technology advances and systems get more complicated, safety assessment techniques have 
to evolve so as to model multiple viewpoints in order to be comprehensive. For example, the 
STPA hazard analysis technique is a method to include multiple viewpoints (e.g. component, 
operation, organisation and government) in a safety assessment model. As such a complicated 
model is being developed within the limitation of existing resources (such as time and 
manpower), it can exacerbate the presence of epistemic uncertainties during safety assessment.  
For example, while the STPA provides the means to consider organisational viewpoints, the 
safety analysts may not have the experience or necessary information to assess the safety 
concerns at the organisational level (e.g. concerns relating to organisation policies and 
standards). As a result, this may create more epistemic uncertainty during the safety 
assessment as the analysts attempt to make decisions based on the assessed risk taking into 
consideration organisational issues.  
While others focus on developing safety causal models to better represent the real world, we 
took a more pragmatic approach by targeting the possible presence of uncertainties (i.e. both 
unknown unknowns and known unknowns) associated with the underlying models in safety 
assessment that can become safety-critical in the lifetime of the system.  
Managing epistemic uncertainties in the underlying models of safety assessment will require 
time and resources to identify, document, track and address these uncertainties. Although 
effort to manage uncertainties into the future may seem not to immediately affect the risk 
assessment, it affects the confidence in the assessed risk. There is the unspoken danger that 
such uncertainties can become one of the contributing safety-critical hazards down the system 
lifecycle, such as the fate of the CHALLENGER space shuttle as illustrated in chapter 1. If 
one cannot confidently accept an uncertainty as not safety-critical, a reasonable attempt to 
capture and manage such uncertainty can be beneficial in keeping the system safer.  
This has motivated us to review the current approach of treating epistemic uncertainties and 
embark on an endeavour to reduce the undesired effects of epistemic uncertainties associated 
with safety assessment. The T.A.G approach is a plausible product to complement existing 
safety assessment techniques to provide a pragmatic balance between the desire to eliminate 
uncertainties and the practical limitation of managing such uncertainties.  
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Annex A – Literature Referenced in HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
No. Title Author Description 
1 Failure in safety-
critical systems 
[154]  
C. Johnson Barrier analysis: assumes that hazard comes into contact with 
target because barriers or controls were unused or inadequate. 
The method analyses people, process and technology 
measures taken to prevent target from affected by hazard. 
Change analysis: Determine if abnormal work practices 
contribute to the cause of adverse occurrence. Deviation from 
normal operation may be intentional but it is difficult to 
predict the impact of the change.  
2 An Accident 
Causation Analysis 
and Taxonomy 
(ACAT) model of 
complex industrial 
system from both 
system safety and 
control theory 
perspectives [155] 
W. Li et al. The ACAT model uses a combination of system factors and 
control functions to form a matrix model for accident 
causation analysis and classification. In the model, complex 
systems are decomposed into six components, namely 
machine, man, management, information, resources and 
environment. From control theory perspective, actuator, 
sensor, controller and communication are defined as part of 
the control function. 
3 IS/IT project 
failures: a review of 
the extant literature 
for deriving a 
taxonomy of failure 
factors [156] 
Y. K. Dwivedi 
et al. 
The research collates and classifies existing literature review 
to understand common failure factors in Information System / 
Information Technology projects. It provides a list of factors 
and attempts to categorise them by geographical location. 
4 FRAM, the 
functional resonance 
analysis method: 
modelling complex 
socio-technical 
systems [157] 
E. Hollnagel The Functional Resonance Analysis Model (FRAM) defines a 
systemic framework to model complex systems for accident 
analysis purposes. FRAM uses a non-linear accident model 
based on the assumption that accidents result from unexpected 
combinations (resonance) of normal performance variability. 
It identifies essential system functions by characterizing them 
using six basic parameters (Input, Output, Time, Control, 
Precondition, and Resource) 
5 The human factors 
analysis and 
classification 
system—HFACS 
[146] 
S. A. Shappell 
et al. 
The HFACS framework is based on Reason’s ‘Swiss Chess’ 
model and has been developed to provide a general human 
error framework around which investigative methods can be 
designed and accident database can be restructured. The 
framework has been used within the military, commercial, 
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and general aviation sectors to systematically examine 
underlying human causal factors and to improve aviation 
accident investigations. It comprises four levels of failure: 1) 
Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe 
Supervision, and 4) Organisational Influences. 
6 Handbook of human 
systems integration 
[158] 
H. R. Booher Human Systems Integration (HSI) is an integrating discipline 
designed to help move business and engineering cultures 
toward a more people-technology orientation. A wide range 
of tools, techniques, and technologies have been developed to 
integrate human factors into engineering systems. For this to 
be effective, HSI outlines the principles and methods that can 
be used to help integrate people, technology, and 
organisations with a common objective toward designing, 
developing, and operating systems effectively and efficiently.  
7 Patient safety: latent 
risk factors [159] 
M. V. 
Beuzekom et 
al. 
Factors that promote errors may not be directly visible in the 
working environment. The underlying latent causes are 
categorised into a limited number of classes known as the 
Latent Risk Factors (LRFs). Understanding how LRFs affect 
safety can help to design more effective control measures 
8 Risk management in 
a dynamic society: a 
modelling problem 
[160] 
J. Rasmussen The research argues that risk management must be modelled 
by cross-disciplinary studies, considering risk management to 
be a control problem and serving to represent the control 
structure involving all levels of society for each particular 
hazard category. The socio-technical system includes several 
levels ranging from legislators, over managers and work 
planners, to system operators. This system is stressed by a fast 
pace of technological change, by an increasingly aggressive, 
competitive environment, and by changing regulatory practices 
and public pressure. 
9 Causal mechanisms 
in the social sciences 
[142] 
Hedstrom & 
Ylikoski 
Provides an account of the important philosophical and social 
science concepts to the mechanism approach. It focuses on 
how the idea of causal mechanism has been applied in the 
social sciences such as political science and criminology. The 
literature covers factors from the human, organisation and 
environment perspectives. 
10 Addressing enablers 
in layers of 
protection analysis 
[161] 
P. Baybutt Enablers are events and conditions that do not directly cause 
the hazard scenarios but are required to be present or active 
for the scenario to proceed. Such enablers can be classified 
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broadly into human actions, equipment failures and external 
events. 
11 Near miss reporting 
in the chemical 
process industry 
[162] 
Schaaf Eindhoven Classification Model: Use to classify causal 
factors into three main categories of failures (technical, 
organisational and human) for detailed analysis 
12 A taxonomy of 
network challenges 
[163] 
Cetinkaya & 
Sterbenz 
Taxonomy of network challenges focus on adverse events 
triggering faults that eventually result in service failures. 
Understanding these challenges accordingly is essential for 
the improvement of the current networks and for designing 
future internet architectures. The classification of network 
challenges includes natural, human-made, dependency and 
technology factors. 
13 Cognitive reliability 
and error analysis 
method (CREAM) 
[164] 
E. Hollnagel CREAM consists of a method, a classification scheme and a 
model to analyse human reliability and erroneous actions. The 
underlying model makes a distinction between causes, known 
as genotypes, and effects, known as phenotypes. There are 3 
categories of causes, namely human psychology, technology 
and organisation. The effects would be different error modes. 
14 The balance theory 
and the work system 
model [165] 
P. Carayon The work system model in the balance theory provides a way 
of describing all the elements of work that affect workers and 
outcomes. According to the model, tasks are performed by a 
person who uses tools and technologies; the tasks are 
performed in a physical environment and under organizational 
conditions. Hence, the five elements of work are individual, 
tasks, tools and technologies, physical environment and 
organisational conditions. 
15 Job strain, effort-
reward imbalance 
and employee well-
being: a large-scale 
cross-sectional study 
[166] 
Jonge et al This study investigated the effects of the Job Demand-Control 
(JD-C) Model and the Effort-Reward Imbalance (ERI) Model 
on employee well-being. Part of a larger scientific program that 
aims at understanding the contribution of social and 
psychological factors to human health and disease. It primarily 
focuses on the human and environment conditions. 
16 Man and machine - 
Systems for safety 
[167] 
E. Edwards In the S.H.E.L.L. model, each person (centre Liveware) is 
applied to and interacted with the other four components 
(Hardware, Software, Environment and Liveware). It is 
believed that a mismatch between the centre Liveware and 
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any other four components will potentially lead to a cause of 
human error. 
17 MIS problems and 
failures: a socio-
technical 
perspective, part II: 
the application of 
socio-technical 
theory [168] 
Bostrom & 
Heinen 
The research introduces socio-technical interacting classes to 
counter the issue of not having a systematic view to analyse 
socio-technical issues. These classes include technology and 
tasks in the technical system and the structure and people in 
the social system. 
18 Engineering a safer 
world: Systems 
thinking applied to 
safety [66] 
N. G. Leveson The STAMP model is an accident causality model that is based 
on system and control theories. The model is constructed from 
three basic concepts: constraints, hierarchical levels of control, 
and process models. The method focuses on issues related to 
technical, human and organisation factors in complex socio-
technical system. 
19 Fundamentals of 
ergonomics in 
theory and practice 
[169] 
J. R. Wilson Ergonomic refers to the theoretical and fundamental 
understanding of human behaviour and performance in 
purposeful interacting socio-technical systems, and the 
application of that understanding to design of interactions in 
the context of real settings. It considers factors that interact 
with an individual, including organisation, logistics, 
environment, task, technology interface, context, temporal and 
cooperation. 
20 Work system theory: 
overview of core 
concepts, 
extensions, and 
challenges for the 
future [170] 
S. Alter The theory provides a static view of a current (or proposed) 
system in operation and a dynamic view of how a system 
evolves over time through planned change and unplanned 
adaptations. The work system framework represents a work 
system in terms of nine elements: processes and activities, 
participants, information, technologies, products/services, 
customers, environment, infrastructure and strategies. 
21 Sociotechnical 
attributes of safe and 
unsafe work systems 
[171] 
Kleiner et al Theoretical and practical approaches to safety based on socio-
technical system principles focus on the intersection between 
social, organisational, technical and work process factors. The 
literature discusses three approaches to analyse and design 
complex STS, namely human-systems integration, macro-
ergonomics and safety climate. 
  
259 
No. Title Author Description 
22 A taxonomy of 
situation awareness 
errors [80] 
M. R. Endsley The research is conducted on aircrew situation awareness. For 
aircrew, while some of these incidents may represent failures 
in actual decision making (action selection), a high percentage 
of these errors are actually errors in situation awareness. 
These errors are categorised according to the ability to 
perceive, comprehend and project situation. The taxonomy 
focuses on both information and human factors that affect the 
situational awareness of an individual.  
23 The job demands-
resources model: 
State of the art [172] 
Bakker & 
Demerouti 
The model specifies risk factors associated with job stress. 
These factors can be classified in two general categories (i.e. 
job demands and job resources) and can be applied to various 
occupational settings. It primarily focuses on human factors. 
24 The centrality of 
work [173] 
Dejours & 
Deranty 
The “centrality of work” is based on the “psychodynamic” 
approach to work. It distinguishes between four separate but 
related ways in which work can be said to be central: 
psychologically, in terms of gender relations, social-politically 
and epistemically. It considers factors like work engagement, 
psychic defence and worker behaviour. 
25 Modelling, 
metamodeling, and 
taxonomy of system 
failures [174] 
J. P. van Gigch Taxonomy of failures is important so that system analysts, 
engineers, designers, and managers may one day agree upon a 
standard system of labelling, coding, counting, and measuring 
failures.  Classification and measurement are prelude to the 
discovery of patterns and leads to understanding, prediction, 
and avoidance. The types of failure in the taxonomy include 
structure, technology, regulation, rationality, behaviour and 
evolution.  
26 Reason’s Human 
error theory [175] 
J. Reason  In the “Swiss cheese” model of human error, Reason describes 
four levels of human failure, each influencing the next: 
Organisational influences, unsafe supervision, precondition for 
unsafe acts and unsafe acts. For the human errors, the focus is 
on slip, lapse and mistake potentially committed by an 
individual. 
27 Promoting safety in 
the oil industry 
[176] 
Wagenaar et al The TRIPOD framework is used to analyse disturbances to safe 
operation based on an underlying model of causation. Assume 
incident is caused by local triggering factors known as general 
failure types: hardware (HW): design, maintenance 
management, operating procedures, error-enforcing 
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conditions, housekeeping, incompatible goals, communication, 
organisation, training and defence planning. 
28 Macroergonomics: 
analysis and design 
of work systems 
[177] 
B. M. Kleiner Macroergonomics is the design of work systems which focuses 
on organization-system interaction. A work system comprises 
two or more people working together (i.e. personnel sub-
system), interacting with technology (i.e. technological sub-
system) within an organizational system that is characterized 
by an internal environment (both physical and cultural) and 
external environment. 
29 Towards 
standardisation of no 
fault found 
taxonomy [178] 
Khan et al The research attempts to standardise the taxonomy 
surrounding the phenomena commonly known as No Fault 
Found. It classifies NFF conditions under organisational, 
built-in tests, integration and technical intermittent.  
30 Management 
Oversight and Risk 
Tree-MORT [179] 
W.G. Johnson MORT comprises a fault tree that serves as a checklist to 
analyse potential causes either due to management failure or a 
failure in the technical control. The fault tree considers factors 
like technology, process and human. 
31 A failure modes and 
mechanisms naming 
taxonomy [147] 
O’Halloran et 
al 
The taxonomy is developed to improve the accuracy of 
reliability analyses during the early stages of design. It aims to 
help analyses techniques such as FMECA and FTA by 
providing a hierarchical failure mode and mechanism 
taxonomy and the ability to correctly classify failures analyses 
in reliability engineering. The taxonomy focuses primarily on 
technical properties and takes reference from Failure 
Mode/Mechanism Distributions (FMD) documentation, such 
as the FMD-2016. 
32 System of systems 
acquisition trade-
offs [149] 
Burton, Paige, 
Poulding and 
Smith  
The Defence Lines of Development (DLoD) components (i.e. 
Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Concepts & 
Doctrine, Organisation, Information and Logistics) are 
fundamental components to guide military through life 
capability management for the UK Ministry of Defence 
33 Defence capability 
development manual 
[150] 
D. J. Hurley The Fundamental Inputs to Capability from the Department of 
Defence in Australia are Organisation, Command and 
Management, Personnel, Collective Training, Major Systems, 
Facilities and Training, Supplies, Support and Industry. 
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34 Joint publication 1-
02 - Department of 
Defence dictionary 
of military and 
associated terms 
[151] 
S. A. Fry The DOTLMPF from the United States Department of Defence 
refers to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, 
Materiel, Personnel, Facilities and Policy.   
35 Toward a Capability 
Engineering Process 
[152] 
M. Lizotte et al The PRICIE from the Canada Department of Defence refers to 
Personnel and Leadership; Research and Development, 
Infrastructure, Environment and Organization; Concepts and 
Doctrine; Information Management and Technology; 
Equipment and Support; 
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Annex B – Goal Setting Guide 
Target Uncertainty: < Describe the 
targeted uncertainty here > 
Structural: < e.g. platform, process, routines, reviews, 
milestones > 
Behavioural: < e.g. attitude, mindset, soft-skill, 
experience-based, anticipation, acknowledgement 
> 
Relational: < e.g. communication, 
dialogue, collaboration, visibility, 
metaphors > 
1: Track 
Sensors  
1a: Decide 
Monitoring 
Technique – What 
shall we track? 
Track by process: e.g. periodic review 
Track by incident: e.g. monitor threshold 
Determine technique to track causal conditions 
dependency 
Track by chance (e.g. like hazard logging) 
Track by proper planning (e.g. like hazard 
tracking system) 
Track by separate observer 
Track by involved actors 
 1b: Form 
Monitoring Activity 
– How do we track? 
Create sensing process and review gates 
Create structure of reporting observations 
Create measurements to quantify and/or qualify 
uncertainty 
Create resources (e.g. time, infrastructure, funding)  
Scrutinise iterative deviation, prototype, demo (e.g. trial, 
test) 
 Use of soft skills (e.g. flexibility, tenacity, 
resilience. optimism) 
Create opportunities to be sensitive and caution 
about specific conditions 
Create positive tension among specialists with 
diverse perspectives 
Create opportunities for collaboration (e.g. 
workshop, scenario building) 
Create engagement opportunities to 
communicate among stakeholders 
Established channels to escalate 
observations (e.g. proactive identification 
vs fire-fighting) 
Establish dedicated roles and 
responsibilities 
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Target Uncertainty: < Describe the 
targeted uncertainty here > 
Structural: < e.g. platform, process, routines, reviews, 
milestones > 
Behavioural: < e.g. attitude, mindset, soft-skill, 
experience-based, anticipation, acknowledgement 
> 
Relational: < e.g. communication, 
dialogue, collaboration, visibility, 
metaphors > 
Establish areas of certainty separately from uncertainty 
2: Address 
Responses 
2a: Set Trigger 
Points – When and 
how shall we decide 
to respond? 
Establish threshold and triggering limit 
Establish decision making protocol and governance 
Decide on quality of evidence (e.g. data, subjective 
judgement)  
 
Develop decision-making skills 
Create atmosphere of trust and cooperation to 
build consensus 
Establish risk appetite (e.g. higher threshold treats 
observation as one-off or lower threshold treats it 
as critical)   
Use metaphor to conceptualise and 
orientate decision making 
Manage stakeholders’ awareness and 
expectations (e.g. operators, end users, 
contractors, manufacturer) 
Determine composition of decision-makers 
(e.g. individual vs collective) 
 2b: Adapt to Change 
– What are the 
possible responses? 
Decide on reach and depth (e.g. localised, system-wide) 
Decide on duration of response (e.g. one-time, longer 
term) 
Decide on the additional resources required 
Decide on respond urgency (e.g. reactive in 
nature, proactive plan already in place) 
Decide on response agility (e.g. iterative 
changes that move in the right direction of 
safety, less responsive but absolute changes 
by getting full consensus) 
Note: The three categories of structural, behavioural and relational are complementary such that an initiative can encompass characteristics from one or more of the categories.  
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Annex C – Sequence of Events for Yongwen Railway 
Accident 
 
Time Event 
19:30 Lightning strike causes fuse to blow in the power supply circuit of the data acquisition 
drive unit at the Wenzhou South Station Train Control Center (TCC).  
Due to a design flaw, the output signal at the TCC will continue to report the status of the 
track prior to the fused being blown. Hence, even when the rails were occupied after the 
fuse was blown, the TCC output continued to indicate that the track was not occupied 
(which is the state prior to the fuse being blown). 
Lightning also caused sporadic communication failure between track circuit 5829AG and 
TCC, which resulted in corrupted signal being sent from 5829AG. This resulted in a red 
warning on the computer terminal in the TCC. The red warning implied that the track was 
either occupied or in a failure state. 
19:39 Watchman in TCC noticed the red warning and reported the observation to the train 
dispatcher at Shanghai railway bureau. Watchman also informed the signalling engineer 
to carry out inspection and maintenance. 
19:45 Signalling engineers replaced some transmitters that communicate with 5829AG in TCC 
without putting the equipment out of service.  
19:54 According to the regulations, train dispatcher turned TCC into the emergency control 
mode. In the emergency control mode, the autonomous control by each train shall be 
deactivated and control is centralised managed by the TCC.  
20:09 Train dispatcher informed D3115 driver about the red warning observed at the TCC. Train 
dispatcher also advised D3115 driver to switch to visual driving mode and continue driving 
if the train stops because of missing signals. The driver acknowledged the advice from the 
train dispatcher. 
20:12 D301 stopped at Yongwen Station (the station before Wenzhou South Station) waiting for 
the signals to proceed. The train had been delayed by 36 minutes. At 20:14, D3115 left 
Yongwen Station. 
20:17 Train dispatcher informed D3115 driver to switch to visual driving mode and drive at a 
speed below 20 km/h when the passing signal was red. 
20:21 Due to the track circuit failure, the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system on D3115 
activated the automatic braking function. D3115 stopped in the faulted 5829AG track 
section. From 20:21 to 20:28, the D3115 driver had failed 3 times to start the train due to 
the automatic braking function in place. 
20:22-
27 
Due to communication failure from the lightning strike, D3115 driver had failed 6 time in 
his attempt to contact the train dispatcher and the watchman in TCC had failed 3 times to 
contact D3115 driver. 
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Time Event 
20:24 D301 left Yongwen station for Wenzhou South Station. 
20:26 Train dispatcher asked the watchman in Wenzhou South Station about D3115 and the 
watchman replied, “D3115 is close to the faulted track section but the driver is out of 
reach, I will continue to contact him.” 
20:27 Watchman reached the driver of D3115, and the driver reported, “the train is 3 block 
sections to the Wenzhou South Station, but I failed to switch to visual driving mode due to 
abnormal track signals. I cannot reach the train dispatcher because the communication 
system has no signal and I will try again.” 
20:28 Driver of D3115 failed twice to contact the dispatcher.  
20:29 D3115 succeeded in starting the train by switching to the visual driving mode. 
20:29 Engineer in Wenzhou South Station tried to warn the driver of D301 about the presence of 
D3115. At the same time, D301 entered the faulted track section behind D3115. The driver 
of D301 saw the slowly moving D3115 and launched emergency brake. 
20:30 D301 travelling at the speed of 99km/h collided with D3115 travelling at the speed of 
16km/h at track circuit 5829AG. 
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Annex D – Chapter 5 STPA-TAG: Prioritisation of 
Observations 2, 3 & 4 
D.1. Uncertainty Observation 2: Infrastructure Support by Shanghai 
Railway Bureau  
The CRMSA model for uncertainty observation 2 is reproduced in Figure 88. The responses 
to the guided questions from section 5 of the T.A.G. approach user guide is shown in Table 
51. 
 
Figure 88 Uncertainty in the Infrastructure Support by Shanghai Railway Bureau 
 
Table 51. Responses to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 2 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
May not be directly. But poor infrastructure support can reduce the quality of 
the TCC equipment and indirectly lead to equipment failure or not operating 
safely as intended. 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Not having reliable communication in the TCC equipment can be dangerous to 
operation. 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
No safety causal model involved 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
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Factors Questions 
May potentially be complicated to understand the infrastructure support policy 
and actual implementation between shanghai railway bureau and TCC 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
Unknown infrastructure support model. Need to find out more. 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
No safety causal model involved. 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
Past infrastructure support document should be available but may not be easily 
obtainable. 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
Types of infrastructure support should be following standard policies and 
orders. 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
This is a new system link between shanghai railway bureau and TCC to be 
investigated. 
Resource Availability: Assess the resource availability of knowledge related to the target from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
May need to gain access to information regarding infrastructure support under 
the Yongwen railway system. No information immediately available. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Depends on how much time needed for the request information to be available. 
From the responses to the guided questions, we assess the 
criticality, complexity, novelty, and resource availability of 
managing the epistemic uncertainty about level of technical 
infrastructure support to provide reliable communication for 
the TCC equipment by Shanghai railway bureau. The expected 
effort is calculated from the average score of complexity, 
novelty and resource availability. Based on criticality and expected effort, we plotted the 
uncertainty action on the prioritisation matrix chart (see Figure 89). 
Factors Score 
Criticality  0.4 
Complexity 0.2 
Novelty 0.2 
Resource 0.7 
Expected effort 0.37 
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Figure 89 Uncertainty Observation 2 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
We indicate on the bottom left quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.4 criticality 
and 0.37 expected effort. This is the ‘low hanging fruit’ quadrant, which means that 
stakeholders should consider allocating resources on the uncertainty actions regarding the 
infrastructure support by Shanghai railway bureau on TCC equipment only when there are still 
resources available after focusing on the high criticality issues. 
D.2. Uncertainty Observation 3: Software Algorithm during Signal 
Abnormality  
The CRMSA model for uncertainty observation 3 is reproduced in Figure 90. The responses 
to the guided questions from section 5 of the T.A.G. approach user guide is shown in Table 
52. 
 
Figure 90 Uncertainty in the Role of Software during Signal Abnormality 
Table 52. Responses to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 3 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
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Factors Questions 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
Very likely, since component failure will most likely lead to this fault. 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Passing wrong signal can lead to serious harm, especially collision 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
Fairly complex, unsure how the software algorithm that controls the train 
movement can affect other software or hardware components.  
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
Fairly complex, unsure if the software can affect other system components 
when malfunction.  
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
Unknown software algorithm. Unknown if any fail-safe algorithm has been 
implemented. Need to find out more. 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
No in-depth knowledge about the software. 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
Past software support document should be available but may not be easily 
obtainable. 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
Software algorithm and support should be following standard documentation 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
This is a fairly new investigation to focus on the software algorithm. 
Resource Availability: Assess the resource availability of knowledge related to the target from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
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Factors Questions 
May need software experts to support the investigation. No information 
immediately available. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Depends on how much time needed for the request information to be available. 
 From the responses to the guided questions, we assess the 
criticality, complexity, novelty, and resource availability of 
managing the epistemic uncertainty about the ability to use 
software to create failed-safe algorithm or highlight potential 
abnormality when false signals are received. The expected 
effort is calculated from the average score of complexity, 
novelty and resource availability. Based on criticality and expected effort, we plotted the 
uncertainty action on the prioritisation matrix chart (see Figure 91). 
 
Figure 91 Uncertainty Observation 3 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
We indicate on the top right quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.9 criticality 
and 0.67 expected effort. This is the ‘pay more attention’ quadrant, which means that 
stakeholders should consider allocating more resources on the uncertainty actions regarding 
the plausible use of software to create failed-safe algorithm or highlight potential abnormality 
when false signals are received at the TCC. 
D.3. Uncertainty Observation 4: Human Intervention during Signal 
Abnormality 
The CRMSA model for uncertainty observation 5 is reproduced in Figure 92. The responses 
to the guided questions from section 5 of the T.A.G. approach user guide is shown in Table 
53. 
Factors Score 
Criticality 0.9 
Complexity 0.7 
Novelty 0.6 
Resource 0.7 
Expected effort 0.67 
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Figure 92 Uncertainty about Human Interrupt during Signal Abnormality 
Table 53. Responses to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 4 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
Very likely, if the level of oversight and autonomy are not set to a safe level 
and not validated with all foreseeable scenarios.  
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Wrong signals and movement authorities can lead to catastrophic collisions.  
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
Need to have an in-depth appreciation about the human-machine interface and 
integration between the TCC and the train to find out the underlying causal 
relationships.  
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
Need to have an in-depth appreciation about the human-machine interface and 
integration between the two system components: TCC and the train 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
Documented MMI should be available but the actual operational practice 
would need to be discovered. Need to find out more. 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
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Factors Questions 
Machine operation is based on past experiences, but not the human-machine 
interactions. 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
Need to find out more about the human-machine interactions.  
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
Potential to take reference from available literature about human-machine 
interactions 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
Interviews may not to be conducted with the operators.  
Resource: Assess the resource availability related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
No special skills needed, focus on governance and processes. Need manpower 
to conduct interviews. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Depends on how much time needed for the request information to be available. 
May need to conduct interview and understand more about actual operation 
practice. 
From the responses to the guided questions, we assess the 
criticality, complexity, novelty, and resource availability of 
managing the epistemic uncertainty about the extent of human 
interrupt during autonomous operation and the possibility of 
human oversight in the process of handling abnormality, such 
as sending moving authorities when it is unsafe. The expected 
effort is calculated from the average score of complexity, novelty and resource availability. 
Based on criticality and expected effort, we plotted the uncertainty action on the prioritisation 
matrix chart (see Figure 93). 
Factors Score 
Criticality 0.8 
Complexity 0.6 
Novelty 0.5 
Resource 0.6 
Expected effort 0.57 
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Figure 93 Uncertainty Observation 5 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
We indicate on the top right quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.8 criticality 
and 0.57 expected effort. This is the ‘pay more attention’ quadrant, which means that 
stakeholders should consider allocating more resources on the uncertainty actions regarding 
the extent of human interrupt during autonomous operation and the possibility of human 
oversight in the process of handling abnormality, such as sending moving authorities when it 
is unsafe. 
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Annex E – Chapter 6 FTA-TAG: Prioritisation of 
Observations 2 
The epistemic uncertainty is about the logic error in the BSCU command messages. The 
answers to the guided questions from the T.A.G. approach user guide is shown in Table 54. 
Table 54. Answers to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 2 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
May not be often as it happens only when abnormal messages are sent. Need 
information on other unintended messages. 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Can potentially lead to the loss of brake functions. 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
No safety causal model involved. 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
Complex understanding of the messages that can be communicate with the 
BSCU from other systems. 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
It follows conventional appreciation of communication protocols. 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
No safety causal model involved 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
Not new but need to research on the possible messages communicated. 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
Not new model type. 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
  
276 
Factors Questions 
Not sure if there are individuals with experience in data communication. 
Resource: Assess the resource availability related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
No specialised skill set required but need the interconnect specification for the 
messages. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Yes, there should be sufficient time to find out the information. 
From the answers to the guided questions, we assess the criticality, complexity, novelty, and 
resource availability of managing the epistemic uncertainty 
about the logic error in the BSCU command messages. The 
expected effort is calculated from the average score of 
complexity, novelty and resource availability. Based on 
criticality and expected effort, we plotted the uncertainty 
action on the prioritisation matrix chart (see Figure 94). 
 
Figure 94 Uncertainty Observations Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
We indicate on the top right quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.7 criticality 
and 0.7 expected effort. For this quadrant, stakeholders should consider putting in resources 
to manage this uncertainty since it is critical and the expected effort is high. 
 
 
Factors Score 
Criticality  0.7 
Complexity 0.8 
Novelty 0.7 
Resource 0.7 
Expected effort 0.7 
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Annex F – Wheel Brake System Description 
The Wheel Brake System is installed on the two main landing gears. Braking on the main gear 
wheels is used to provide safe retardation of the aircraft during taxiing and landing phases, and 
in the event of a rejected take-off. The wheel brake system is shown in Figure 95.  
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Figure 95. Wheel Break System (WBS) Components Breakdown 
The wheel brakes also prevent unintended aircraft motion when parked and may be used to 
provide differential braking for aircraft directional control. A secondary function of the wheel 
brake system is to stop main gear wheel rotation upon gear retraction. 
Braking on the ground is commanded either manually, via brake pedals, or automatically 
(autobrake) without the need for pedal application. The Autobrake function allows the pilot to 
prearm the deceleration rate prior to takeoff or landing. Autobrake is only available with the 
NORMAL braking system. 
The eight main gear wheels have multi-disc carbon brakes. Based on the requirement that loss 
of all wheel braking is less probable than 5E-7 per flight, a design decision was made that each 
wheel has a brake assembly operated by two independent sets of hydraulic pistons. One set is 
operated from the GREEN hydraulic supply and is used in the NORMAL braking mode. The 
Alternate Mode is on standby and is selected automatically when the NORMAL system fails. 
It is operated independently using the BLUE hydraulic power supply and is backed by an 
accumulator which is also used to drive the parking brake. The accumulator supplies the 
ALTERNATE system in the EMERGENCY braking mode, when the BLUE supply is lost and 
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the NORMAL mode is not available. Switch-over is automatic under various failure conditions 
or can be manually selected. Reduction of GREEN pressure below a threshold value, either 
from loss of GREEN supply itself or from its removal by the BSCU due to the presence of 
faults, causes an automatic selector to connect the BLUE supply to the ALTERNATE brake 
system. An anti-skid facility is available in both the NORMAL and ALTERNATE modes and 
operates at all speeds greater than 2 meters per second. 
In the NORMAL braking mode, all eight wheels are individually braked from their own servo 
valves, which are also used to apply anti-skid. In the ALTERNATE mode, a dual metering 
valve provides a low-pressure hydraulic braking input via four servo valves which provide the 
antiskid function to four pairs of wheels. Operation of the ALTERNATE system is precluded 
when the NORMAL system is in use. 
In the NORMAL mode, the brake pedal position is electrically fed to a braking computer. This 
in turn produces corresponding control signals to the brakes. In addition, this computer 
monitors various signals which denote certain critical aircraft and system states, to provide 
correct brake functions and improve system fault tolerance, and generates warnings, 
indications and maintenance information to other systems. This computer is accordingly 
named the Braking System Control Unit (BSCU). It automatically provides the following 
functions. 
a. Takeover of manual braking (brake pedals), or automatic controls (engagement of 
Autobrake, autopilot commands during CAT IIIb landing) 
b. Control of interfaces with other aircraft systems (Editor’s Note: Interfaces with 
other systems may include the hydraulic system, the brake temperature monitoring 
system, etc.) 
c. Generation of braking commands, according to commands received and the status 
of the system  
d. Braking regulation in order to avoid skidding of the main wheels 
e. Transmission of information (indications, lights, warnings, etc.) to the flight deck 
and to the various aircraft computers concerning the BSCU status 
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Annex G – Chapter 6 FTA-TAG: Action Plan of 
Observation 2   
The action plan is formulated by answering a series of questions using the T.A.G. approach 
user guide. The details are reproduced here in Table 55. 
Table 55. Guide to Develop Action Plan for Uncertainty 2 
Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about the logic error in command messages 
1: Track Sensors 
1a: Decide 
Monitoring 
Technique – 
What shall we 
track? 
Q1. What are the monitoring techniques needed to track the epistemic 
uncertainties? 
• Interfaces between BSCU and other WBS components such as Interface 
Control Document (ICD) 
• Separate manpower (communication engineers) are needed to conduct the 
investigation. 
Q2. Why are the monitoring techniques able to meet the goal of managing the 
uncertainty condition? 
• Having the interfaces and ICD will allow the engineers to investigate the 
command messages that are passed between the BSCU and the other WBS 
components. This is needed to sieve out any potential unintended logic 
error in the command messages that are communicated between the 
components during operations.     
1b: Form 
Monitoring 
Activity – 
How do we 
track? 
Q3. What types of monitoring activity are to be taken? 
• Investigate the communication messages that are transmitted between the 
BSCU and the other WBS components, check if there are any scenarios 
where correct messages are transmitted based on the technical 
specifications but the messages lead to unintended WBS operation. 
Q4. When should these monitoring activities be collected from the techniques? 
• Can be a paper study by reviewing the ICD and interface documentation. 
• Unsure if actual test on the physical system is necessary to validate the 
design performance. This will incur more resources and expertise. 
Q5. Who are responsible to do the tracking? 
• Communication engineers need to be assigned to capture and analyse the 
command messages.  
Q6. What are the structures and supporting resources to put in place for the 
tracking? 
• A structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to 
be in place to ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis.  
• Regular update to be presented at the weekly safety meeting. 
Q7. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to do the tracking? 
• Require communication engineers that are competent in analysing 
electronics signals in WBS operation.  
2: Address Responses 
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Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about the logic error in command messages 
2a: Set 
Trigger Points 
– When and 
how shall we 
decide to 
respond? 
Q8: What are the trigger points from the monitoring activity that require 
proactive response? 
• Discovery of command message that has a logic error.  
• Discovery of command message that affect the safety of WBS operation. 
Q9. Who are responsible to decide on the respond actions? 
Management safety committee 
Q10. What are the governance and supporting structure to put in place to make 
the decision?  
• Results and observations to be presented in the weekly safety meeting. 
• If trigger points are met, communication engineers should escalate result 
directly to the management via incident report. 
Q11. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to make the decision? 
• Knowledge about communication engineering 
• Knowledge about WBS operation. 
• Having the access to higher management that has the authority to review 
WBS operation.  
2b: Adapt to 
Change – 
What are the 
possible 
responses? 
Q12. Who is responsible to review the changes that will be put in place? 
• Project manager, together with communication engineers.  
Q13. How prepared and responsive should the system be in addressing the 
uncertainty? 
• If no data is observed within a month, project manager needs to decide on 
different action plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. 
• Depends on the findings regarding the interfaces, project manager needs to 
decide on the urgency to escalate the issue to higher management.  
Q14. What are the structure and support resources to put in place to address the 
uncertainty? 
Process to escalate safety concerns will follow the existing safety report 
channels.  
Incident report to be submitted when trigger points are met. 
Potentially a review of the software-hardware interface components may be 
needed depending on the investigation. 
Q15. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to address the 
uncertainty? 
Knowledge about communication engineering.  
Using the guide, we have developed the following track and address action plan: 
Track Portion of the Action Plan. Tracking the uncertainty involves investigating the 
interfaces between the BSC and other WBS components, such as the Interface Control 
Document (ICD). This is because having the ICD will allow the engineers to investigate the 
command messages that are passed between the BSCU and the other WBS components. This 
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is needed to sieve out any potential unintended logic error in the command messages that are 
communicated between the components during operations. 
To do that, dedicated communication engineers are needed to conduct the investigation. The 
communication engineers should be competent in analysing electronic signals in WBS 
operation. 
The communication engineers are responsible to investigate the communication messages that 
are transmitted between the BSCU and the other WBS components, check if there are any 
scenarios where correct messages are transmitted based on the technical specifications but the 
messages lead to unintended WBS operation. This can be a paper study by reviewing the ICD 
and interface documentation. It is unsure if actual test on the physical system is necessary to 
validate the design performance. This will incur more resources and expertise.  
A structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to be in place to 
ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis. Regular update is expected at the 
weekly safety meeting. 
Address Portion of the Action Plan. The uncertainty will trigger a response when there is a 
discovery of command message that either has logic error or affect the safety of the WBS 
operation. 
The management safety committee shall be responsible to decide on the respond actions. When 
trigger points are met, the communication engineers shall escalate result directly to the 
management via incident report. 
A review committee that includes project manager and communication engineers shall be 
responsible to review any changes that will be put in place to address the uncertainty. The 
review committee should have knowledge about communication engineering and WBS 
operation. It should also have accessed to higher management that has the authority to review 
WBS operation.  
If no data is observed within a month, the project manager needs to decide on a different action 
plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. Depends on the findings regarding the 
software modules, the project manager needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue to 
higher management. There may potentially be a review of the software-hardware interface 
components depending on the investigation.  
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Annex H – Chapter 6 FMES-TAG: Prioritisation of 
Observations 3 
The epistemic uncertainty is about the mechanical fault at the control valves between the 
BSCU and the hydraulic pumps. The answers to the guided questions from the T.A.G. 
approach user guide is shown in Table 56. 
Table 56. Answers to Guided Questions for Uncertainty Observation 3 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
May not be often as a valve typically should be reliable. Need more 
information about the failure rate of the control valve 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
A failure in the mechanical valve can lead to catastrophic failure to the break 
system. 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
No safety causal model involved. 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
System model of the control valves is needed 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
Since the team is mostly electrical engineers, additional knowledge is needed 
to appreciate mechanical models and theories. 
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
No safety causal model involved 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
Mechanical models about the control valves should be available  
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
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Factors Questions 
Mechanical model types about the control valves should not be new concept. 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
There should be maintenance engineers with experience about control valves 
Resource: Assess the resource availability related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
Yes, is about gathering the necessary theory and failure modes about the 
control valves. 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
project deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
Yes, there should be sufficient time to find out the information. 
From the answers to the guided questions, we assess the criticality, complexity, novelty, and 
resource availability of managing the epistemic uncertainty 
about the mechanical fault at the control valves between the 
BSCU and the hydraulic pumps. The expected effort is 
calculated from the average score of complexity, novelty 
and resource availability. Based on criticality and expected 
effort, we plotted the uncertainty action on the prioritisation 
matrix chart (see Figure 96). 
 
Figure 96 Uncertainty Observation 1 Plotted on Prioritisation Matrix Chart 
We indicate on the top right quadrant the point that corresponds to the score of 0.8 criticality 
and 0.6 expected effort. For this quadrant, stakeholders should consider putting in resources 
to manage this uncertainty since it is critical and the expected effort is high. 
 
 
Factors Score 
Criticality  0.8 
Complexity 0.8 
Novelty 0.4 
Resource 0.6 
Expected effort 0.6 
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Annex I – Chapter 6 FMES-TAG: Action Plan of 
Observation 3 
The action plan is formulated by answering a series of questions using the T.A.G. approach 
user guide. The details are reproduced here in Table 57. 
Table 57. Guide to Develop Action Plan for Uncertainty 3 
Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about the mechanical faults at control valves 
1: Track Sensors 
1a: Decide 
Monitoring 
Technique – 
What shall we 
track? 
Q1. What are the monitoring techniques needed to track the epistemic 
uncertainties? 
• Physical interfaces and joints at the control valves that receive the 
electrical signal from the BSCU. 
• Separate manpower (mechanical engineers) are needed to conduct the 
investigation. 
Q2. Why are the monitoring techniques able to meet the goal of managing the 
uncertainty condition? 
• These physical interfaces represent the location where electrical signals are 
transmitted between the BSCU and the control valves to control the valve 
operation. Mechanical faults such as dry or sticky joints may result in 
signal corruption.   
1b: Form 
Monitoring 
Activity – 
How do we 
track? 
Q3. What types of monitoring activity are to be taken? 
• Investigate the mechanical contacts where the BSCU signals reach the 
control valves, check on the reliability and failure rate of these mechanical 
contacts. 
Q4. When should these monitoring activities be collected from the techniques? 
• Can be a paper study by reviewing the specification of the mechanical 
contacts. 
• Unsure if lab test or additional contractor test result/specification is needed 
to verify the design performance of the mechanical contacts. This will 
incur more resources and expertise. 
Q5. Who are responsible to do the tracking? 
• Mechanical engineers need to be assigned to analyse the mechanical 
performance.  
Q6. What are the structures and supporting resources to put in place for the 
tracking? 
• A structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to 
be in place to ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis.  
• Regular update to be presented at the weekly safety meeting. 
Q7. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to do the tracking? 
• Require mechanical engineers that are competent in analysing physical and 
mechanical properties of WBS operation.  
2: Address Responses 
  
286 
Target Uncertainty: Uncertainty about the mechanical faults at control valves 
2a: Set 
Trigger Points 
– When and 
how shall we 
decide to 
respond? 
Q8: What are the trigger points from the monitoring activity that require 
proactive response? 
• Discovery of mechanical conditions that can potentially compromise the 
electrical signal between the BSCU and the control valves and lead to 
signal corruption.  
• Discovery of specific control valves that may be subjected to the above 
mechanical condition that can cause mechanical faults and lead to signal 
corruption.   
Q9. Who are responsible to decide on the respond actions? 
• Management safety committee 
Q10. What are the governance and supporting structure to put in place to make 
the decision?  
• Results and observations to be presented in the weekly safety meeting. 
• If trigger points are met, mechanical engineers should escalate result 
directly to the management via incident report. 
Q11. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to make the decision? 
• Knowledge about mechanical engineering 
• Knowledge about WBS operation. 
• Having the access to higher management that has the authority to review 
WBS operation.  
2b: Adapt to 
Change – 
What are the 
possible 
responses? 
Q12. Who is responsible to review the changes that will be put in place? 
• Project manager, together with mechanical engineers.  
Q13. How prepared and responsive should the system be in addressing the 
uncertainty? 
• If no data is observed within a month, project manager needs to decide on 
different action plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. 
• Depends on the findings regarding the mechanical contacts, project 
manager needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue to higher 
management.  
Q14. What are the structure and support resources to put in place to address the 
uncertainty? 
• Process to escalate safety concerns will follow the existing safety report 
channels.  
• Incident report to be submitted when trigger points are met. 
• Potentially a review of the mechanical properties of the control valve may 
be needed depending on the investigation. 
Q15. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to address the 
uncertainty? 
• Knowledge about mechanical engineering.  
Using the guide, we have developed the following track and address action plan: 
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Track Portion of the Action Plan. Tracking the uncertainty involves investigating the 
physical interfaces and joints at the control valves that receive the electrical signal from the 
BSCU. This is because these physical interfaces represent the location where electrical signals 
are transmitted between the BSCU and the control valves to control the valve operation. 
Mechanical faults such as dry or sticky joints may result in signal corruption.   
To do that, dedicated mechanical engineers are needed to conduct the investigation. The 
communication engineers should be competent in analysing physical and mechanical 
properties of WBS operation  
The communication engineers are responsible to investigate the mechanical contacts where 
the BSCU signals reach the control valves, check on the reliability and failure rate of these 
mechanical contacts. This can be a paper study by reviewing the specification of the 
mechanical contacts. It is unsure if lab test or additional contractor test result/specification is 
needed to verify the design performance of the mechanical contacts. This will incur more 
resources and expertise.  
A structured management oversight appointed by the management needs to be in place to 
ensure data is feedback to the safety team for analysis. Regular update is expected at the 
weekly safety meeting. 
Address Portion of the Action Plan. The uncertainty will trigger a response when there is a 
discovery of mechanical conditions that can potentially compromise the electrical signal 
between the BSCU and the control valves and lead to signal corruption. Discovery of specific 
control valves that may be subjected to the above mechanical condition will also trigger a 
response from the investigation team.   
The management safety committee shall be responsible to decide on the respond actions. When 
trigger points are met, the mechanical engineers shall escalate result directly to the 
management via incident report. 
A review committee that includes project manager and mechanical engineers shall be 
responsible to review any changes that will be put in place to address the uncertainty. The 
review committee should have knowledge about mechanical engineering and WBS operation. 
It should also have accessed to higher management that has the authority to review WBS 
operation.  
If no data is observed within a month, the project manager needs to decide on a different action 
plan if the uncertainty is potentially still safety-critical. Depends on the findings regarding the 
mechanical contacts, the project manager needs to decide on the urgency to escalate the issue 
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to higher management. There may potentially be a review of the mechanical properties of the 
control valve depending on the investigation.
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Annex J – Evaluation Questionnaire  
1. Name: 
2. Job Responsibility: 
3. Can you please rate your level of experience in safety assessments?  
Beginner  1  2  3  4  5  Expert   (     ] 
 
For the following questions, rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statements. 
 
With reference to the safety assessments that you have been involved in … 
4. “In my experience, almost all the information that is needed for safety assessment is available at 
the point in time of conducting the analysis.” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
5. “Epistemic uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty due to the lack of information) has significantly affected 
the trust that I am able to place in safety assessment results.” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
6. “Epistemic uncertainties in existing safety assessment are well managed and we are able to prevent 
them from leading to any hazardous situations.” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
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HOT-PIE Taxonomy 
In Step 1 of the T.A.G. approach, the HOT-PIE taxonomy is established to recognise known and 
unknown uncertainties not covered in the original safety assessment.  
With reference to the HOT-PIE taxonomy … 
7.  “With the artefacts and resources available, the taxonomy can augment existing safety 
assessment.” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
8. “The taxonomy will help me identify epistemic uncertainties that otherwise be easily overlooked if 
not prompted” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
9. “The amount of effort required to incorporate the taxonomy is worth it given the benefits, 
considering the resources and limitation of the safety assessments that I have been involved in” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
10. I have the following comments to support my views regarding the taxonomy: 
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Prioritisation Factors 
In Step 2 of the T.A.G. approach, prioritisation factors are established to prioritise uncertainty 
analyses in existing safety assessment.  
With reference to the prioritisation factors … 
11.  “After identifying the epistemic uncertainties that are present in the safety assessment, it is 
important to prioritise them for further investigations in existing safety assessments that I have been 
involved in.” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
12. “The prioritisation factors help me to focus on epistemic uncertainties that are more important” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
13. “The amount of effort required to incorporate the prioritisation is worth it given the benefits, 
considering the resources and limitation of the safety assessments that I have been involved in” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
14. I have the following comments to support my views regarding the prioritisation factors: 
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Action Plan 
In Step 3 of the T.A.G. approach, an action plan is established using guided questions to develop 
goals to track and address epistemic uncertainties through-life in anticipation that the 
uncertainties may change with time.  
With reference to the guided questions…  
15. “The guided questions will help me to formulate an action plan to track and address epistemic 
uncertainties in safety assessment through-life” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
16. “It is feasible to prepare an action plan like this with the help of the guided questions as part of 
safety assessment” 
Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  Agree   (     ] 
 
17. I have the following comments to support my views regarding the action plan: 
 
 
 
 
18. I have the following further comments about the T.A.G. approach: 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the interview. 
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Annex K – T.A.G. Approach Users Guide 
Generic Process of Tagging Uncertainties 
 
 
Figure 97. Process Flow to Integrate T.A.G. Approach in Safety Assessment 
 
Step 1 (S1): Perform Risk Analysis. The usual risk analysis per existing safety assessment 
technique. In addition, T.A.G. approach is integrated here by inserting the following sub steps: 
Step 1a (S1a): Identify Epistemic Uncertainty. This is Step 1 of the T.A.G. 
approach. Stakeholders can use the HOT-PIE taxonomy as a reference to identify both 
known and unknown epistemic uncertainties. Stakeholders can also make use of the 
CMSS and CRMSA models to help in finding uncertainties in the safety causal 
models, system models and the model types in the safety assessment. 
Step 1b (S1b): Document Epistemic Uncertainty.  This is part of Step 2 of the 
T.A.G. approach. Any epistemic uncertainty that has been recognised, regardless if it 
is assessed to be safety critical, should be tagged and stored in a T.A.G. database. This 
database is needed in the next step for prioritisation.  
Step 1c (S1c): Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses. The T.A.G. database will document 
causal relationships with epistemic uncertainties that may potentially be safety critical. 
We refer to them as plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships. Stakeholders are not 
able to commit if such plausible-but-uncertain causal relationships are safety critical 
due to a lack of information at the point of conducting the risk analysis. They would 
also have to assess if the risk is at least tolerable for these uncertainties to be tracked 
further.  Due to potential lack of resources, stakeholders may need to prioritise these 
uncertainties for further tracking.  
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Step 2 (S2): Generate Safety Artefacts. Besides generating safety artefacts from safety 
analyses (e.g. list of hazards, risk mitigation plans, outstanding action items and residual risk 
report), there will also be a database of prioritised uncertainties to be analysed from the T.A.G 
database. All this information should be integrated into the same existing reporting channel 
and transferred to the system engineering process in the next step.    
Step 3 (S3): Integrate with System Engineering Process. Besides the usual course of actions 
due to the risk analysis, the T.A.G. approach would also generate action plans to track and 
address epistemic uncertainties. The requirements from such action plans would be feedback 
to the system engineering process for further actions.  
T.A.G. Approach Step 1: Identify Uncertainties using HOT-PIE taxonomy 
In step 1 of the T.A.G. approach (see Figure 98), we develop a taxonomy of causal mechanisms 
(see Table 58) to help users identify plausible uncertainties during safety assessment. 
 
Figure 98. T.A.G. Approach First Step: Identify Target 
 
Table 58. The HOT-PIE Taxonomy of Causal Mechanisms 
Primary Causal 
Conditions 
Secondary Causal  
Conditions 
Human H1: Manpower – expertise[154-156] staffing[146, 154, 156-160] mix[158] 
ownership[154] experience[154, 158] leadership[142, 146] skill[146, 156, 158, 159, 
161-163] ability[158] characters[164] individualistic[165] demographic[165] 
cultural[165] obligation[166] survivable[158] stakeholders[66, 156, 167-169] 
user[170] turnover[156] education[156]  
H2: Mental state – escalation[142] brokerage[142] free rider[142] convention[142] 
norm[142] selective benefit[142] morale and motivation [142, 156, 158] social[163, 
171] deliberate[161] esteem[166] complacency[146] stress[146] overconfidence[146] 
fatigue[146] distraction[80, 146] confusion[146] health[158] comfort[158] visual 
limitation[146] illness[146] injury[158] disability[158] hearing limitation[146] 
cognitive[158] physical[158, 172] sensory[158] team dynamic[158, 159] 
aptitude[158] emotional[172] psychic[173] conflict of interest[156] lack 
purpose[156] perception[80, 174] memory fail[80] poor mental model[80] incorrect 
mental model[80] reliance on default[80] 
 
H3: Action – operation[155] network[142] broadcast[142] rumour[142] 
communication[146, 154, 156, 159] open[159] interrelation[159] atmosphere[159] 
engagement[173] coordination[146] omission[80, 161] commission[161] extraneous 
act[161] observation[164] interpretation[164] overcommit[166] performance 
slip[175] specification slip[175] lapse-forgot[175] lapse-overlook[175] rest[146] 
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Primary Causal 
Conditions 
Secondary Causal  
Conditions 
preparation[146] intentional violation[159, 163, 176] behaviour[173] lack 
involvement[156] influence[174] 
 
Organisation O1: Management – supervision[142, 146, 155] audit[142] communication[164] 
structure [146, 164, 168, 174, 177] levels of domain[174] role ambiguity and 
conflict[165] schedule[165] demand[166] feedback and refine[146] company[160] 
project size[156] project uniqueness[156] project density[156]  
O2: Policy – regulation and control[142, 160, 167, 174] job future and security[165, 
166], culture and climate[146, 156, 162, 165, 177, 178] reward and recognition[165, 
166] incompatible goals[156, 159, 176] trade-off[159] ambiguous goal[156] narrow 
goal[156] expectation[156] customer satisfaction[170] 
 
O3: Resource – training facility[142, 155, 164, 170, 176] material[154, 155, 162] 
supplier management[142, 156, 169] support facility[146, 156, 161, 170, 172] time 
phase[157, 161] time step[157, 161] project urgency[156] allocation[146] 
monetary[146, 156] instructional[158] unrealistic time frame[156] outsource 
management[156] interdependent infrastructure[163, 170] test equipment[178] test 
procedure[178] 
 
Technology T1: Machine – hardware capability[155, 157, 163, 167, 169, 174, 176, 177] 
hardware compatibility[178] technical[168, 171, 179] equipment [146, 161, 164] 
interface[146, 164] link[163] node[163] display[146] construction[162] 
software[147, 157, 163, 167, 169, 174, 177, 178] communication[147, 170, 176] 
engineering[66] mobility[163] traffic[163] area coverage[163] services[170] 
tool[170] technique[170] abstraction[154] working range[154] tech change[154, 156] 
innovation[154] complexity[146] availability[159] function[159] 
standardisation[159] features[156] customisation[156] interdependency[163]  
T2: Property – energy[157] kinetic[154] biological[154] acoustical[154] 
chemical[154] electrical[154] mechanical[154] electro-magnetic[154] thermal[154] 
radiation[147, 154] bonding[147] buckling[147] change in property[147] 
corrosion[147] cracking[147] deformation[147] fatigue[147] seizure[147] 
impact[147] rupture[147] voiding[147] wear[147, 178] breakdown[147] 
contamination[147] diffusion[147] degradation[147] incorrect current[147] punch 
through[147] leak[178] loose[178] drift[178] synchronisation[178] 
 
T3: Support – system design[162, 176] tool design[165] tool usability[165] work 
area design[165] task design[146, 176] medium[163] 
 
Process P1: Nature – segregation[154] systematic[154] oversight[146, 154] procedure [146, 
154, 157, 159, 161, 162, 164, 167, 176-178] practice[154, 167] overload[80, 165] 
control[157, 165] autonomy[165, 172] repetitiveness[165, 174] feedback[165, 172] 
ability to learn[165] input[157] output[157] lower level failure[163] cascade 
failure[163] delay[163]  
P2: Phase – design and plan[164, 179] validation[154] verification[154] 
manufacturing[66] operation[66] risk management[154, 156, 158, 176] review[154] 
maintenance[159, 176, 178, 179] housekeeping[176] inspection[179] 
supervision[179] work[160, 170, 171, 177] training[159, 161] execution and 
operation[146, 161, 170, 178] mis-operation[161] task[165, 168, 169] sense-
making[170] decision making[170] thinking[170] 
 
Information I1: Knowledge – procedure[155] standard[155] method[155] assumption[161] 
policy[146, 169] rule[162, 167] guideline[157] precondition[157] type of info[164] 
manual and checklist[146] protocol[159, 163] roles and responsibilities[156] best 
practice[156] data[156] concept[156] no fault found[178] rationalities[174] 
evidence[174] values[174] fluctuation[174] customer requirements[170] codified 
information[170]  
I2: Error – application error[175] assumption error[175] syntax error[175] 
requirement error[175] lack of distinction[175] lack of awareness[175] insufficient 
knowledge[175] situational awareness error[159] incomplete specification[156] 
conflicting requirements[156] info processing problem[156, 170] data 
unavailable[80] data not detected[80] decisional error[174] executional error[174] 
 
Environment E1: Physical – transport network[142] ambient condition[161, 164] weather[146, 
161] orientation[161] size[161] location[161] elevation[161] operating 
condition[158, 164] noise[146, 165] lighting[146, 165] vibration[146, 165] 
pollution[165] heat[146] terrestrial[163] meteorological[163] cosmological[163] 
E2: Non-physical – cultural[155, 170, 177] social[167] attitude[155] economic[142, 
156, 163, 167, 177] competitiveness[170] political[142, 156, 163, 167, 169, 177] 
regulatory[170, 177] legal[156, 167] contract[142] propaganda[142] duration[161] 
delayed[161] alternative[166] strategic interest[166] government[160] 
complexity[156] security[163] 
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Note: The referenced materials explaining each casual mechanism are listed in the reference. 
 
T.A.G. Approach Step 2: Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses 
In step 2 of the T.A.G. approach (see Figure 99), we develop a questionnaire and prioritisation 
factors to help users document the way they prioritise uncertainties to be analysed (see Table 
59). 
 
Figure 99. T.A.G. Approach Second Step: Document Analysis 
 
Instructions to prioritise uncertainty analyses: 
1. Identify the uncertainty in the targeted causal relationship. 
2. Using the help of the questionnaire, analyse the criticality of the target based on the 
guided questions (see Table 59). Score the criticality from 0 (low criticality) to 1 (high 
criticality). 
3. Analyse the complexity of the target based on the guided questions. Score the 
complexity from 0 (low complexity) to 1 (high complexity). 
4. Analyse the novelty of the target based on the guided questions. Score the novelty 
from 0 (low novelty) to 1 (high novelty). 
5. Analyse the resource availability of the target based on the guided questions. Score 
the resource availability from 0 (high resource availability) to 1 (low resource 
availability).  
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6. Calculate the overall expected effort by average out the sum of the three scores under 
complexity, novelty and resource availability (assuming the factors have equal 
weightage). 
7. Locate the quadrant on the prioritisation matrix that corresponds to the score for 
criticality and expected effort (see Table 60). Prioritise based on the location on the 
matrix. 
 
Table 59. Guided Questions to Prioritise Uncertainty Analyses  
Target Uncertainty to be analysed: < Describe the targeted uncertainty here > 
 
Factors Questions 
Criticality: Assess the criticality of the target to affect system safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Probability Q1. How likely will this target cause harm to the system? 
 Severity Q2. How serious are the consequences if this target occurs? 
Complexity: Assess the complexity of the system related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Causal Model  Q3. How complex are the safety causal models from where the target is 
identified? (e.g. no. of related causal conditions, hazard interdependency, 
residual risk interdependency) 
 System Model  Q4: How complex are the system models from where target is identified? (e.g. 
system structure / product size / product design, process / task interdependency, 
process design, technology interdependency, project management difficulties) 
 Model Type Q5: How complex are the model types from where target is identified? (e.g. 
reach and depth of patterns, templates and conventions used by the safety and 
system models)  
Novelty: Assess the novelty of knowledge related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Safety Novelty Q6: How much of past information was used to define the safety causal model 
from where the target is identified? (e.g. causal factors, hazard list) 
 System Novelty Q7: How much of past information was used to define the system model from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. system legacy, process, technology, 
objective) 
 Model Type Novelty Q8: How much of past information was used to define the model type from 
where the target is identified? (e.g. patterns, templates, conventions) 
 Experience Q9: Are there other prior experiences related to the target? 
Resource : Assess the resource availability related to the target from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 Capability Q10: Do we have the capability to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. 
manpower, skills, infrastructure and support, environment, other resources) 
 Urgency  Q11: Do we have the time required to learn the knowledge needed? (e.g. project 
deadline, lifecycle milestones) 
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Table 60. Prioritisation Table for Uncertainty Action 
Quadrant Criticality Expected Effort 
A Low  Low 
B Low High 
C High Low 
D High High 
 
 
As an example, users may decide to prioritise the uncertainty analyses based first on the 
criticality of the uncertainties and secondly by the amount of efforts needed (see Figure 100). 
With this strategy, user would decide to put high priorities to analyses in quadrants A and B, 
rather than C and D. Take note that this is but one of the many ways that users can prioritise 
the uncertainty analyses. The final choice of where to focus on depends on the context facing 
the users during the analysis. 
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Figure 100 An Example of Prioritisation for Uncertainty Analysis  
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T.A.G. Approach Step 3: Set Goals for Action Plan to Track and Address Uncertainties 
In step 3 of the T.A.G. approach (see Figure 101), we develop a questionnaire (see Table 61) 
to help users set goals in the action plan to track the uncertainty through-life and address the 
uncertainty when some thresholds are met. 
  
Figure 101. T.A.G. Approach Third Step: Track and Address Goal 
 
Table 61. Guide to Set Goals in Action Plan 
Target Uncertainty: < Describe the targeted 
uncertainty here > 
Guided Questions to set Goals for Action Plan 
1: Track 
Sensors 
1a: Decide Monitoring 
Technique – What shall we 
track? 
Q1. What are the monitoring techniques needed to track the 
epistemic uncertainties? 
Q2. Why are the monitoring techniques able to meet the goal 
of managing the uncertainty condition? 
 1b: Form Monitoring Activity – 
How do we track? 
Q3. What types of monitoring activity are to be taken? 
Q4. When should these monitoring activities be collected 
from the techniques? 
Q5. Who are responsible to do the tracking? 
Q6. What are the structures and supporting resources to put in 
place for the tracking? 
Q7. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to 
do the tracking? 
2: Address 
Responses 
2a: Set Trigger Points – When 
and how shall we decide to 
respond? 
Q8: What are the trigger points from the monitoring activity 
that require proactive response? 
Q9. Who are responsible to decide on the respond actions? 
Q10. What are the governance and supporting structure to put 
in place to make the decision?  
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Target Uncertainty: < Describe the targeted 
uncertainty here > 
Guided Questions to set Goals for Action Plan 
Q11. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to 
make the decision? 
 2b: Adapt to Change – What are 
the possible responses? 
Q12. Who is responsible to review the changes that will be 
put in place? 
Q13. How prepared and responsive should the system be in 
addressing the uncertainty? 
Q14. What are the structure and support resources to put in 
place to address the uncertainty? 
Q15. What are the skills, experiences and attitudes needed to 
address the uncertainty? 
Note: A sample of considerations for the track and address plan is provided in the reference. 
The following is a process flow (see Figure 102) to guide user during the follow-up actions to 
address the epistemic uncertainty. Note that the greater the epistemic uncertainties surround a 
risk analysis, the lower the confidence in the analysis.  
 
Figure 102. Possible Outcomes when Addressing the Uncertainty 
When being triggered to address the uncertainty, stakeholders would conduct a risk analysis 
to assess the risk that is still facing the system, as well as the assessing the confidence in the 
analysis. At this moment, stakeholders would have to decide if the risk is confidently within 
the tolerable or acceptable region. If it is not, a decision would have to be made to either focus 
on managing the risk or clarifying the uncertainty.  
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Referenced Models 
 
Figure 103 Conceptual Model of System Safety (CMSS) 
Conceptual Model of System Safety (CMSS).  The CMSS comprises three types of elements: 
system, safety and uncertainty elements, as shown in Figure 103. The CMSS represents 
important relationships between system and safety-related elements. This is adopted from the 
IEEE 42010 standard that describe an architectural description for system elements. The 
original standard has been modified to better represent the influence of safety elements and 
the associated epistemic uncertainties.  
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Figure 104 Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA) 
Causal Relationship Model of Safety Assessment (CRMSA).  The CRMSA can be used to 
represent the causal relationships during safety assessment when identifying epistemic 
uncertainties (see Figure 104).  
Safety assessment is carried out with the aim of identifying causal relationships that could be 
hazardous. The CRMSA shows the causal conditions in a causal relationship when identifying 
hazards. Examples of causal conditions in the safety domain include cause, effect, hazard and 
accident. A system element can have one or more causal conditions. A causal condition can 
exhibit causal relationship with potentially many other conditions. The causal mechanism 
provides the narrative or context of how causal conditions can influence each other. An 
example of a CRMSA is shown in Figure 105.  
 
Figure 105 Illustration of CRMSA 
 
 
Literature Referenced in the HOT-PIE Taxonomy (same as Annex A) 
Sampled Track and Address Considerations (same as Annex B) 
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Glossary 
Term Definition 
Aleatory Uncertainty Uncertainty that is due to the random nature of the subject of 
interest [10] 
Assumption A clearly stated but insufficiently supported proposition that 
is expected to be true [133] 
Causal Condition An abstraction for capturing some ‘state of affairs’ – event 
or state, in the system or its environment. Example of safety 
conditions include hazards, failure modes and faults [21] 
Causal Mechanism A phenomenon that provides the mechanism for a causal 
relationship, that may either be known or unknown [142, 
143] 
Causal Relationship An associated pair of a cause condition that leads to an effect 
condition [21] 
Confidence Degree of trust one can have in the truth of a position [8]  
Epistemic Uncertainty Uncertainty that is due to a lack of knowledge [10] 
Harm Death, physical injury or damage to the health of people, or 
damage to property or the environment [63, 64] 
Hazard A situation with the potential to cause harm [63, 64] 
Incompleteness The state of not having all the necessary parts [190] 
Information Systematically organised data [26] 
Knowledge Actionable information being used in the context of a system 
being investigated [26] 
Model Abstraction of the real world for the purpose of analysis 
(section 3.2.1.1) 
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Risk Combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of 
that harm [63, 64] 
Risk Assessment 
Uncertainty (ra-
uncertainty) 
Uncertainty associated with risk assessment (section 1.2.3) 
Risk Assessment Models 
Uncertainty (ram-
uncertainty) 
A type of ra-uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge 
associated with the models that are used to predict safety risk 
(section 1.2.3) 
Safe Freedom from unacceptable or intolerable levels of harm [63, 
64]  
Safety Assessment The processes and techniques to conduct safety analysis 
(section 2.2) 
Safety Assurance Degree of confidence over the results obtained from the 
safety assessment (section 2.2) 
Safety-Critical System A system whose failure or malfunction may result in one (or 
more) outcomes that cause harm [76] 
System View A representation (or model) of one or more aspects of a 
system that illustrates how the system addresses one or more 
concerns held by one or more of its stakeholders [20] 
System Viewpoint A collection of patterns, templates, and conventions for 
constructing one type of view [20] 
Taxonomy A system for naming and organizing things into groups that 
share similar qualities [191] 
Uncertainty A situation where something is not known [10] 
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